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In 2008, the Indonesian government introduced the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ to develop an 
efficient, competitive and responsive port system that supported trade and promoted economic 
growth. This law was designed to remove the legislated monopoly power of the Indonesian 
Port Corporations (Pelindos) and separate the role of ‘operator’ and ‘regulator’. Private 
companies were issued with port business licenses to operate and manage ports, leading to a 
shift in the governance model from the traditional ‘public ownership model’ to the ‘landlord 
model’. It has been almost a decade since this law was passed in Indonesia. However, there has 
been very little analysis undertaken to assess if these reforms brought about an improvement 
in port performance. This research aims to contribute to the literature by providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the port governance framework in Indonesia and how it has evolved 
since the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ came into place. The research includes case studies of the Ports 
of Tanjung Priok in Jakarta and Tanjung Emas in Semarang. 
The methodology involved in evaluating port reform is a mixed methods approach (Rao and 
Woolcock 2003; Rao et al. 2003). This approach provides a broader analysis of the Indonesian 
port reform while offsetting the weakness inherent in using only one approach. In the case of 
Indonesia, this methodology was useful especially as data was not readily available at the port 
level. The quantitative results based on both financial and non-financial indicators, show that 
port performance at both the Port of Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Emas has improved since 
2008. However, it is difficult to argue that the improvement in port performance was only 
because of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ and not other factors such as increasing cargo volumes 
that also affected performance. In order to improve understanding of the determinants of 
performance, a qualitative analysis is undertaken using the ‘Matching Framework’ (Brooks 
and Balthazar 2001). This framework provides a qualitative analysis suggesting that the 
political environment in Indonesia needs to provide more certainty to achieve the outcome of 
an ‘efficiency oriented configuration’ and to realise the gains from port reform. Also, the 
separation of the ‘operator’ and ‘regulator’ roles, has not worked well in practice. The results 
suggest that path dependency and the legacy of colonisation plays a critical role in explaining 
the trajectory of port reform in Indonesia as legal reform has not always been able to bring 
about institutional reform. Although the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ was the trigger for the beginning 
of a reform process, the results suggest that more needs to be done to implement them and 
realise their full potential. This includes the need for further policy changes to bring about a 
conducive environment for economic growth and a more flexible approach to private sector 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
“On the Continent, they regard a port as a gateway for the country’s trade, and the 
wider open the gate, and the smoother the road, the greater, they consider, will be 
the trade gain to the country.” (Owen, 1914, p. 17 cited in Heaver 2006) 
 
1.0 Background and Context of Study 
Ports have long played a critical role in facilitating trade to boost economic growth in nations. 
They have developed an important relationship with their hinterlands through the development 
of industrial activity, population centres and markets. The traditional definition of a seaport by 
Goss (1990a, p.208) is that of “a gateway through which goods and passengers are transferred 
between ships and the shore”. However, this definition has evolved with seaports today 
becoming critical facilitators in logistics processes and supply chains within global production 
networks that have to constantly adapt to technological change, institutional reforms and 
competition in the maritime industry (Wilmsmeier and Monios 2016).  
 
Trade in the past had always been limited to prized commodities such as silk, gold, silver and 
spices because of high transport costs involved from trading over distant lands along the ancient 
silk route (Bernstein 2008). At other times, trade took place with goods such as sugar, tobacco 
or spices which could not be produced locally. However, globalization and containerization 
changed this by allowing manufacturers to reach markets through lower transportation costs. 
Globalisation brought about greater inter connectivity in economies through travel, internet 
and improved communications while containerization paved the way for an efficient freight 
transportation system that blurred the boundaries between global and domestic economies that 




Until the 1960s, Broeze (2002) argues that cargo had always been carried as individual pieces 
that were packed in boxes, crates and packages for liner shipping. However, this was 
revolutionised with containerisation which reduced the loading time for ships and improved 
port productivity. This also reduced losses and pilferage and made it possible to transport the 
same container from ship via rail or road to the end customer. Stopford (1997) argues that trade 
flourished until two severe recessions in the 1970s and 1980s when growth in Western Europe 
and Japan stagnated. However, countries in Asia such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong 
and Singapore were rapidly emerging as newly industrialised economies. As these countries 
transitioned between their different stages of development and become wealthier, their demand 
for goods increased, corresponding to an increase in seaborne trade (Broeze 2002). From the 
1980s, China’s economic growth started to take off gradually as it introduced the ‘Open Door 
Policy’ of President Deng Xiaoping in 1978. This resulted in a series of reforms that transferred 
power from the central to the local government and had an impact on the economy and sea port 
governance (Notteboom and Yang 2017).  
 
Hong Kong was the main gateway to ports in China and Taiwan in the late 1980s when China’s 
container seaport system was in its infancy. As China industrialised, the nation’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth averaged between 12 to 14 per cent from the late 1980s to 
2008 (Notteboom and Yang 2017). This rapid growth has been due to strong growth in exports 
that included mechanical and electrical products, high tech products, clothing, textiles and 
footwear. At the same time, China accounted for nearly 78 per cent of iron ore imports making 
it the largest steel producer in the world compared with 10 per cent and 9 per cent for Japan 
and Europe respectively. After a gradual slowdown to 10 per cent in 2010, growth has averaged 
between 6 to 7 per cent (Notteboom and Yang 2017).  
3 
 
Notteboom et al. (2017) showed that worldwide container port throughput has increased from 
88 million Twenty Equivalent Units (TEUs) in 1990 to 691 million TEUs in 2016. 
Approximately half of this throughput is handled by the 20 largest container ports. This growth 
in trade is being driven by emerging markets such as China that produce a large share of 
manufacturing output and import large amounts of natural resources and intermediate goods. 
India also has the potential of dramatically increasing global trade as it develops (McKinsey 
and Co. 2017). This increasing demand is constantly being met by increasing vessel size. In 
1995, the average size of a container vessel was 4,250 TEUs while in 2017 it is not uncommon 
to see vessels of 20,000 TEUs. Likewise, break bulk cargo has also seen significant increases 
in trade over the same period of time.  The large vessels enable shipping lines to benefit from 
economies of scale by integrating with international maritime logistics chains but also place 
constant pressure on terminal operators and port authorities to further invest in infrastructure. 
 
This ever changing global trade landscape has forced port authorities to re-evaluate their 
governance approach as part of their efforts to ensure that they remain competitive. 
Historically, most port authorities were owned by government. Although some ports remained 
public utilities, others were forced to compete for trade, resulting in port rivalry. In the process 
of becoming more competitive and reducing costs, port authorities began to outsource functions 
or were corporatized or privatised. The 1980s witnessed the privatisation of British ports which 
led the process of devolution for port governance. Since then, there has been a shift towards 
various forms of devolution including commercialisation, decentralisation and privatisation in 
various ports around the world (Brooks and Pallis 2008). This has led to research into 
evaluating port reform. Brooks et al. (2017) summarises a selection of port reform studies that 
have taken place in countries globally. Some of these reforms in port governance have been 
successful and others not as successful.  
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However, Pilcher and Tseng (2017) caution that there are challenges that need to be navigated 
when evaluating port reform. Much of the research on port reform tends to only measure if the 
process has been successful or not. However, as ports evolve from their traditional role, this 
can add more complexity to the analysis.  A first step is to clarify the meaning of key terms 
such as ‘port governance’. Pilcher and Tseng (2017) argue that the definition of port 
governance could refer to various elements other than ownership and control of port operations 
and these definitions can change over time. Likewise, port governance could also incorporate 
‘corporate governance’.   
 
Brooks (2016,p.129) argues that the term ‘governance’ as defined by free market 
economists refers to ‘… the adoption and enforcement of rules governing conduct and 
property rights’ and its application is not limited to corporations. However, Brooks (2016) 
highlights that this term usually is confused with the term ‘government’. With reference to 
ports, Brooks (2016) defines ‘port governance’ as the ‘legislative and regulatory rules 
imposed by government on a port’. This definition is extended to include the processes and 
structures that are chosen when such policies come into play. Distinguishing between port 
and corporate governance, Brooks (2016) argues that the definition of ‘corporate 
governance’ requires the port to have an obligation to serve the objectives of the 
corporation’s shareholders which include employees, customers and local community. As 
the port’s ownership shifts completely towards a private model, the concerns of community 
stakeholders can become secondary to concerns to improve profits.  
 
Wilmsmeier and Monios (2016a, p.39) define governance as ‘the institutions, mechanisms and 
processes through which economic, political and administrative authority is exercised.’ Their 
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definition includes the role of private actors and society in designing policy. On the contrary, 
De Langen (2006) makes a distinction between ‘port authority governance’ and ‘port 
governance’ with the former seen to be linked with ‘corporate governance issues, such as 
shareholder influence, structure of the board of governors and corporate social responsibility’ 
while the latter is related to ‘cluster governance since a port consists of a variety of actors’. 
Therefore, Pilcher and Tseng (2017) argue that a key challenge in evaluating port governance 
stems from the ambiguity in the number of definitions provided which can change with time 
and other factors. Although there is a lot of overlap on the definition of port governance, the 
definition of port governance in the thesis will refer to the definition provided by Wilmsmeier 
and Monios (2016a, p.39) 
 
Other challenges in evaluating port reform could be the various stages and elements of 
devolution, including commercialisation and privatisation. Data availability is another 
challenge for research in this area of port reform. Therefore, Brooks and Pallis (2008) argue 
that relying on one methodology to evaluate port governance reform would mean that the 
outcome may be skewed and limited. Also, there could also be other factors driving port 
performance besides the port reform process. Pilcher and Tseng (2017) argue that the reform 
process in a country also needs to take into consideration what measures governments in other 
countries have undertaken or whether their own practices have been successful.  
 
Debrie et. al. (2013) argues that an evolutionary analysis is important when assessing port 
reform. This is because ports are institutional structures that have been shaped or constructed 
by a set of formal or informal rules which could make them more resistant to changing their 
trajectory. For instance, some neo classical economists are of the view that because agents are 
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assumed to be rational, institutions will converge to an equilibrium in which it would not 
benefit anyone to change the rules. These rules include routines, regulation and the institutional 
arrangements such as governance systems and bureaucracies that lock an institution, or ports 
in this case, in their pathway. However, institutional economists reject the notion of rational, 
utility maximising agents. They argue that institutions can change over time due to external 
shocks in their environment such as ‘containerisation’. This can result in stretching, layering 
or displacement in governance structures where port authorities see a need to develop 
capabilities and activities (Notteboom et. al. 2013).  Thus, institutional analysis can provide a 
better understanding of why and how port development can result in success or failure (Pyvis 
and Tull 2017). Although there have been many studies done on port reform in various 
countries, a gap in the literature still exists with limited research undertaken on the port 
governance and reform process in Indonesia.  
 
The Indonesian Economy and Port Governance 
 
Indonesia is an archipelago of approximately 17,500 islands of which 6,000 islands are 
uninhabited. The largest islands are the Kalimantan province of Borneo, Sumatra, Papua, 
Sulawesi and Java (where Jakarta is located). The nation gained independence from the Dutch 
in 1945 and is Southeast Asia’s largest economy. As seen in Table 1.1, Indonesia’s population 
in 2017 was approximately 264 million, with nearly half of the nation’s population located in 
Java and Sumatra where most economic activity takes place (Sandee 2016). Over the last two 
decades, Indonesia has transitioned from a low income country in political, financial and 
economic crisis to a middle income, democratic and stable country that is now a member of 
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the Group of Twenty (G-20) countries (World Bank 2014). The nation’s main exports consist 
of manufactured goods, fuels, food items, agricultural raw material and metals and ore.  
 
 
Table 1.1: Country Statistics 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Real GDP Growth (%) 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 
Inflation Growth (%) 4.3 6.4 6.4 6.4 3.5 3.9 
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.2 6.1 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.4 
Total Population (‘000s) 248,883 252,032 255,131 258,162 261,115 263,991 
Consumer Expenditure 
(USD million) 508,925 509,068 498,626 484,843 528,176 553,050 
Internet Users (‘000s) 32,631 34,017 39,530 51,329 60,009 69,848 
Source: Euromonitor (2018) 
 
 
Indonesia’s GDP per capita has also nearly tripled from US $1,343 in 2005 to US $3,614 in 
2016 (UNCTADSTAT 2017). Indonesia’s economy has seen strong growth accompanied with 
lower unemployment and poverty rates following the aftermath of both the Asian Financial 
Crisis (1998-1999) and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. Since 2012, falling commodity 
prices has led to a slowdown in economic growth leading to increased poverty and income 
disparity increase between Java and the other islands. The gains of economic growth have not 
been felt equally across the nation, leaving many Indonesians in rural areas still vulnerable to 
poverty (World Bank 2014). Figure 1.2 shows the regional disparity prevalent for goods 
shipped between Indonesian islands due to high transportation and logistics cost. This 
highlights the need to rebalance growth away from commodity production to undertake 
structural reforms to improve productivity in the nation. For Indonesia to transition from a 
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middle to a high income country, it needs an average growth rate of 7 to 9 per cent per annum 
till 2030 (MP3EI).  













Source: WorldBank (2016) 
Note: Red areas represent regions with higher price disparities 
 
The World Bank provides the example where the cost of shipping a container of oranges from 
China to Jakarta is much cheaper than shipping from Padang in West Sumatra to Jakarta, 
despite the geographical proximity (World Bank 2016, p.7). Connectivity from rural areas to 
larger markets is important for Indonesia to improve the livelihood of its people living in rural 
areas and reduce poverty by improving economic competitiveness. Inefficient transport 
networks place a constraint on the Indonesian economy with limited shipping volumes in many 
parts of the country (Sandee 2016). This affects the volume of perishable goods that can be 
traded from Jakarta to the islands, if reliable sailing schedules are not available. Indonesia’s 
geographical location is also along important trade routes for commerce such as the Straits of 
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Malacca through which East Asia’s shipping trade occurs with Europe, Middle East and Africa 
(Hill 2018). 
 
The port system in Indonesia is known to be inefficient mainly due to high logistic costs and 
lack of infrastructure investment (Nathan Associates 2008; Dick 2008; Sandee 2016). These 
logistic costs are estimated at 27 per cent of Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (State 
of Logistics 2013, p.18). However, better connectivity can only be improved by further 
investment in infrastructure to enable an efficient distribution of goods to markets within 
Indonesia and overseas and reducing regulatory barriers. The public sector is estimated to be 
able to fund only a third of its infrastructure needs while foreign investment in ports is capped 
at 49 per cent (Ray and Ing 2016). If the infrastructure deficit remains, it will be difficult for 
Indonesia’s ports to be globally competitive which could impact its transition from a middle 
income to a higher income country. 
 
Logistics cost in Indonesia have declined slightly between 2004 to 2011 from 27.6 per cent to 
24 per cent of GDP, with transport costs making up for 50 per cent of this overall logistics 
costs. The lack of competition due to cabotage rules in Indonesia’s maritime sector is also a 
contributor to high inter island transportation costs. This rule limits an international shipper to 
unload cargo in Jakarta and pick up local cargo and unload it in Makassar and pick up cargo 
on its way back on an international trip. Without proper planning, shippers do not know when 
their containers will arrive, which is made worse by poor connectivity due to congested road 
linkages. The Indonesian government recognises the importance of efficient transport networks 




To address this, the Indonesian government introduced the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ to improve 
port competitiveness. The aim of this law was to remove monopoly power from State owned 
ports or ‘Pelindos’ to increase competition and encourage private sector participation by 
separating the operator and regulator function (Shipping Law 2008). The law allowed three 
years to transition to the new governance model which began in 2011. It has been almost a 
decade since this law was passed in Indonesia. Since then, Indonesia’s current President, Joko 
Widodo (Jokowi) has embarked on an ambitious plan to develop Indonesia’s maritime sectors, 
continuing from the reforms of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2004-2014). 
However, have these reforms brought about an improvement in port performance? This 
research aspires to contribute to the literature by evaluating port reform in Indonesia since the 
passage of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’. It aims to answer the following research questions.  
 
1.1 Research Questions 
 
The research questions this thesis aims to address are as follows: 
 
1. Did the change in the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ result in the implementation of a ‘landlord’ 
port governance structure? If so, did this new governance structure result in improved 
port performance? 
2. Did ‘institutional lock-in’ play a role in determining the trajectory of port reform in 
Indonesia or have other alternative pathways developed? 






1.2 Case Study Location 
 
The two port case studies that are examined in this thesis to answer the above questions are the 
Ports of Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Emas in the island of Java. They are both connected to 
large hinterland activities as seen in Figure 1.1. The Port of Tanjung Priok has been selected 
for this study as it Indonesia’s largest port located in West Java, with an average container 
throughput of 6.08 million Twenty Foot Equivalent (TEUs) in 2017 (World Shipping Council 
2017). It is managed by the Indonesia Port Corporation (IPC) or PT Pelabuhan that has four 
branches (Pelindo I to Pelindo IV) that are responsible for managing ports within a specific 
geographical location. The Port of Tanjung Priok falls under the management of Pelindo II 
which manages 12 ports across 10 provinces (Annual Report 2012). Formally known as 
‘Batavia’, the port has long played a critical role in the Indonesian economy (Patunru et al. 
2009).  
 
Figure 1.2: Map of Indonesia 
 
Source: World and City Maps (2017) 
 
Port of Tanjung Emas 
Port of Tanjung Priok 
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In comparison, the Port of Tanjung Emas has been selected because it is a growing port in 
Semarang that developed from a feeder port into an international port in January 2017. Located 
on the East island of Java, the port’s annual container throughput was 620,000 TEUs in 2016 
(Unpublished data from TPKS).  This makes it Indonesia’s third largest port after Tanjung 
Priok and Tanjung Perak (3.36 million TEUs). The port of Tanjung Emas has been very 
innovative in its use of technology through automated cranes and has plans to move towards 
becoming a ‘green’ terminal in the near future. It falls under the management of Pelindo III. 
There are two branch offices of Pelindo III in Semarang. This includes the Tanjung Emas 
Branch and Terminal Petikemas (TPKS) Semarang Branch. Tanjung Emas Branch handles 
General Cargo and TPKS Branch handles only containers.  This research will make reference 
to the container terminal in the TPKS Branch due to easier access to port authority personnel 
to undertake the field trip. 
 
Figure 1.3 provides a detail view of the Java transportation network, showing the various ports 
on the island and their hinterland connectivity. Therefore, the comparison between Indonesia’s 
leading port and a growing port will provide a more objective and balanced evaluation of port 
reform. Also, the availability of data and field visits were another factor that played a part in 





Figure 1.3: Java Transporation Network  
 
 Source: Nugroho et al. (2016, p.4) 
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1.2.1 The Port of Tanjung Priok 
 
 
The Port of Tanjung Priok is ranked 30th in the world, handling 6.08 million TEUs in 
2017(World Shipping Council 2017). Tanjung Priok was initially designed to handle 5 million 
TEUs but this capacity had been exceeded in 2013 when the port had to handle close to 6 
million TEUs due to the increase in container traffic. Due to strong export growth, the port 
faces capacity problems and traffic congestion on the main port access road (Port Finance 
International 2014; Pang and Gebka 2016; Sandee et al. 2014). Prior to the ‘2008 Shipping 
Law’, the port was operated and regulated by the state owned monopoly, Pelindo II (Sandee et 
al. 2014). 
 
Prior to port reform, Tanjung Priok was falling behind in customs clearance, ship turnaround 
time and port efficiency. The port handles freight from the industrial estates, especially the east 
of Jakarta, where the largest industrial conglomerates are located. Dwell time at the port has 
also been increasing steadily at the Jakarta International Container Terminal (JICT), averaging 
10 days since mid 2013. The increase in dwell time is attributed to pre clearance procedures 
and time consuming physical inspection of goods. Agencies have found it difficult to hand over 
their powers to facilitate the integration of clearance facilities. Likewise, new regulations 
issued by the Ministry of Trade require ‘new’ importing firms to automatically be classified as 
red lane importers. This requires more red lane inspections causing further delays and 
uncertainty (Sandee et al. 2016). Investors have also been hesitant to invest in port 
infrastructure because of concerns of a low return on investments and the lack of a clear 





The port currently has four container terminals. These are the Jakarta International Container 
Terminal (JICT), the KOJA Container Terminal, the MTI Container Terminal and the 
Conventional Terminal which together handle approximately 70 per cent of Indonesia’s total 
container traffic (Gintang et al. 2015, p.7). The main port terminal in Indonesia is the Jakarta 
International Container Terminal (JICT) which is a joint venture operated between Pelindo II 
and Hutchinson Port Holdings (HPH). The capacity constraints of the port, which are limiting 
its competitiveness, have led the Indonesian government to invest in increased capacity 
expansion through the ‘Kalibaru’ or ‘New Priok Project’ (Annual Report Pelindo II 2016).  
 
This project is being implemented in two phases, with the completion of phase one and two in 
years 2019 and 2023 respectively. The project will expand Tanjung Priok Port by adding seven 
new container terminals resulting in a total increase of the port’s container handling capacity 
to approximately 18 million TEUs by 2023. The draft of the port will also gradually increase 
from 14 metres to 20 metres to accommodate larger vessels up to 18,000 TEUs. Figure 1.4 
provides an overview of the existing terminals and the new port expansion plan (Kuroda and 

























1.2.2 The Port of Tanjung Emas 
 
Tanjung Emas Port is located on the north coast of Central Java, in the city of Semarang. Figure 
1.6 provides a detail map of the city. Semarang was formed on the 2nd of May in 1547 when 
Ki Pandanarang II was chosen as the regent of this city by the Sultan of Pajang kingdom, 
Hadiwijaya. This coincided with the period of rapid expansion of Hindu culture which ran 
parallel with the Islamisation in this region. Gradually, Semarang became a prominent 
destination for Chinese immigrants besides Batavia (now Jakarta) and Surabaya. The arrival of 
the Chinese immigrants was motivated by trading relationships between China and South East 
Asia regions. Before the Dutch arrived, the Chinese in Semarang played a critical role in 
collecting the taxes on imports and exports. They also monopolised the salt and rice trade 
(Yuliati 2014). 
 
             Figure 1.5: Map of Semarang 
 





Due to its strategic location, the Dutch colonised Semarang at the end of the 17th century after 
the King of Mataram Kingdom made agreements with VOC in October 1677 and 1678. The 
treaties signed gave the VOC power to manage the incomes of Semarang port, a monopoly in 
the trade of sugar, rice, textile, opium, and free taxes. These were compensation from Mataram 
to the VOC for defeating a rival, Trunajaya, who opposed Mataram. The inhabitants of 
Semarang became more diverse over time with Malay, Arabic and Indian traders arriving along 
with French, German, English and African traders. The port of Semarang was less suitable for 
trade as continuous sedimentation on the river that linked the city to the sea had resulted in 
ships being unable to sail. In 1868, dredging work initiated by trading companies began on the 
Semarang river with a new canal that enabled boats to sail from the Java sea to the centre of 
Semarang city. This allowed foreign ships access to Semarang port. Until the 1960s, only 
vessels with a maximum draft of 5 metres could anchor at the port (Yuliati 2014). 
 
Shipping lines often complained that the high sea tides hampered the distribution activity from 
the port to its final destination. (Patunru et al. 2009). The port’s sailing channel is much shorter 
compared with Tanjung Priok because of increased sedimentation levels brought about by the 
two big rivers on the side of the port and is prone to flooding from the high tides.  Exporters 
and importers were reluctant to use Tanjung Emas because there was no ship route that matched 
the destination of exported cargoes. The limited hinterland of Semarang did not provide the 
Pelindo with an incentive to improve its infrastructure unlike Tanjung Priok or the Port of 
Tanjung Perak in Surabaya which served as alternatives to Semarang.  Patunru et al. (2009) 
argued that government ownership limited the port’s development. However, some degree of 
competition in port handling services by private companies could see improvements in 




However, as trade in the country increased, the government allowed the port to develop under 
Pelindo III in 1985. Today, Semarang port is now known as the Port of Tanjung Emas and is 
Indonesia’s third largest container port.  As a port terminal operator, it falls under Pelindo III 
that manages ports in seven provinces in Indonesia covering Central Java, East Java, Bali, West 
Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Central Kalimantan and South Kalimantan (Patunru et 
al. 2009).  Wood and Furniture are the larger proportion of goods that are exported followed 
by yarn and plywood as shown in Figure 1.7. The port has between 55 and 65 ship calls a month 
with seventy per cent of its shipment providing feeder services to either the ports of Tanjung 
Priok, Tanjung Pelepas or Singapore. In 2001, the terminal management was separated into a 
new business unit called ‘Terminal Peti Kemas Semarang (TPKS)’ to improve its performance 
(Patunru et al. 2009).   
 
 
Figure 1.6: Top ten commodities exported from TPKS 
 
























In 2003, Maersk and Evergreen shipping lines began operating at the port. Pelindo III decided 
to develop a longer term plan to improve connectivity and infrastructure investment for the 
ports in 2012, especially those in Eastern Indonesia as it was a feeder port. At the TPKS 
terminal, container throughput has nearly doubled at the port from 350,000 TEUs in 2010 to 
just above 600,000 TEUs in 2016 and the port is now not just a feeder but an international port 
with direct services. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
Pilcher and Tseng (2017) argue that the methodology applied in evaluating port performance 
is largely dependent on the availability of data. In Indonesia, there is no reliable international 
database or national agency collecting specific information on indicators such as port labour 
and operational productivity. Indonesian port authorities also have concerns of releasing this 
information publicly due to benchmarking done against other ports. Thus, data provided tends 
to be patchy which makes it challenging to undertake a time series quantitative analysis. Also, 
Brooks and Pallis (2008) argue that relying on one methodology to evaluate port governance 
reform could result in an outcome that is skewed and limited.  
 
Therefore, three different methodologies are used to evaluate port reform in Indonesia in this 
thesis from 2012 to 2016, allowing for a three year transition from 2008 to 2011. The rationale 
for using these three different methodologies is to approach the reform from different 
viewpoints using different methods and techniques and also to overcome the shortcomings 
present in using one method. The first methodology is an indicator approach. This approach 
evaluates various financial and operational indicators to assess port performance. The literature 
on the operational indicator approach examines productivity indicators (Richard et al. 2009); 
21 
 
De Langen & Nijdam (2007); Bichou (2006); Talley (2007)). However, obtaining a variety of 
productivity indicators from port authorities has been challenging because of concerns with 
benchmarking.  
 
Financial performance indicators have been used in the literature to evaluate port reform in 
Singapore (Tongzon 2008), Western Australia (Tull and Affleck 2007) and Australia and New 
Zealand (Reveley and Tull 2001). Other indicators such as stakeholder satisfaction were also 
considered. However, the results of this approach used by Verhoeven (2015) to study port 
reform at the Port of Rotterdam suggest that there is ‘wear off’ effect when using stakeholder 
satisfaction which suggests it may not provide the right perspective to assess port reform. 
Instead, the qualitiatve data obtained from stakeholder interviews could provide a better 
assessment rather than an individual indicator. 
 
The second methodology is a qualitative analysis known as the ‘Matching Framework’. This 
has been developed by Balthazar and Brooks (2001) to ascertain the ‘fit’ of the port by 
analysing the alignment of the ‘structure’, ‘strategy’ and ‘environment’ variables and how they 
change after port reform. This is a useful framework to study port reform as a governance 
model is exposed to its environment, strategy and structure (Wilmsmeir and Sanchez 2017). 
This methodology has been used to study port reform in Canada and Philippines (Balthazar 
and Brooks 2001), Italy (Lamonarca et al. 2007), Libya and Malaysia (Ghashat et al. 2011) 





Finally, the third methodology uses institutional analysis to analyse ‘path dependence’ in 
Indonesian ports. This approach has been adopted by transport geographers and economists to 
understand the role of embeddedness and institutional rigidity in ports and how this could affect 
the outcome of port reform(Debrie et al. 2013; Reveley and Tull 2012; Notteboom et al. 2013; 
Wilmsmeir and Monios 2016; Strambach 2010). Applying this methodology over the period 
from 2012 to 2016 to Indonesian ports will enable a futher analysis to identify if there are any 
institutional rigidities that are hampering port reform or has an alternative pathway developed 
for port reform. 
 
1.4 Data Sources 
 
A variety of data sources were used for this study. This includes (1) documents including 
reviewing economic plans for Indonesia, National Ports Masterplan, the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ 
legislation, Annual Reports from port authorities, (2) data collected from interview designs 
with relevant stakeholders including port authorities, port terminal director and economic think 
tanks, (3) field visits to the Port of Tanjung Priok and the Port of Tanjung Emas and (4) 
studying at the Centre for Maritime and Air Tranport at the University of Antwerp in Belgium 
which allowed the author to interact and gain a better understanding of the involvement 
between Indonesian Port Authorities and the Netherlands Government. This opportunity has 
allowed for further interview data to be collected from Indonesian port authorities and 
government representatives, port users and investors interested in Indonesian ports.  This 
multiple data collection technique allowed the researcher to obtain various perspectives and 
gain a more in depth understanding of Indonesian ports as there is no national level database 




1.5 Interview Design and Field Visits 
 
A questionnaire was developed as part of the researcher’s interaction with the participants to 
gather information about port governance and reform in Indonesia. The questionnaire has been 
prepared with the guidelines and procedures of Murdoch University’s Human Ethics and 
received Murdoch Ethics approval (Project Number 2016/084) prior to field visits in Indonesia. 
Interviews required prior consent from the participants and economic and social risks were 
taken into consideration. The interviews were a means of obtaining some ground level 
understanding of port operations, infrastructure and port reform process. This will shed light 
on how policymakers can make improvement to policies around port reform. The researcher is 
conversant in Bahasa Indonesia but most interviewees were well conversant in English and 
thus interviews were conducted in English. This questionnaire can be found in Appendix 4.  
 
The questions in the questionnaire would be slightly altered depending on the expertise of the 
individual and the perspective they are bringing.  Field visits to Indonesia were conducted in 
early 2016 and involved interviews with academic staff at the Universitas 17 Augustus 
Semarang and interviews and site visits at the Port of Tanjung Emas and the Port of Tanjung 
Priok. Stakeholder interviews included those with a domestic port director at the Port of 
Tanjung Priok, port manager at the Port of Tanjung Emas, Port of Tanjung Emas employees, 
academics, port infrastructure and transport specialists at think tanks in Jakarta. Further 
exchanges of electronic mail correspondances have continued to take place over the duration 
of the research to clarify and obtain further information as required. Informal interviews were 




1.6 Chapter Outline 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides an 
overview of the literature on port governance and institutional reform. It studies the various 
port governance models which include the public, private and hybrid model. The chapter also 
explores the concept of ‘commericalisation’, ‘devolution’ and Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
models. It also explores the constantly evolving role of port authorities in various countries as 
the push for cooperation between seaport authorities increases in response to market 
consolidation through the formation of shipping alliances.  This leads onto the discussion of 
whether the ownership of ports should fall under the private or public sector. The chapter 
studies the empirical evidence of port performance in various countries to determine if there is 
an ‘ideal’ model for port governance. Lastly, the chapter discusses the risks of cyber security 
attacks as the trend towards autonomous port operations continue. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a background of the Indonesian economy. This chapter starts by providing 
an overview of how Indonesia grew through trade in the archipelago as demand for Javanese 
products, especially spices grew. It then studies Indonesia’s economic growth after it gained 
independence from the Dutch in 1945 and examines both President Sukarno’s (1945 to 1965) 
‘guided democracy’ rule and President Suharto’s (1966 to 1996) ‘new order regime’. Although 
Indonesia did experience strong economic growth during President Suharto’s rule, government 
policy kept on switching between a liberalised and nationalistic stance, while crony capitalism 
and corruption grew. The onset of the ‘Asian Financial Crisis’ in 1998-99 saw an end to the 
Suharto era. Presidencies that followed by B.J. Habibie (1998-1999) and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri (2001-2004) were relatively short and focused on fiscal management and inward 
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oriented policies until the presidency of the Yudhoyono government (2004 -2014). He was 
eventually succeeded by Indonesia’s current President Joko Widodo (Jokowi).This chapter also 
focuses on the various Indonesian infrastructure plans, in particular President Jokowi’s 
maritime plan to develop Indonesia’s port competitiveness to assist in transitioning Indonesia 
from a middle to high income country. The chapter concludes by analysing the role of path 
dependency on Indonesia’s institutions. 
 
In Chapter 4, benchmarking of a range of logistic and port performance indicators provide an 
assessment of Indonesian maritime and logistic services against the performance of other South 
East Asian economies. Competition within the South East Asia (SEA) region is also placing 
pressure on Indonesian ports to improve their port performance. China’s ‘Belt Road Initiative 
(BRI)1’ initiative has started to play a key role in the development of ports in the Indonesian 
archipelago through the ‘Sea Toll Road’. Acknowledging the constraints and challenges of 
Indonesia’s maritime sector, the focus shifts to providing an overview of the evolution of 
Indonesia’s port governance framework from 1960 until 2017. This chapter discusses the 
introduction of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ which aimed to shift the port governance model to a 
‘landlord model’ to improve competition and efficiency in ports through further investment in 
infrastructure. However, budgetary constraints and limitations on foreign investment in ports 
is a challenge for Indonesia to navigate in order to close this infrastructure deficit. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of port labour, unions and industrial action in Indonesian ports. 
 
                                                 
1 The ‘Belt Road Initiative’(BRI) was previously known as ‘One Belt, One Road (OBOR)’. The change in name 
by the Chinese government was to better reflect the various networks or roads which would sound more 
inclusive rather than imply a single route (European Council on Foreign Relations 2017). 
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Chapter 5 examines the various methodologies that have been used to assess port performance 
and their strength and weaknesses. The chapter explores the three methodologies used in this 
thesis which includes the indicator approach, ‘Matching Framework’ and institutional analysis. 
These different approaches will allow the port reform process to be analysed from various 
angles to allow for a wider analysis. The indicator approach discusses the various operational 
and financial indicators to evaluate port performance such as dwell time, port labour, container 
throughput, net operating profit and financial ratios. The ‘Matching Framework’ approach has 
been developed from strategic management and organisation theory. It uses three key variables 
for analysis which include the organisation’s environment, structure and strategy to determine 
if it has the right ‘fit’. This framework is suitable for evaluating port reform because the 
governance model has the above three elements. The last approach used is the institutional 
analysis. This approach aims to analyse if ‘institutional lock-in’ has played a role in the port 
reform process in Indonesia.  
 
The discussion in Chapter 6 will summarise the results of this thesis by examining the 
application of the three methodologies to the case study ports of Tanjung Priok and Tanjung 
Emas. First, the indicator approach is applied to both case study ports. Secondly, the ‘Matching 
Framework’ is used to examine the post port reform process to evaluate if it has achieved a 
better ‘fit’ through the alignment of the ports strategy, structure and environment. Lastly, the 
institutional analysis will provide an additional perspective to study the ‘lock-in’ effect that can 
be inherent in institutions such as port authorities and whether this impeded the port reform 
process or enabled other alternative trajectories to be developed. The comparison between the 
Port of Tanjung Emas and the Port of Tanjung Priok will also provide a contrasting comparison 
between the level of institutional ‘lock-in’ the leading port of Indonesia and another growing 
port such as Tanjung Emas, and how it determines port reform outcomes. 
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This will be followed by the conclusions in Chapter 7. The results from this research will 
provide an insight as to whether or not the performance at the Ports of Tanjung Priok and 
Tanjung Emas have improved as a result of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’. It will also provide policy 
recommendations on what further reform is required in Indonesia’s maritime sector for port 
authorities to achieve their maximum potential. In addition, potential areas for future research 








Successful ports around the world rarely are accidents of history. They have continuously relied 
on active forward planning and timely infrastructure investments.  Although most ports begin 
their development because of their strategic location, the success of a port is never determined 
only by its geography. The local port environment, the governance model, strategy and 
capabilities of the port authority together with the global environment determine the 
performance of the port.  In studying a port’s success, it is important to have a good grasp of 
the institutional framework governing the port (Wilmsmeir and Monios 2016). This can be 
broadly defined as the culture or ‘way of thinking’ at a port. This plays a significant role in 
determining how the port is governed.  
 
A constantly evolving economic environment, technological developments and globalisation 
have ended a long period of stability in many ports around the world that were mostly 
controlled by governments (Brooks and Pallis 2012). With port authorities having minimal 
market power, shipping lines continue to form alliances that vertically integrate into port 
terminal ownership. This gives the shipping lines, the primary customer of the port, greater 
negotiating power for lower prices (Mooney 2017; Notteboom et al. 2017). Likewise, mega 
sized container vessels also place further pressures on ports by demanding specific 
infrastructure and further dredging to accommodate the increase in water draft (Wilmsmeir and 




The trend is larger vessels in relation to market consolidation and the formation of alliances 
amongst various large shipping lines to offer joint services on key trade routes, resulting in 
greater investment in port infrastructure to remain competitive (Wilmsmeir and Monios 2016). 
Shipping lines have also become active players in the container terminal market by entering 
key ports via joint ventures with local or global terminal operators and forming alliances. In 
the past, many large carriers were not members of an alliance as they were able to achieve 
sufficient economies of scale, commercial independence and flexibility on their own. However, 
recent years have witnessed shipping lines such as Evergreen which were not part of any 
alliance become member of an alliance for survival and increased profit margins. 
 
There are currently three major alliances which include ‘The Alliance’, ‘Ocean Alliance’ and 
‘2M’. ‘The Alliance’ includes shipping lines Hapag-Lloyd/UASC, Yang Ming and a joint 
venture between Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL), Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (K-Line) and Nippon 
Yusen Kaisha (NYK) Line by April 2018. The ‘Ocean Alliance’ includes French based 
Compagnie Maritime d'Affrètement Compagnie Générale Maritime (CMA CGM), China 
Ocean Shipping Company and China Shipping (COSCOCS), Orient Overseas Container Lines 
(OOCL) and Evergreen and the last alliance include ‘2M’ which consists of shipping lines 
Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) and Maersk Line (Notteboom et al. 2017). 
 
These changes have placed pressure on ports to change their governance structure to adapt to 
changing times. There are a few variations of the port ownership model which includes the 
public, hybrid (public and private) and fully privatised model. The World Bank and other 
economists such as Baird (1995;1999) and Brooks and Balthazar (2001) have tried to categorise 
the different type of port ownership models. However, debate still continues on which model 
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of governance, the private or public, results in better performance. The advocates for public 
ownership view ports as strategic national assets with a wider socio economic role to play. 
Advocates of privatisation argue that the private model will improve efficiency, 
competitiveness and investment in infrastructure but government regulation and monitoring is 
also essential to avoid abuse of monopoly power. Therefore, it is debatable if there is an ideal 
model of port governance.  
 
This chapter begins to address this question in Section 2.1 by providing an overview of the 
relationship between institutional reform and port governance. In Section 2.2, the various port 
governance models are presented. This discussion is further elaborated in sub sections 2.2.1 
and 2.2.2 on port devolution and the evolving role of port authorities respectively. Section 2.3 
considers the debate for private versus public ownership for ports. Section 2.4 provides a study 
of trends in port governance in various countries. Finally, Section 2.5 discusses the impact of 
cyber security in semi and fully automated port terminals, followed by the conclusion in 
Section 2.6.  
 
2.1 Institutional Reform and Port Governance 
 
The institutional environment in a country is determined by its legal and administrative 
framework through which firms, individuals and governments interact. Notteboom et al. (2013, 
p.28) views institutions as ‘a socially constructed set of rules devised by humans that constrain 
or enable human interaction’. These rules can either be formal or informal. The Productivity 
Commission (2014) argues that the quality of institutions has a significant role to play on the 
competitiveness and growth of a nation. Good institutions of public decision making and 
competent governments enable societies to choose growth-enhancing policies and sound 
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development strategies which reduce the opportunities and incentives for corrupt behaviour, 
thus strengthening trust and institutional effectiveness. 
 
Ports can also be viewed as institutions. In the port sector, strong and effective governance 
arrangements are necessary to achieve the efficient provision of port infrastructure services. 
Over the years, there has been a shift in the governance of ports from public ownership to 
partial or full privatisation models. Globalisation, increasing competition from neighbouring 
ports and pressure from stakeholders have seen traditional governance structure in ports change 
to enable ports to be more responsive to their changing environments and seize rising 
commercial opportunities (Notteboom et al. 2013). Port stakeholders include transport 
companies, port labour, customers, shipping companies, various level of government, customs 
and local residents, some of which are summarised in Table 2.1. In some countries, port 
systems are governed by national government through port authorities while other countries 
follow a more decentralized model and have ports managed by local governments or 
municipalities. De Langen (2006) argues that each of these stakeholders have different 
interests. For example, a transport firm may be looking at keeping costs low but for port labour, 
the concerns could be about wages and job security. 
Table 2.1: Port Stakeholders and Interests 
Stakeholders Transport firms, Port labour, Local port related manufacturing 
industries, End user of ports, Local environmental groups, Local 
residents, Local, regional and national government, Customs, 
Towage, Shippers, Freight forwarders and third party logistics 
providers, Ports and sea carriers 
Source: De Langen (2006); Lee and Lee (2016) 
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Brooks and Pallis (2012) argue that despite this shift, it is difficult to define a standard model 
for port management. Debrie et al. (2013) draws a contrast in how academics and institutional 
actors view governance. The former view it as a concept that enables the understanding of both 
decentralisation and deregulation while the latter view it as a framework for recommending 
change.  Similarly, Notteboom et al. (2013) argues that transport economists and geographers 
have come to a consensus on how path dependence can explain the differences in port 
governance structures and outcomes in reform by shaping local and national differences in port 
governance structures and development trajectories.  
 
In the case of seaports, path dependence can be explained by various sources such as sunk costs 
of infrastructure, technological lock in, historically developed routines of actors and the socio-
economic structure of a country (Notteboom et al. 2013). Tongzon (2015) explains further how 
path dependence in institutions can also be determined by its political and social culture which 
lays the foundation of how institutions affect governance. Therefore, there is a tendency for the 
institutions to follow the existing institutional framework as it is a lot easier than having to 
change the rules at each stage of reform. This notion of ‘lock in’ refers to a situation where the 
alternative development trajectories in an institution continue, without breaking out of an 
existing path (Notteboom et al. 2013). However, Wilmsmeir and Monios (2016) argue that 
although path dependence plays a role in port development, there are possibilities that decisions 
and outcomes could deviate from an existing development path. 
 
This helps to explain the development of diversity in the governance structure of ports. 
Notteboom et al. (2013) cites the example of how the introduction of containerization was 
viewed as a ‘routine breaking’ event, which many ports and transportation companies did not 
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anticipate. This change resulted in lock in for equipment and skills to manage containers 
efficiently. Reveley and Tull (2012) refer to events such as containerisation as ‘trigger points’ 
when studying path dependence in Australian and New Zealand ports. ‘Trigger Points’ are a 
reactive form that lead to other events unfolding one after another. In many institutions, once 
pathways are locked in, it is difficult for port institutions to adopt a different pathway which 
could at times affect the flexibility or growth of ports as the case of Australia or New Zealand. 
The reluctance to depart from the traditional trajectory can impede the growth in a port. 
Therefore, ‘trigger points’ put pressure on institutions to change their existing pathway.  
 
Using this approach, Reveley and Tull (2012) explain how the deviation from path dependence 
took place for port regulation in Australia and New Zealand. For New Zealand, 
containerisation was seen as a trigger point that brought about a reactive path dependence. 
This resulted in introducing competition in its labour market which saw great resistance 
initially before undergoing a slow transformation. Australia’s trigger point came as part of 
the nation’s microeconomic reform process which led to improved economic efficiency. This 
triggered the reactive path dependence which saw improvements in the efficiency of port 
authorities, the creation of a more competitive commercial environment and improved labour 
hiring processes by limiting restrictive practices and the number of unions. Reveley and Tull 
(2012) argue that although economists prescribe ‘competition’ as a solution to breaking path 
dependence and institutional rigidity, this approach was limited by market failure and social 
constraints in Australia. This illustrates that even government initiatives to change path 





This leads us to the concept of ‘plasticity’ which was first introduced by Strambach (2010) and 
applied by Notteboom et. al. (2013). ‘Plasticity’ is defined as ‘a situation where a range of 
alternative development trajectories are possible within the overarching institutional system 
without necessarily breaking out of the existing path’ (Notteboom et al.2013, p.4). This 
suggests the stretching of existing institutions and explains why it can be possible for an 
institution to develop lock in and yet create new paths (Notteboom et al.2013; Strambach 
2010). Ng and Pallis (2010) argue that as firms and institutions develop, they adopt routines 
that become outdated with time. These institutions become inflexible over time because they 
do not adapt to changes in technology, competition or shifting political processes which need 
to be changed as they are restricted by the firms’ governance structure. In practice, it can be 
challenging even for a government to break the political culture to bring about change. 
 
Besides stretching, Debrie et al. (2013) argues that institutional reform can also occur through 
layering and displacement. Layering involves adding new rules or procedures to existing 
institutions. Displacement is the alteration of existing institutions to serve new purposes or 
functions. In some cases, the addition of a new layer might imply abandoning older layers, 
while in other cases of displacement no new rules or procedures are added, instead, existing 
institutions and arrangements are realigned. Port reform involves the implementation of a 
public policy that will change the coordination structures and specific actions at a national 
level.  However, Debrie et al. (2013) challenges the traditional models of port reform to 
emphasize the role of embeddedness in port institutional reform. The argument is that as port 
governance is a ‘complex evolutionary process’, the outcome of the intended reform could 
differ from the actual reform. Therefore, port reform should be viewed not as a rigid process, 
but as a ‘pathway of change’ in which the process of reform could follow different trajectories 
depending on the country and the individual port. 
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Applying the concept of path dependence and institutional plasticity, Debrie et al. (2013) 
classifies the four port governance models generated through the trajectory of reform by 
drawing upon research undertaken by Mintzberg and Waters (1985) on strategic management. 
These models include the path follower, path adaptor, path resistant and path leader. The ‘path 
follower’ port is one in which local traditions are weak and it is easy to implement national 
changes. The second model is the ‘path adaptor’ port where local forces act as path adaptors to 
national reform, making it harder to implement reform homogenously across the country. The 
third is the ‘path resistant’ port where local conflicts delay the implementation of national 
reform. Lastly, we have the ‘path leader’ port. In this port, the local forces lead in national 
reform by implementing or proposing innovative solutions in port governance, project funding, 
marketing and inter port coordination. The first two models reveal a dominant top down process 
while the ’path resistant’ and ‘path leader’ port models demonstrate a bottom up process, 
leading to the institutional divergence of port governance. Debrie et al. (2013) summarises this 







































        Source: Adapted from Debrie et al. (2013) and Mintzberg and Waters (1985) 
 
However, it can be challenging to assign a port neatly into one of the four categories as the port 
may display elements of more than one category. For instance, an example of a ‘path follower’ 
would be China where the national port system has been highly dependent on government 
policy and planning. Notteboom and Yang (2017) argue that port development in China has 
been led by the national government through economic planning. The first phase from 1979 to 
1984 saw strong centralized decision making and control of the Chinese seaport system by the 
government. In the second phase from 1984 to 2004, a trend towards decentralisation continued 
with ports either being controlled by central and local government or just local government. 
This devolution process also allowed foreign investors to have a stake of no more than 49 per 
cent in ports. However, the government still continued to be in control of port planning and 








the ‘Port Law of 2004’ saw further decentralisation of port governance through corporatization 
of port authorities and removing limits on foreign investors, with port planning and policy 
formulation responsibility still falling on the national government and the respective provincial 
governments. Notteboom and Yang (2017) argue that port governance changes have resulted 
in more competitive port environment with the 13th ‘five year plan’ promoting Chinese 
enterprises to go abroad to attract foreign investment. China’s port governance has shown 
elements of ‘institutional plasticity’ where it has been successful in stretching its institutions 
without breaking out of its existing governance pathway. Although most of the reform has been 
top down driven, bottom up efforts in recent times from local port business groups have started 
to emerge. 
 
Italian port reform could arguably fit the description of a ‘path adaptor’ model. Parola et. al. 
(2017) argued that the Italian port reform process, which began in 1994 with the ‘landlord 
model’, introduced a governance approach that replaced 24 Port System Authorities (PSA) 
with 18 PSA.  It was driven by the need for ports to operate commercially. The reform saw the 
transition from public to the landlord model, increase tonnage at ports and greater private sector 
investment. However, a short coming of the port reform was that it did not provide the port 
authorities with financial autonomy to undertake long term investments and expansions, 
leaving the Italian ports lagging behind in port performance. The reform also did not give ports 
the financial autonomy to negotiate their own fees. A second stage of the port reform has been 
announced with the 18 PSA merging into 15 PSA, which will extend over a wider geographical 
region. Parola et. al. (2017) argues that the reform process highlights the divide between the 
central government’s intended reform and the emergent reform from port users. The weakness 




The Greek ports can be an example of a ‘path resistant’ model. Port reform first took place in 
Greece in 1999 through the quasi corporatization of 12 ports of ‘national interest’ and the listing 
of Greece’s two major ports, Piraeus in 2003 and Thessaloniki in 2001 on the stock exchange. 
Pallis and Vaggelas (2017) argue that despite two decades of reform, the process is still not 
complete and without a governance framework. In the end, Pallis and Vaggelas (2017) argue 
that decisions on port governance were imposed externally on Greece in 2010 following the 
global financial crisis with a troika of international institutions observing the implementation 
of the imposed bailout conditions. Although path dependency created the effect of ‘lock in’, 
institutional plasticity had been present to develop new capabilities and activities. The reform 
process continued to add new layers of bureaucracy but it did not break the existing pathway. 
 
Finally, Pyvis and Tull (2017) argue that the Port of Tauranga in New Zealand would be an 
example of a ‘path leader’ port. Its organizational model allowed flexibility and institutional 
reform that enabled the port to operate more efficiently. However, major institutional reform 
was only undertaken when the benefits of potential profits overweighed the thinking of 
‘entrenched interest groups’. Tauranga is also a port where there is competition amongst 
stevedores for container handling services. Therefore, its governance structure and pressure 
from local forces enabled the port to benefit from market services and cost savings. 
 
As Debrie et al. (2013) argues, an evolutionary analysis is important because it links past 
behaviours and inherited social factors into the present. Debrie et al. (2013) argues that 
conventional studies tend to ignore the embeddedness of ports within their institutional and 
economic domain and analyse reform from a rather static angle.  Therefore, there is a need to 
analyse the institutional framework, the multi layered decisional chain, the geo economic 
dimension and socio cultural environment, to understand ports as institutions in a broader 
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context. Thus, when a reform process appears to be rigid and hierarchical, it could be because 
of this embeddedness within the institutions that creates a trajectory of resistance or ‘lock in’ 
to the implementation of local reform. Reveley and Tull (2012) argue that this could be seen in 
Australia where port regulatory reform was just the first step taken in a reform process that 
encountered significant inertia from existing entrenched governance structures.  
 
Ng and Pallis (2010) argues that after a reform process, the post reform setting would still have 
remnants from the pre-reform process. This is because the existing institutional frameworks 
will provide a resistant path for the alternative trajectory. For instance, in Europe, the 
‘Hanseatic’ tradition of municipal governance dominates ports around the Baltic and North 
Sea; the ‘Latin’ tradition of central governance dominates in France and Mediterranean 
countries; and the ‘Anglo Saxon’ tradition of independence can be seen in ports in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland (Verhoeven and Vanoutrive 2012). The influence path dependence had 
on the outcome of port reform can be seen with the corporatization of the Port of Rotterdam in 
2004 (Notteboom et al. 2013). It resulted in stretching its governance structure to embrace 
globalization, competition and become more responsive to changes to its operating 
environment. The port left intact its historical and cultural rooted ‘Hanseatic’ ownership but 
outsourced its operations and developed an internationalization strategy to continue its 
development towards maintaining its status as a leading port (Notteboom et al. 2013; De 
Langen and Van der Lugt 2017). 
 
Similarly, Dooms and Farrell (2017) argue that recent reform in African ports has reflected 
their colonial past of Anglophone (English speaking), Francophone (French speaking) and 
Lusophone (Portuguese speaking). It is common to find national port authorities controlling 
port services in Anglophone countries, autonomous operations in Francophone countries and a 
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mixed approach in Lusophone countries. Tongzon (2015) argues that the new governance 
model of port reform in Singapore was also shaped by values such as government intervention, 
market orientation and Confucian traditions. Pilcher & Tseng (2017) argue that the Latin model 
of port governance tends to see more central government control over port authority activities.  
 
In the case of Indonesia, Dick (2008) argues that shipping was a monopoly operated by the 
Dutch owned ‘Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij’ (KPM) during colonial rule. Despite their 
departure, the Dutch’s port management style became entrenched in the manner in which 
Indonesia managed its ports. After the departure of the Dutch, the failure to operate a joint 
venture between the state and KPM resulted in maritime transport fall under central planning 
by the Indonesian government. However, the Netherlands and Indonesia continue their 
cooperation in port development with the Port of Rotterdam Authority assisting to develop 
Jakarta’s port (Government of the Netherlands, 23rd November 2016). 
 
In conclusion, the relationship between institutions and port governance is important because 
the governance model chosen can affect performance of the ports. This path dependency also 
influences the choice of governance model and determines the degree of private sector 
participation which is dependent on the mindset of the country (Brooks 2006, p. 407). 
Therefore, understanding path dependence is vital to study the port’s development as this is the 
basis upon which policy, planning and infrastructure investment decisions are made.  The next 






2.2 Port Governance Model 
 
Governments started devolving responsibility for ports from the public sector to the private 
sector in the 1980s. As discussed in the previous section, the outcome of port devolution is 
largely dependent on the governance systems. The literature on the institutional arrangement 
in ports identifies four broad forms of structures which includes the Service Port Model, Tool 
Port Model, Landlord port model and Private Sector Port Model. These models are identified 
in the World Bank Port Reform ToolKit (WBPRTK) and assessed for their strengths and 
weaknesses (WBPRTK 2007).  
 
The Service Port model is a public model in which the Port Authority owns the land and all 
available assets (fixed and mobile) and performs all regulatory and port functions. All cargo-
handling operations are performed by labour directly employed by the Port Authority. This 
model is used in many developing countries where there is usually an absence of private sector 
involvement in port activities. It limits competition and innovation that results in inefficiencies. 
This structure is very largely dependent on government funding for development. Although 
ports in developing countries would traditionally have fallen in this category, many former 
service ports are in transition towards a landlord port structure such as the Port of Colombo in 
Sri Lanka and the Port of Nhava Sheva in India (WBPRTK 2007).   
 
The second model is the Tool Port model which is characterized by divided operational 
responsibilities. The Port Authority owns, develops, and maintains the port infrastructure and 
superstructure, including cargo handling equipment such as quay cranes and forklift trucks. 
The operation of Port Authority equipment is usually performed by Port Authority labour, but 
other operations are performed by private cargo-handling firms, on board vessels as well as on 
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the quay. The private operators are usually small companies. The Port of Chittagong in 
Bangladesh is a typical example of the tool port (WBPRTK 2007). 
 
The landlord port is characterized by its mixed public-private orientation. Under this model, 
the port authority acts as a regulatory body and a landlord, while port operations (especially 
cargo handling) are carried out by private companies. The private companies provide and 
maintain their own infrastructure, install their own equipment and employ the stevedoring 
labour. The responsibilities of the port authority as a landlord include the long term 
development of the land and the maintenance of basic port infrastructure such as access roads, 
channels, berths and wharves. This approach is likely to result in increased infrastructure 
investment and improved efficiency, enabling it to be more responsive to changing market 
conditions. Examples of landlord ports are Rotterdam, Singapore and New York, Today, the 
landlord port is the dominant port model in larger and medium sized ports (Asian Development 
Bank 2000; WBPRTK 2007).   Today, 85 to 90 per cent of global ports are landlord ports which 
account for approximately 65 to 70 per cent of global container throughput (UNCTAD 2017). 
 
Baird (1995) argues that fully privatized ports are few and can be found mainly in the United 
Kingdom. Full privatization is considered by many as an extreme form of port reform. It 
suggests that the state no longer has any meaningful involvement or public policy interest in 
the port sector. All regulatory, capital and operating activities are provided by the private 
sector. However, this approach could result in an abuse of the natural monopoly position that 
some ports may enjoy, leading to a role for government regulation (Goss 1990c; Brooks 2004; 




With privatised ports, the ability of the public sector to influence economic development is 
diminished as there is a minimal role for the public sector to play. However, full-port 
privatization has not been widely adopted. Many countries still view some form of government 
intervention as necessary to manage strategically significant port land and the inherently 
monopolistic characteristics of port services. Therefore, there are many variations of a 
privatised model ranging from partial to full privatisation. These port governance models are 
summarised Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2: Allocation of responsibilities under the World Bank model 
Source: World Bank Port Reform Took Kit (WBPRTK), (2007) 
 
 
However, Brooks (2007) argues that the World Bank’s approach does not recognise how 
differences in governance models may reflect differing strategic purposes of a port. Debrie et 
al. (2013) argues that the World Bank governance models do not capture the specificities of 
local environments or “embed” the changes in specific institutional and economic 
contexts.  Baird (1995; 1999) proposed a framework to understand the different models of port 
privatisation by further extending the World Bank’s model. Baird’s framework was developed 
by separating the three essential elements involved in the functioning of ports. These elements 
are port regulation, landowner and operator which can be privatised either individually or 
collectively. These elements are summarised in the Table 2.3 with the PRIVATE/I model 
indicating that only the operations are privatised. The PRIVATE/II model suggests that both 
Responsibilities Service Tool Landlord Private 
Infrastructure Public Public Public Private 
Superstructure Public Public Private Private 
Port Labour Public Private Private Private 




the operations and land is privatised. Lastly, the PRIVATE/III model is the fully privatised 
model in which regulatory activities, land ownership and operations are privatised. 
 
Table 2.3: Privatisation Options 
Port Models Port Regulator Port Landowner Operator 
PUBLIC Public Public Public 
PRIVATE/I Public Public Private 
PRIVATE/II Public Private Private 
PRIVATE/III Private Private Private 
Source: Baird (1999) 
 
 
Further work undertaken by Baird (2002) utilised this framework to study the extent of 
privatisation within the top 100 container ports. The results suggest that 88 of the ports were in 
the PRIVATE/I model, 2 in the PRIVATE/II model, 3 in the PRIVATE/III model and only 7 
in the PUBLIC model. Ports will very often exhibit a more complex mix of public and private 
sector roles and responsibilities and this requires closer analysis. Baird provides the example 
of Hamburg which is a PUBLIC port as it is owned by the State. However, there are a number 
of terminals leased to private companies who employ their own cargo handling personnel. This 
would imply that Hamburg is both a PUBLIC and a PRIVATE/I port. Therefore, although the 
framework provides a useful guide to the main options helping define a ports policy, Baird 
(1999) warns that a degree of caution is necessary as not all ports will fit into these four models 
and ports might exhibit a more hybrid governance option. 
 
Balthazar and Brooks (2001) similarly argue that Baird’s (1999) classification of port 
governance is oversimplified and it is difficult for a port to fit into just one category. They 
applied Baird’s model to assess governance in Canada and the Philippines and found it difficult 
to fit the data to the categories in the model. This is because ports today exhibit a combination 
of public, fully private or a combination of both public and private models. Building upon the 
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work of Baird (1999), Balthazar and Brooks (2001) separate the regulatory functions from port 
functions and distinguish landlord activities from day to day operating activities. This can be 
seen in Table 2.4. Brooks (2004) argue that the allocation between public and private 
responsibility will vary and will determine a particular governance model across countries but 
they do not separate the functions into neat categories as suggested by Baird (1999).  
 
Table 2.4: Port Devolution Matrix 
 
  Port Functions 
Governance Regulator Functions Landlord Operator 
 
Public          
 
Mixed 
Public/Private       
 
 
Private                                            
 
• Licensing, permitting 
• Vessel traffic safety, 
• Customs and 
Immigration 
• Port monitoring, 
emergency services 
• Protection of public 
interest on behalf of the 
community 












• Maintenance of 
port access 





• Cargo and 
Passenger handling 
• Pilotage and 
towage, 
• Line handling, 
facilities security 
• Maintenance and 
repair 
• Marketing of 
operations 
• Waste disposal 
•  Landside and 
berth capital 
investment 
Source: Balthazar and Brooks (2001) 
 
 
Dooms and Farrell (2017) argue that although the end objective of port reform might be a 
conversion into a ‘landlord model’, it does blur the line between the role of government as an 
owner and the private sector. They also question how far port authorities should stretch the 
development of their own strategies and take on commercial risks. Therefore, while full 
privatization of public ports seems unpalatable to most governments today, the number of fully 
public ports has been steadily diminishing as governments sought to achieve greater efficiency 
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from ports through new governance arrangements. The next section focuses on the greater role 
the private sector plays through port devolution.  
 
2.2.1 Port Devolution 
 
Brooks (2004) extends this discussion with an additional governance model known as ‘port 
devolution’. In Canada, devolution is defined as ‘…the transfer of functions or responsibility 
for the delivery of programs and services from the federal government to another entity’ (Rodal 
and Mulder 1993, p.28). This other entity could be a government, non-government 
organisation, community group, business or industry. This model is focused on increased 
service levels, increased operational efficiency, and improved allocation of public funds. 
Although this definition does not include privatisation, Brooks (2004) concludes that 
devolution could range from many stages through partial to full privatisation.  
 
Pilcher and Tseng (2017) argue that ‘privatisation’ should be differentiated from 
‘commercialisation’ as the latter allows for more government control. Commercialisation was 
seen as the first stage of reform in Australia (Chen et al. 2017). As terminals become specialised 
and integrated into global logistics chains, they adopt global approaches to management.  This 
has been largely due to improvements in supply chains which has, resulted in greater 
transparency of government activities. Secondly, increasing deficits and debt have resulted in 
government searching for more cost effective strategies. Balthazar and Brooks (2006) reason 
that the intention of this devolution is to separate the regulation from the operation of ports. 
This is to secure the benefits of commercially driven business decision making in organisations 
previously run by government. This has been the impetus towards the drive for port 
privatisation in many countries. However, many countries have moved towards a 
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‘privatisation’ approach through management concessions, which is commercialisation rather 
than privatisation.  
 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are another form of devolution that have been emerging in 
recent decades as governments have to deal with budgetary pressures and expanding 
infrastructure quality. A PPP agreement is defined as ‘a long-term contractual relationship 
between a public body and a private partner (or a consortium of private firms) for the 
construction and operation of infrastructure’ (Araújo and Sutherland 2010, p.6). PPPs are 
attractive to both the private sector and government because they allow the private sector to 
recover their costs while the assets are still owned by government and relieve government from 
financing. 
 
Over the last three decades, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been emerging as a 
mechanism for leveraging greater private sector participation in port development. The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2017) argues that public ports 
benefit from the private sector through capital and transfer of know how. A common type of 
PPP is the Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) model. Building, operating and maintaining a 
port terminal does require a significant amount of financial investment, managerial and 
technical skill and technology. The government usually awards concessions on a leasehold 
basis for 20 to 50 years for projects that involve a large amount of investment to allow the 
private sector to manage the risks involved to generate a return. Therefore, the private partners 
relieve government of the operational risks and financial burden. and are responsible for 
terminal operations and investment with superstructure. They are usually awarded concessions 
or permits so the government ultimately retains ownership of port land to safeguard public 
interest. Concessions allow a port authority to require a minimum guaranteed throughput which 
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encourages optimal usage of the facilities and terminal. If this minimum throughput is not met, 
a penalty is incurred which has to be paid by the terminal operator.  
 
UNCTAD (2017) estimates that $68.8 billion United States Dollars (USD) of private 
investment was committed across 292 projects between 2000 and 2016. This included port 
infrastructure, superstructure and terminals. Most investors in port development tend to be 
global port management companies such as AP Moller-Maersk Group, the Port of Singapore, 
Hutchinson Whampoa, Bollore Group and CMA CGM, as summarised in Table 2.5.   
 
Table 2.5: Leading global port investors private sector investment in ports 2000-2016 
Global Investors Investment 
(million USD) 
Number of Projects 
AP Moller Maersk Group 12,425 43 
Port of Singapore 5,064 18 
Hutchinson Whampoa 4,558 17 
DP World 3,922 27 
Bollore Group 3,301 11 
Marubeni 2,541 5 
International Container Terminal 
Services Inc. 
2,029 21 
EIG Global Energy Partners 1,858 3 
Mediterranean Shipping Company 1,419 4 
Hutchinson Port Holdings 1,276 3 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2017, p.91) 
 
In recent years, newcomers such as China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) and 
International Container Terminal Services have also entered the market to build up their 
portfolio of operating port terminals, feeder operations and other logistics and support services. 
Lee and Lee (2016) argues that the last two decades have seen Chinese state owned and private 
companies invest in transport and energy infrastructure in Africa and South America. In March 
2013, the Chinese invested USD 10 billion in constructing a port in East Africa to strengthen 
relations with Tanzania and land locked countries such as Malawi, Zambia and Uganda. A high 
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speed coastal railway was also built in Nigeria. China continues to be an active component of 
the Brazil Russia India China and South Africa (BRICS) economic bloc that is expected to 
generate further cargo. In May 2017, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company and 
Lianyungang Port Group agreed to acquire a 24.5 per cent stake in ‘Khorgos Gateway’, 
Kazakhstan’s government container transport company.  With bulk cargo, apart from owning 
a quarry or operating terminal, further investment can be seen by bulk operators in ships 
carrying cargo to their markets (UNCTAD 2017). 
 
The Financial Times (4th September 2017) reports that the first half of 2017 has seen China’s 
state owned company, China Merchants Port, invest into Brazil by purchasing 90 per cent stake 
in the Brazilian port operator and invest more than $1 billion USD to develop and operate 
Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. Chinese groups have planned to invest in nine overseas projects 
valued at $20.1 billion USD in the year to June 2017, nearly double the investment of $9.97 
billion the for the same period the year before. Although Chinese regulators tightened controls 
on overseas investment by private companies, this has made acquisitions by state groups easier.  
However, some of these commercial projects have met with challenges where doubts have been 
raised by government over potential military use. 
 
However, challenges to PPPs still remain, with legal complexity being one of them.  For 
instance, poor regulatory and institutional frameworks can act as a barrier in terms of enforcing 
contracts. Also, regulations in various countries can also limit the level of foreign and private 
sector participation in ports due to its strategic nature. Therefore, government needs to ensure 
that it has set up the appropriate PPP framework to address and mitigate risk and provide 
adequate legal, technical and managerial expertise. When awarding concessions, port 
authorities have also started examining private port operators carbon emissions and green port 
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credentials to ensure they comply with climate change policies and environmental regulation 
(UNCTAD 2017).  The empirical evidence suggests that the median size for PPP project is 
around US $200 to $300 million with an average concession of 30 years. Majority of projects 
tend to follow the Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO) structure while the second frequent 
is are Build Operate Transfer (BOT) structure.  However, the empirical evidence on the success 
of PPPs are mixed suggesting cost over runs, delayed delivery or changes to the specifications 
made by the public or private sectors after contracts have been awarded, resulting in increase 
in prices. PPPs seem to perform better for road, bridges and prison projects as compared with 
IT and soft services (Araújo and Sutherland 2010). 
 
Ultimately, PPPs can bring about efficiency gains depending on how risks and responsibilities 
are shared and transferred from the public to the private sector to achieve a mutually beneficial 
outcome for both parties. In conclusion, Brooks and Balthazar (2006) stress that the decision 
to devolve ports partially or fully should rest on the assessment by government of its own 
ability to manage the port’s performance critical factors. These factors include upgrading 
organizational systems and capabilities to keep up with rising global standards in information 
processing capability, equity, ethics, and the participation of the workforce.  
 
2.2.2 The evolving role of Port Authorities 
 
We now turn to discuss the evolution of the role of a ‘Port Authority’. Since the 1980s, port 
reform has resulted in a change in the traditional role of the ‘Port Authority’. Historically, 
governments usually devolved port development responsibility to port authorities. Port 
authorities usually represent a public sector body established and appointed by government 
with a lot of bureaucracy (Goss 1990c; De Langen and Van de Lugt 2017). These bodies can 
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sometimes consist of people representing or being nominated by highly interested parties, such 
as associations of shipowners' agents, city authorities or trade unions. These parties may 
succeed in pursuing narrowing sectional interests rather than those of the ports’ ultimate users 
because of poorly defined objectives by ports. They can also be responsible to government 
departments headed by senior politicians, allowing politicians to take an interest in such 
matters. 
 
De Langen and Van de Lugt (2017) argue that this traditional perspective of  a public sector 
port authority does not do justice to the commercial nature of port development. They do not 
suggest leaving port development to private enterprise. However, if government wants to retain 
control of port development, port authorities should be responsible for the regulatory, 
infrastructure and operations. The separation of control from operations reflected in most 
‘landlord models’ is not to split the government and private sector. Instead, this increase in 
autonomy allows the port to develop into a business model of a ‘Port Development Company 
(PDC)’ that focuses on creating value for the port. It also involves developing connections 
within the port cluster. The reason for developing the commercial value of a port is due to the 
intense competition for ports to attract cargo and to improve their competitive position. An 
increasing number of port authorities in the Netherlands have gained further autonomy in 
managing operations through this model (De Langen and Van de Lugt 2017).  
 
Verhoeven and Vanourtive (2012) use a different approach by classifying a port authority into 
a conservator, facilitator and entrepreneur.  A ‘conservator’ port authority is passive, 
mechanistic and traditional in its operations. A ‘facilitator’ port authority sees itself as looking 
beyond the traditional boundaries of ports to engage in strategic partnerships. Lastly, the 
‘entrepreneur’ port authority has a more commercial approach to investing. In recent times, De 
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Langen and van de Lugt (2017) note that some port authorities have left out the use of the word 
‘authority’ and referred to themselves as a ‘Port Development Company’ or ‘Port of 
Barcelona’. The removal of the term authority reforms the image of an organisation that was 
created by government to perform a specific function which does not involve providing 
commercial services in competitive environments. For instance, ‘Havenbedrijf Rotterdam’ 
which means ‘Port Company Rotterdam’, was established in 1932. In the Netherlands, 
institutional transition of port authorities has led to its four large port authorities developing 
into autonomous organisations despite being owned by government. These companies develop 
long term business plans with a focus on the company’s role and commercial objectives. This 
expands their role to more than just a ‘landlord model’. The number of autonomous port 
authorities has also increased in Italy, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal (Brooks et 
al. 2017).  
 
Notteboom et al. (2017) argue that the push for cooperation between seaport authorities stems 
from increased cooperation between shipping companies and the vertical integration of supply 
chains. As shipping companies cooperate to set up shipping alliances to gain larger economies 
of scales, it gives them greater bargaining power to negotiate tariffs. This has prompted greater 
port cooperation amongst European ports. Van De Voorde and Verhoeven (2017) have argued 
that this, for example, has been the case in Belgium. These attempts at greater cooperation 
between ports have also led to mergers of cross border ports such as the Copenhagen Malmo 
ports merger (De Langen & Nijdam 2009). However, Brooks et al. (2017) argues that attempts 
at having a ‘common port policy’ had limited success in the European Union because of the 
difficulty in reaching a consensus across various countries, interest groups and stakeholders. 
Reveley and Tull (2002) argue that the main reason coordination of port planning does not 
work at national levels is because ports policy may not align with the broader national policy 
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and institutional framework. This results in a weaker outcome because the objectives of the 
port privatisation, broader transport policy and economic policy do not align. Similarly, port 
cooperation in Japan has only achieved limited success in favouring public sector investment 
on just a few strategic hub ports that are having the potential to compete as transhipment hubs. 
Therefore, privatisation can bring about uncoordinated development in port development.  This 
will be discussed further in Section 2.4 with reference to the Swedish and UK ports. 
 
The discussion above highlights the various port authority models that could be applied in 
various countries. These models continue to evolve and reflect the complex nature of port 
ownership. However, which model is better? Is it the private, public or a hybrid model? The 
next section aims to answer this question by presenting the arguments for and against private 
and public ownership. 
 
2.3 Private Versus Public Debate 
 
As we have seen above, the early 1980s saw a shift in public to private investment in ports 
driven on the grounds of efficiency improvements and reducing public debt. The recent 
worldwide trend towards port devolution provides evidence of a much greater range of existing 
potential port governance models than had been contemplated by previous authors. As 
discussed previously, Brooks (2004) argues that the WBPRTK approach was too simplified as 
it did not provide guidance to a government on which approach to undertake when faced with 
pressure to devolve port administration. This section aims to analyse the advantages and 




Globalisation has resulted in greater inter-port competition to attract more customers where 
geographical distances between ports are minimal. For instance, this can be seen along the 
Straits of Malacca between Malaysian and Singapore ports. When new ports emerge, the 
neighbouring ports will feel the effects of competition. Carriers will seek cost reduction and 
operational efficiency at the ports they use (Feng et al. 2012). If ports fail to attract traffic in a 
context of a free competitive market, their performance will decline. Apart from geographic 
location, port facilities are important for economic competition. Mega ships have continued to 
increase the pressures on ports to dredge further to accommodate the increase in water depth 
requirements (International Transport Forum 2015). Therefore, service levels, external factors 
such as international politics, social and environment and information systems are critical. 
Other criteria include hinterlands networks, investments in ports, stability of port labour, safety, 
speed of cargo handling and documentation stability, terminal operation efficiency and 
adaptability to the changing market environment (Feng et al. 2012).   
 
Cullinane and Song (2002) argue that expansion in public ports is constrained as their assets 
cannot be used to raise capital. Privatisation enables ports to broaden their capital base and this 
then provides them with the opportunity to seek and obtain capital from the most appropriate 
source. This source of financing can enhance development, expansion, and improvement of 
infrastructure in ports at a time when governments are meeting increasing taxpayer resistance 
and are reluctant to further increase their debt. Advocates of privatization base their arguments 
upon three streams of literature in economics. These are property rights, transactions cost, and 
principal-agent literature. Property rights literature focuses on the non-transferability of 
ownership claims in the public sector. Transactions cost literature analyses the decision by an 
economic agent, such as a firm, to make or buy a product or service (Gillen and Cooper 1995).  
Principal-agent literature is concerned with the problem of information and incentives. It poses 
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the question as to what incentives does the agent need to provide for the principal to obtain 
more efficient outcomes (Vickers and Yarrow 1989).  
 
Applying these concepts, Williamson (1981) argues that public sector bureaucrats have less 
incentive to minimize costs or make decisions that increase the future value of an asset as they 
are unable to obtain appropriate gains from their efforts. Therefore, they have less incentive to 
undertake actions which result in improved efficiency. Furthermore, the lack of transferable 
property rights result in less incentives for monitoring managerial behaviour. However, in the 
private sector model, the future value of decisions is capitalised into the value of the firm. 
Therefore, the owners have a greater incentive and ability to ensure managers are working on 
their behalf (Gillen and Cooper 1995). Similarly, Gillen and Cooper (1995) provide a strong 
rationale for port privatization. They point out that governments believe that privatisation 
encourages and improves efficiency, makes industry more responsive to the demands of 
customers, reduces public debt, and forces management to face the realities of the marketplace. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1989) are firm supporters of private ownership. They conclude that 
ownership of a firm will have significant impact on its performance, given that ownership rights 
modify the structure of incentives available to decision-makers in the firm. 
 
Haarmeyer and Yorke (1993) argue that public port authorities are inefficient and their 
management is not responsive to changes in the industry. Lacking exposure to full competitive 
pressures, publicly owned and operated ports have weaker incentives to efficiently allocate 
labour and capital resources and are more likely to be subject to extraneous political influences. 
Increasingly, international competitive pressures encourage shippers and ship operators to 
direct cargo traffic to ports which have the most cost-effective industrial bulk and non bulk 
handling techniques and better intermodal coordination. These tend to be ports where private 
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managers have greater autonomy and incentive to adopt technological changes and efficient 
labour practices.  
 
However, many researchers do not agree that full privatisation is a solution to the problems of 
a public port. Heaver (2006) argues that historically, port improvements were not a matter for 
private investment because it was viewed as a quasi public good2. He argued that simply 
transferring responsibility to the private sector to avoid government spending provides neither 
a desirable nor an economically efficient solution to meeting the transportation needs of a 
community. Privatization also increases the risk of a port administration disregarding its 
statutory ‘public service’ functions that it has been entrusted with, as private investors and 
operators tend to favour profit maximization and cost minimization. The lack of competition 
could also see that a profitable public monopoly port could turn into a private monopoly. Juhel 
(2001) argues that the private sector will only invest when risk is limited in return for profits. 
Countries that have economic and political instability often see the state or an international 
body absorbing the risk of port operations. 
 
Goss (1990c) and Baird (1995) argue that ‘port regulation’ is an essential element that should 
not be transferred to the private sector because its nature as a quasi public good implies that 
the private company will be regulating itself and other competing companies in the same port 
area. The regulation of ports is also an essential element which combines duties and 
responsibilities that a port authority has to enforce as established by statute. In addition to the 
above, a port authority may also be expected to monitor the performance of the port, coordinate 
policy making with local and national government bodies, plan for future expansion, and 
market and promote the entire port and its facilities to users. Therefore, port regulation is the 
                                                 
2 A quasi public good is a good that is excludable but non rival (Hubbard et al. 2015, p.464) 
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one element of a port which should be least likely to be privatised, as this will imply that the 
port company regulates itself along with competing companies within the port area. Instead, 
convincing arguments have been made in favour of the retention of public port authorities to 
ensure the regulatory function to be effectively carried out (Goss 1990c; Baird 1995). As 
Baltazar and Brooks (2001, p.171) noted, 
 
If the government opts to privatize the regulator functions, the authors believe these 
should not be outsourced to the port. If this happens, as it sometimes does, the fox 
would oversee monitoring or overseeing the chicken barn, and the potential for abuse 
of the natural monopoly position that ports may enjoy increases dramatically. 
  
Regardless of whether or not there is a landlord or comprehensive port authority, Goss (1990c) 
argues that only a public authority can provide the necessary monitoring to protect the public 
against monopoly behaviour. This is because the private sector's time horizon can be relatively 
short compared to that of the public sector due to pressure by shareholders for quick results. 
This in turn results in higher prices to recover costs more quickly. However, Baird (1999; 2012) 
argues that the public sector has its own timeframes with politicians under pressure by their 
constituents as seen in the case of the port privatisation in the United Kingdom. Therefore, 
there is a strong argument in the literature for public authorities to retain their regulatory 
function (Goss 1990c; Baird 1995; Balthazar and Brooks 2006; Cullinane and Song 2002; Tull 
and Affleck 2007).  
 
Opponents of privatisation argue that privatization would lead to monopolies, loss of service, 
reduced flexibility, and unfairness among users as well as between modes. Some view private 
ownership as the elevation of private greed over public interest and as a short sighted policy 
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that sells valuable state assets in order to finance tax cuts with no adequate safeguards for the 
consumer or worker (Gillen and Cooper 1995).  However, Goss (1990a; 1990b) argues that a 
public port could still abuse its market power through excessive rent extraction by port 
authorities. Goss (1990c) gives the example of the discovery of oil beneath the Port of Long 
Beach. Its extraction provided a royalty revenue stream to the port authority. However, as these 
funds could only be spent on improving the port for commerce and fishing, it resulted in 
accumulating revenue surpluses which were held as a deposit.  Goss concludes that both 
government and market failure is possible and perhaps port authorities should have most 
activities carried out by the private sector while still retaining ownership.  
 
Similarly, Tull (1997) argues that the lack of competition amongst Australian ports in major 
capital cities existed because their geographical location had provided them with monopoly 
power over their hinterlands. This led to poor rankings of efficiency when benchmarked against 
international comparisons of efficiency. Tull’s analysis of the case study of the Fremantle Port 
Authority (FPA) in Western Australia showed that management practices at the FPA were 
inefficient due to over staffing and over investment. Internal promotions were also based on 
seniority rather than suitability for the position. Also, the price paid for office furniture was 
double if it had been obtained from outside the FPA. Instead of laying off surplus staff, they 
were employed to service the private vehicles of FPA staff. Therefore, the examples above 
suggest that public ports also enjoy monopoly rents if there is not sufficient competition to 
improve productivity and efficiency. 
 
Likewise, a ‘landlord model’ is also susceptible to abuse of monopoly power and regulation. 
Verhoeven (2014) argues that this is the case of three of the four major port authorities that 
have been corporatized in Belgium and Netherlands, with no specialised national port 
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regulator. This has resulted in the National Competition Authority handling complaints 
involving ports or they are resolved through consultation with port users or self regulation. 
These complaints include disagreement on expected financial performance, state dividends and 
corporate taxation. Dooms and Farrell (2017) argue that although the absence of independent 
regulators have not hampered economic performance, there is concern over whether these 
conflicts will exacerbate in European courts in the future. A similar situation was highlighted 
for UK ports that had privatised their regulatory function (Monios 2017; Tull and Affleck 
2007). This further highlights the need for the regulatory function to be independent and fall 
under public ownership. 
 
Goss (1990c) argues that property rights should fall within government ownership as it gives 
powers to build port structures, demolish old ones and act as a freeholder. Secure property 
rights are necessary for port authorities to perform their functions. Public ownership also 
enables port planning to be carried out by the government. There is also the quasi public goods 
argument which views ports as providing goods that are unlikely to be provided by the market 
and are non rival but excludable. Therefore, a private company will not have an incentive to 
provide for goods from which it cannot earn revenue. On the contrary, the public sector can 
also levy taxes and distort the economy if it is unable to raise funds for investments in port 
infrastructure. Similarly, Goss (1990c) argues that negative externalities can occur within the 
port sector such as port congestion, pollution such as rubbish dumping and oil spills irrespective 
of ownership. There is also a need to agree on routes to link between the port and its hinterland 
to manage congestion or intermodal interference which further emphasises the need for public 
ownership. There is also a risk that competition might see the development of mergers, cartels 
and other forms of market power abuse, which can have negative effects on economic welfare.  
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Cullinane and Song (2002) argue that a division of responsibilities between a public port 
authority and private sector operators may well result in poor coordination of investments, 
services and operations. This could ultimately lead to reduced efficiency of hinterland 
operations. As a result, they may be inclined to abandon facilities and services which, although 
socially or environmentally essential, are less rewarding or incur expenditure rather than earn 
revenues. This was seen in the case of port privatisation in Sweden which will be discussed in 
the next section. In recent times, countries such as Greece, and Portugal have had to privatise 
their ports as a precondition for receiving funding from international institutions as part of the 
bailout conditions imposed following the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ (Brooks et. al. 2017). 
 
Monios (2017) shows that ports in the UK system include private, trust and municipal ports. 
The national perspective in the UK is for ports to be self governing unlike other countries that 
have adopted the ‘landlord model’ approach to retain and influence port matters. Privatisation 
in the UK ports occurred in two phases. The first phase was when several ports came under 
public ownership at the end of World War II under the British Transport Docks Board (BTBD) 
which was renamed as Associated British Ports (ABP) in 1982. Port privatisation saw 49 per 
cent of shares sold in 1983 and the remainder in 1984, with ABP now the largest owner of 21 
ports in the UK. The second phase began in the early 1990s with the selling of a handful of the 
largest trust ports. However, it should be mentioned that the Ports of Liverpool and Felixstowe 
had already been privatised in 1971 and 1991 respectively. Full privatisation of ports in the UK 
limited competition due to monopoly ownership on estuaries and on single cargo sites such as 
oil terminals. This potentially allowed port owners to extract economic rent from users through 
their combined landlord and harbour authority status with limited oversight from the 




Also, full privatisation left no role for further reform initiatives. Monios (2017) argues that the 
abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) in 1989 brought about more 
improvements in efficiency at ports than the change in ownership model. Thus, the UK case 
highlights that the choice of governance model does not necessarily relate with port 
performance. 
 
Over the last twenty years, Baird (2013a) argues that the UK had witnessed private equity3 
firms acquiring port operating groups and explores the reasons and implications of such 
ownership. Baird’s study focuses on major ports owned by private equity funds and excludes 
ownership by port operating companies. The port privatisation process in the 1980s saw former 
public sector port officials buying their ports at discounted prices through private equity and 
selling them on for higher prices once the financial markets settled. In many countries, ports 
are viewed as strategic assets and it is rare to have the state sell its ports.  This rationale for port 
privatisation in the UK was due to the belief in political circles that it was the markets, and not 
government’s function to provide port capacity.  
 
Baird argues that for many private equity firms, ports are a safe investment as they exist in 
semi protected markets and have significant barriers to entry which should result in sustainable 
profits. Private equity firms are also interested in the attractiveness of the asset so that in can 
be resold in future years to repay the borrowed capital. With increase in trade flows, seaports 
offer growth potential as traffic volumes and revenues will also grow. These sustainable profits 
allow the private equity firms to repay interest on debt from a leveraged transaction. As such, 
                                                 




Baird (2013a) argues that private equity ownership is not focused on creating new port assets 
to benefit the wider community or improve competitiveness in the economy. 
 
However, Farrell (2013) challenges the arguments Baird (2013a) makes about private equity 
ownership. Farrell’s (2013) argument is that profitability under private equity ownership is not 
any less than under other types of private ownership or public sector ports. Also, case studies 
have produced mixed results in terms of stability of ownership. Farrell argues that although the 
prices paid for the Trust Ports in the UK were low, this has created an image of the port industry 
as a ‘get rich quick’ scheme which was not the case. This was because the privatisation process 
coincided with the recession of the early 1990s which saw ports report falling profits. Port land 
was also undervalued and it was believed that the end of the NDLS would bring about an 
increase in competition. However, Farrell (2013) agrees that the privatisation process was 
badly structured. Ports chose their own form of privatisation, subject to the approval of the 
Department for Transport. However, Baird (2013) responds by arguing that private equity 
ownership and regulation should be avoided as it entrusts its seaport ownership in the hands of 
offshore investors with highly leveraged transactions based on borrowed money. Baird argues 
that UK has to look towards the approach used by other countries in managing seaports and 
other infrastructure. 
 
Monios (2017) agrees that Baird (2013) is correct in his criticism of the high level of both debt 
and profits found in private equity ownership of many UK ports. However, Monios also agrees 
with Farrell (2013) that the lack of investment by private equity firms may not always be the 
end result if the right incentives are present to these operators. Monios (2017) argues that the 
national perspective in the UK is for ports to be self governing unlike countries that have 
adopted the ‘landlord model’ approach to retain and influence port matters. In more recent 
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times, there has been a push by the Department for Transport towards preparing National 
Master Plans to allow national monitoring. However, Italy and Germany have also struggled 
with national level coordination of port investments. Despite this, Baird (2013) and Monios 
(2017) argue for the need to establish a national port regulator to represent the nation’s interest 
and monitor port performance.  
 
In summary, both the arguments for and against the public versus private ownership debate 
have merit. Most arguments against public ports are arguments against inefficiencies arising 
from bureaucracies, monopolies and the role of regulation. In the public arena, political 
interference and lack of appropriate incentives can reach the point where managers simply want 
to be left alone and so they merely do enough to achieve that goal. The arguments for 
privatisation are around improving efficiency, performance and maintaining a competitive 
edge. This is achieved through owners capitalising the future value of decisions into the value 
of the firm which provides owners and managers a greater incentive to perform. The case of 
the UK ports also highlight the issues around national coordination of port planning. The next 
section looks at the empirical evidence of whether or not there is a preferred model for 
governance.  
 
2.4 Trends in Port Governance 
 
The late 1980s and 1990s saw the first wave of port reforms through privatisation in the UK 
ports. Brooks and Pallis (2012) argue that the ‘new public management’ philosophy was a 
result of dealing with budget deficits and desire to improve efficiency of public enterprises. A 
growing body of empirical evidence shines some light on the governance models used and port 
performance. Baird (2002) identifies and analyses recent trends about privatization of the 
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world’s top-100 container ports. The results suggest that the most common aim or motivation 
behind a port seeking to bring in the private sector is to increase efficiency and lower port costs. 
Terminal concessions and leasehold arrangements are the most common methods used by ports 
to facilitate private sector intervention. Although some models such as the public port 
authority/private concession or lease arrangement models are used more than others, the key 
conclusion is that there is no single approach to port privatisation. The model and split between 
public/private investments depends on local laws, competition and the local ‘way of doing 
things’.  
 
A key feature of port reform in many countries involved eliminating the role of state run 
monopolies, decentralisation and involving the private sector (Wilmsmeier and Monios 2015). 
As discussed in the previous section, port privatisation began in the UK with the outright sale 
of the port, leaving the ports with no port regulator. The process evolved in two stages with 
privatisation of state owned ports and railways from 1979 to 1983. This was followed by the 
sale of major trust ports. The reform also saw the abolition of the NDLS which allowed the 
ports to be more competitive. Brooks and Pallis (2012) argue that the driver behind the sale of 
British ports was more about removing public ownership rather than improving port 
infrastructure and facilities as undertaken in other countries (Brooks and Pallis 2012). 
Haarmeyer and Yorke (1993) argue that the outcome of port privatization in the UK resulted 
in more profitable and efficient ports. However, Baird (1995) argues that the privatized ports 
became profitable as a reflection of their low debt beginnings coupled with other advantages 
such as local and estuarial monopolies, real estate gains, and self-regulation of financial support 
for the industry. Baird concluded that many of the trust ports were sold at below real market 
value and had no meaningful competing bids. Despite its merits and demerits, gradually the 
British privatisation wave spread across the globe. 
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Port privatization had begun to move forward in Mexico with the country’s largest port, 
Veracruz, taking the first step towards privatization by franchising three private stevedoring 
services in May 1991(Villa 2017). Privatisation in Malaysia also followed with its first 
container terminal, Port Klang, which was becoming profitable but inefficient by international 
standards to handle the growth of a newly industrialising economy. It had complaints about 
congestion, low productivity and pilferage. In 1983, the privatisation process began with the 
Fifth Malaysian Plan 1986-1990. The Kelang Container Terminal was initialy corporatised 
before privatisation followed in 1992 (Tull and Reveley 2002; 2008, Ghashat et al. 2011). In 
1989, Thailand's government signed contracts with CT International Lines for private 
management of its new ports at Phuket and Songhla and reached an agreement with striking 
Bangkok port workers that only the container-terminal portion will be contracted out and the 
government's Port Authority will operate the general cargo terminal (Haarmeyer and Yorke 
1993).  
 
In 1996, the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), decided to privatise its port administration. 
Tongzon (2008) states that Singapore took a gradual path towards privatisation through 
corporatisation compared with other Southeast Asian ports. The driver behind privatisation was 
not to balance the budget, as the PSA’s financial performance was sound. Rather, it was to give 
the PSA greater responsibilities and autonomy over everyday decisions and commercial 
strategy. With growing competition, especially from Malaysia, the government felt that it was 
necessary to make changes to the governance structure to enhance commercial flexibility and 
operate and invest effectively. This gave the PSA more autonomy and ensured a level playing 




However, the departure of two major container shipping lines, ‘Maersk’ in 2000 and the 
Taiwanese shipping line ‘Evergreen’ in 2002 to the neighbouring Malaysian port of Tanjung 
Pelepas demonstrated the threat regional competition could pose to the PSA. Therefore, the 
PSA Corporation was restructured to cover only Singapore’s domestic container terminal 
operations. In December 2003, this downsized entity became a fully owned subsidiary of a new 
holding company, PSA International. This enabled PSA International to have a more global 
focus and explore international opportunities as a response to limited growth opportunities in 
Singapore (Cullinane et al.2007). 
 
The Port of Rotterdam underwent a similar corporatisation process in 2004. The reason behind 
the corporatisation was to provide more autonomy from the municipality with the port still 
being owned by the local government. In 2008, the Port of Rotterdam was the first amongst 
other European ports to adopt an international strategy. This model allowed the opportunity for 
international activities such as boardroom consultancy, management contracts and joint 
ventures. With limited growth in the home market, greater financial and strategic freedom 
enabled the port authority to broaden its focus from Rotterdam to taking equity stakes in ports 
abroad (De Langen and Van der Lugt 2017).  
 
The success of Swedish port privatisation has been rather limited. Bergqvist and Cullinane 
(2017) argue that the Port of Gothenburg had experienced several disturbances because of 
privatisation. In 2013, APM terminals decided to increase tariffs by using a ‘loophole’ in the 
agreement that allowed them to introduce new charges. Customers were disappointed with the 
increase in tariffs as there had been no improvement in service levels or infrastructure 
investment to justify the increase. Prior to privatisation, the coordination of rail services to 
different terminals and freight segments was relatively easy. However, this has become a lot 
67 
 
more difficult as privatisation saw the separation of terminal operations and the port authority 
which became responsible for the overall rail coordination. This reinforces the arguments of 
Goss (1990c) and Baird (1999) raised in the previous section that property rights should fall 
within government ownership to improve coordination issues. Monios (2017) and Baird (2013) 
also argue that the UK ports face a similar issue with no national port regulator monitoring port 
performance or national interests. 
 
Historically, ports in Australia have been publicly owned. Port reform in Australia was driven 
by the Federal government’s push for microeconomic reform in the early 1990s. The aim of 
the microeconomic reform was to improve economic performance through improvements in 
efficiency. In 1995, the National Competition Policy was designed to produce a co-ordinated 
approach to competition reforms (Reveley and Tull 2008).  Port reform initiatives in Australia 
include the sale and transfer of ownership, sale of assets of infrastructure or services, long-term 
lease arrangements, corporatization and commercialization (Everett and Robinson 1998). 
According to Reveley and Tull (2008), port privatisation began in Victoria in 1996 when 
Geelong and Portland were sold. This was followed by privatisation in South Australia where 
all ports were sold to Flinders Ports in 2001. 
 
Chen et al. (2017) argues that port privatisation in Australia’s major capital cities has been part 
of the government’s asset recycling project to fund other infrastructure and reduce debt. The 
resulting governance structure is a 99 year long term leasehold for the port with the private 
sector. The duration of a 99 year lease does appear long but the rationale for it is to attract 
investors with a long term perspective. However, Chen et al. (2017) argues if there is no term 
in the lease contract about performance management, it is possible that investors will limit port 
investment and maintenance, especially towards the end of the lease term.  Also, under the 
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private landlord model, the company can exercise monopoly power through vertical integration 
and higher port charges which could have an impact prices of port services. This approach was 
undertaken at the Port of Brisbane (2010), Port Botany (2013), Port Kembla (2013), Port of 
Newcastle (2014) and Port of Darwin (2015). The privatisation of the Port of Darwin also 
raised national security concerns as it included the Darwin Marine Supply Base. The Northern 
Territory Government signed a $506 million deal with Landbridge Group owned by Chinese 
billionaire Ye Cheng for 99 years, with Landbridge taking a 80 per cent take, leaving Australian 
stakeholders with 20 per cent. The concerns were raised because Darwin plays host to major 
Navy and multinational exercises and is the centre from which the Navy conducts border 
integrity operations (ABC News, 15th October 2015). Therefore, these concerns of customers 
and communities of the privatised ports need to be closely monitored. The Port of Brisbane, 
New South Wales and the Port of Newcastle have no price regulation nor a formal independent 
statutory regulator. Ports in New South Wales (NSW) need to provide advance notice of any 
propose change to port charges.  
 
However, Flinders Port in South Australia and the Port of Darwin in the Northern Territory 
have an independent regulatory and monitoring framework. A five yearly review of Flinder’s 
Port pricing regime showed that the port was already charging higher prices in 2012 compared 
to other ports (Lloyd’s List Australia, April 27th 2017).  In a submission to the Essential 
Services Commission of South Australia, Meehan and Tull (2012) argue that the approach 
adopted by the Commission to monitor trends in the prices of Essential Maritime Services was 
flawed as it is measured only against changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) instead of 
adopting a CPI-x regulation which could promote efficiency and place downward pressure on 
prices. This is because this approach encourages a private firm to maximise its increase in price, 
if permitted, without having to increase its efficiency. Therefore, Cheon et al. (2010) argues 
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that this privatisation reform might improve the government balance sheet but not necessarily 
the long term performance of the port.  
 
 
Ports in Western Australia have been operating under a commercialised governance model 
since 1999. Tull and Affleck (2007) evaluated the performance of eight WA port authorities 
after the regulatory regime of Western Australia’s ports had been rated as ‘poor’ by a report 
prepared by Access Economics for the Australian Council for Infrastructure 
Development(AusCID). Their results reflected that charges for services at Fremantle Port were 
not excessive compared with other similar ports around Australia. It was also difficult to make 
a direct linkage between economic regulation and superior economic performance.  The 
findings from the report emphasised the role for a broader set of regulatory arrangements to 
govern the management and performance of WA’s port authorities (Tull and Affleck 2007). In 
2014, the State Government decided to amalgamate seven of the eight port authorities into four 
regional port authorities. This was done to improve planning and port coordination across the 
State (Department of Transport n.d). 
 
 
Rapid economic development and growing trade has led to Asian ports dominating worldwide 
container trade. By 2015, thirteen Chinese seaports ranked in the top 20 global ports. In China, 
policies of port corporatisation and privatisation have led to a much more market-oriented 
governance structure which has encouraged foreign investment and the diversification of 
ownership of port assets (Notteboom and Yang 2017).  However, corruption in China continues 
to be a problem. Transparency International (2016), a risk based consultancy, ranks corruption 
in China a score of 79 out of 176 countries with a significant level of corruption presence in its 
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public sector. The initiatives taken to deal with corruption have intensified in China under the 
current President, Xi Jinping which has resulted in more rigorous administrative and reporting 
processes at ports. 
 
Turning to Africa, Dooms and Farrell (2017) discuss the privatisation at the Ports of Nigeria, 
Ghana and Mozambique. Port reform in Ghana took place as part of the government’s wider 
reform programme, the Ghana Trade and Investment Gateway (GHATIG), that was initiated 
in 1998. This led to the port governance shift towards a national landlord port authority model 
which has also been partially successful. Port reform began with privatisation of stevedoring 
services and 20 year concessions to invite international terminal operators to manage its 
terminal. However, the challenge that the port authority in Ghana has to deal with is securing 
private sector investments through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), timely investment in 
infrastructure and improving access to its hinterland. The ports in Kenya and Tanzania that still 
operate under the ‘tool port’ model could benefit from the privatisation lessons of the ports in 
Nigeria, Ghana and Mozambique. 
 
Prior to privatisation, Nigerian ports were suffering from poor infrastructure, high dwell times, 
low labour productivity, high port charges, theft, customs fraud and overmanning due to 
nepotism and patronage. Although the privatisation process has resulted in improvements in 
operational efficiency at Nigerian ports, it has been held back by a lack of customs reform 
despite automated checks and hiring private companies to scan imported containers, corruption 
and high cost of port services. Terminal operators have also complained about the inadequate 
infrastructure at the ports. The government also banned the import of cargoes such as fish and 
cement that could be produced locally in response to the collapse in oil prices in 2015. This has 
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reduced terminal throughput without compensation for port customers (Dooms and Farrell 
2017). 
 
A further study by Sequeira and Djankov (2008) found the probability of paying a bribe at the 
Port of Maputo in Mozambique is nearly 53 per cent compared to 36 per cent at the Port of 
Durban in South Africa. Bribes at the Port of Maputo accounted for a 130 per cent increase in 
total port costs. At Maputo, bribery was limited to custom transactions carried out in person as 
private sector managers had been successful in keeping informal payments to employees in 
check due to its port reform process. Contrarily, automation of customs procedures at the Port 
of Durban found corruption greater amongst dock workers who were protected by powerful 
unions. The high level of corruption at Maputo has seen cargo diverted to the port of Durban. 
Nigeria’s corruption ranking based on Transparency International (2016) is 136 out of 176 
countries while Mozambique’s ranking for corruption is even higher at 142 out of 176 
countries. However, corruption ranking at South Africa is much lower at 64 out of 176 
countries. Although these rankings can be subjective and should only be used as a guideline, 
they do support the findings from Sequeira and Djankov (2008). 
 
In South Africa, Havenga et al. (2017) discuss the public ownership and management of the 
ports by the state owned company Transnet. The two operating divisions of Transnet are the 
Transnet National Ports Authority which is responsible for landlord functions and Transnet 
Port Terminal responsible for operations. As the port system in South Africa is vertically 
integrated and managed by the same company, port reform and regulation played a key role in 
mitigating pricing and institutional distortion which was necessary to achieve a fair level of 




Turning to Canada, Canadian ports have traditionally been owned by the Federal government 
and have witnessed waves of port reforms since the 1990s. These reforms were prompted by 
the release of the government’s ‘National Marine Policy’ document which proposed the 
commercialisation of ports in Canada. This resulted in the creation of Canada Port Authorities 
(CPA) in 1998. The federal government is still responsible for approving new construction on 
port-owned lands, which in many other countries is the responsibility of the local government. 
The commercialised port authority is responsible for operating an autonomous and financially 
sustainable commercial organisation.  
 
Brooks (2017) argues that future reform towards privatisation is beginning to be discussed in 
Canada because of a recent review of transport policy which ‘encourages’ port privatisation.  
This has influenced discussions to expand capacity at the Port of Vancouver’s ‘Roberts Bank 
Terminal 2’ project, as part of a major container terminal expansion. The debate taking place 
is whether the revenue earned from the port authorities, which is a federal asset, should be 
reinvested into the port or used for other pressing needs. This would leave the private sector to 
bear the risk and finance the investment instead of the Federal Government. Although it has 
been argued that this expansion is not needed, this will be assessed by the level of interest the 
project attracts from private investors (C.D Howe Institute 2017). 
 
Unlike Canadian ports, American ports receive subsidies from local governments. Balthazar 
and Brooks (2017) argue that it is difficult to allocate the United States (US) ports to a 
governance category. Many US ports are non operating landlords with terminal activities 
managed by management leases or contractual arrangements (Brooks and Pallis 2012). Brooks 
and Pallis (2012) stress that the only federal role for port authorities in the US is channel and 
navigational aid maintenance. The ports in the US are owned by government with cargo 
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handling terminals outsourcing their services to the private sector. Some ports engage in 
strategic collaboration and have expanded their role from traditional landlord to supply chain 
participation (Knatz 2017). Knatz (2017) argues that, unlike other countries, the US has seen 
very minimal change to port governance over the last decade. 
 
In Chile, port reform took place towards the end of the 1990s at the two main container ports, 
San Antonio and Valparaiso which brought about improvements in port productivity and 
efficiency. Prior to port reform, the ports operated on a ‘tool port’ model and intra competition 
between the two ports was minimal. The introduction of a concession in 2000 resulted in a 
private operator at each port which saw port throughput increase till 2011. However, the post 
financial crisis environment has seen container throughput decline due to infrastructure 
constraints. Although the terminals and ports operate efficiently, the reform failed to create a 
national port authority, leaving strategic and long term planning decisions to the Ministry of 
Transport and Telecommunications. Therefore, as the current governance model of 
concessions is drawing to an end, port planning development from the public authorities has 
not kept pace. The Chilean experience resulted in a new path dependence breaking out which 
resulted in a complete transfer of power from the public sector to private terminal operator, 
creating institutional weakness through over reliance on terminal operators. This can be seen 
when operations by private operators result in congestion or labour strikes that close the port 
and pose a threat to the national economy, leaving government with only a few options to 
address the problem (Wilmsmeier and Sánchez 2017). 
 
Baird (2010) argues that despite evidence of significance private sector involvement in port 
operations and services, the results suggest that the public sector still has a strong interest in its 
seaport system. The leading general cargo ports of the world such as Singapore, Rotterdam and 
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Hong Kong are public ports and are among the largest and most efficient container ports 
globally. Although publicly managed, each has a significant level of private sector participation 
in cargo-handling operations. The updated outcome of port governance reforms in various 
countries is summarised in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.6: Summary of trends in port governance reform 
Country  Date of last major 
reform (previous 
reform) 
Port Governance Model Before and After Reform 
Australia 2015 (1990s) Port ownership models have evolved from public ownership to full privatisation (Flinder’s port) and towards a landlord model 
(99 year lease) models in the East Coast. However, ports in the West Coast have evolved to commercialised entities and have 
undergone a further amalgamation process. 
 
Belgium  2009 (1999) Corporatised ports owned by the municipality that are fully autonomous. The ports of Ghent, Antwerp and Ostend have become 
limited companies.  Port authorities nevertheless remain dependent on financial support from the Region 
 
Brazil  2013 (1993) In the early 1990s, a law was passed that transferred port operations to the private sector. The role of the existing Docks companies 
was transferred to port authorities. Further reform was introduced by the Federal Government in 2012 to establish clearer rules 




Canada 1998 (1982) Canadian ports have been running as commercialised entities since reform in the 1990s. However, there is still discussion taking 






Chilean ports have experienced a devolution process to the private sector that started in the 1990s. This was done to shift the 
responsibility, financing and management of port performance to the private sector. 
 
China 2004 The Chinese ports have seen a significant change in port governance from a completely public or centralised model that shifted 
gradually to a joint management model for ports between central and local government between 1984 to 2004.The Port Law of 
2004 saw a more decentralised port governance model which led to the corporatisation of ports and encouraged foreign investment 
by abolishing the 49 per cent ceiling and the need to have a local Chinese partner. 
 
Cyprus  2016 (1973) The ports of Cyprus have been running on public or state owned model since the 1970s and operate on a National level as there 
are no local port authorities. However, with a slowdown in business and profit in transhipment traffic, the trigger for port reform 
came in 2013 when the financial crisis engulfed Cyprus. This resulted in international creditors bailing out the State on the 
condition that inefficient State assets were liberalised. This saw the ports shift to a commercialise model for the Port of Limassol 











Kenya 2004 (1977) 
Tanzania 2004 (1993, 
1977) 
Reform in Africa has seen the private sector play a more influential role through participation in terminal operations. However, 
there are still concerns about the lack of a proper legal framework for investment and absence of an independent regulatory 
authorities. Following the break-up of the East African Community in 1977, Kenyan and Tanzanian ports were owned and 
managed by the national government. In Kenya, a landlord model was proposed in 2004 but it still operates a service port with 




In France, ports had previously operated according to the ‘tool model’ where the port authority manages the infrastructure and 
operations of the port. Since then, the French model of port governance has experienced two successive waves of reforms that 
have modified the status of ports. In 2004 ports were devolved to local authorities and the 2008 reform aimed at reorganising the 




Port reform began in Greece with the corporatisation in 1999 with its two major ports Piraeus and Thessaloniki which were 
converted to government owned port corporation. This also included the quassi corporatisation of 12 ports of ‘national interest’. 
The 2008 financial crisis saw the call for tenders for the operation of the container terminals resulting in a Chinese state owned 
company, COSCO Pacific as a majority port owner. 
 
Hong Kong - In Hong Kong, port governance is largely left to the private sector to finance, develop and operate terminal facilities. The role of 
the government is around port planning and providing the necessary infrastructure to service the port. 
 
Italy  2016 (1994) Italy’s port reform began in 1994 as it transitioned from the public to the landlord model. However, port authorities were not 
given financial autonomy. With Italian ports at the risk of losing its position, further reform took place in 2016 which saw the 
consolidation of 24 port authorities into 15 port authorities with greater financial autonomy. 
 
Japan  2011 (1995) The Japanese ports current policy is to target public investments on a limited number of transhipment hub ports due to a shrinking 
budget and loss of its competition to the Port of Busan in Korea as a transhipment hub and other nearby Asian ports. 
 
Korea  2010 (1996) Ports in Korea are operated by the government with strong growth following the growth in the Chinese economy. Over time, this 
model has evolved to see more private sector participation to expands it business overseas. The Korean port governance models 
is best described as a mixture of public and private participation or Private/Public port. 
 
Malaysia Late 1980s Port Klang was privatised as part of the Malaysian government ‘Fifth Malaysian Plan 1986-1990 and developed as a leading 
transhipment hub in Malaysia. 
 
Mexico 2013/14 (2005, 1993) Port governance in Mexico has been completely operating under a closed economy public model, resulting in a lack of 











1988 Ports were under the public ownership model. However, the Port Companies Amendment Act 1990 allowed ports to be fully 
privatised. The outcome was partial privatisation of Northland Port Corporation, Port of Tauranga, Southport and Lyttelton Port 
through listing of shares on the New Zealand stock exchange. 
 
Portugal  2005–2007 (1998) The Portuguese ports operated a tool port governance model in the 1990s which gradually moved towards the landlord model in 
1993. The 2005 reform saw Port Authorities being introduced with responsibilities with management objectives. From 2005 to 
2015, the governance model saw the introduction of new legislation allowing for greater liberalisation of port services. 
 
Singapore  2004 (1996) Port reform in Singapore began in 1996 with a shift from a public model to a landlord model. 
 
South Africa 2002 (1990s) Ports in South Africa are public port models which are managed by the state owned company Transnet. It is responsible for port 
operations, port landlord and railroad. 
 
Sweden 2009/10 Swedish ports have traditionally been owned by municipalities. However, greater regional involvement in the port sector 
influenced the process of port privatisation at the Port of Gothenburg in Sweden. According to port authorities, the Gothenburg 
privatisation has not been very successful and privatisation has since stalled. 
 
Taiwan 2012 Taiwanese ports have been owned by the government by four units that acted both as the regulator and market player. In 2012, 
the government decided that port efficiency needed to be increased and set out towards a landlord model in which there was 
privatisation but public ownership was retained. 
 
Turkey 2004 (1993) Turkey’s ports have traditionally been operated by the government. However, operational limits of public ports saw the need for 
port devolution. This resulted in a shift in governance from the service port model towards a tool port model and now moving 







Port governance in the UK system includes private, trust and municipal ports. Privatisation in the UK ports occurred in two phases. 
The first phase was when several ports came under public ownership at the end of World War II under the British Transport Docks 
Board (BTBD) which was renamed as Associated British Ports (ABP) in 1982. Port privatisation saw 49 per cent of shares sold 
in 1983 and the remainder in 1984, with ABP now the largest owner of 21 ports in the UK. The second phase began in the early 
1990s with a handful of the largest trust ports were sold. However, it should be mentioned that the Ports of Liverpool and 








No substantive reform The port governance in US is difficult to categorise as many US ports are non operating landlords with terminal activities managed 
by management leases or contractual arrangements. They still remain under public ownership. 
Source: Adapted from Brooks et al. (2017) with additions from Reveley and Tull (2008) on New Zealand and Reveley and Tull (2002) on Malaysian ports
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It can be seen from the discussion of the ports summarised in Table 2.6 that ports still have a 
significant level of government ownership with the level of private sector investment in ports 
which varies from concessions, PPPs, corporatisation and commercialisation. In countries such 
as the UK, it can be debated if the privatisation process brought about efficiency gains and a 
loss of monitoring roles for government which could be unpalatable to other governments. 
However, the privatisation of the Malaysian ports has seen Port Klang and the Port of Tanjung 
Pelepas improve performance significantly. Institutional conditions also restrict port 
governance choices. The Port of Rotterdam exemplifies this as it is still owned by the local 
government and is keen on keeping its ‘Hanseatic’ tradition but saw the importance of the role 
of the private sector to maintain its competitive advantage. On the other hand, countries such 
as Singapore have been successful at operating a ‘landlord’ model where government 
ownership still plays a dominant role but operations are outsourced to the private sector. 
 
Brooks et al. (2017) argues that port reform is never easy to implement as the timeframe varies 
from country to country as seen in the discussion above. Some countries such as France took 
three years to implement their port reform while Brazil took twenty years as this process was 
disrupted by conflicts and lengthy negotiations. Reforms in Greece have been slow while there 
have not been any substantive reforms in the United States over the last decade. However, the 
uncertainty surrounding global events such as the 2008 global economic crisis have also made 
it more challenging for governance frameworks to respond appropriately. At the same time, 
the economic crisis also provided the impetus for many ports to transition towards the landlord 
model to reduce costs, improve efficiency and profits. For example, the global economic crisis 
saw both Korean and Taiwanese ports lose their competitiveness as transhipment centres. This 
resulted in both countries pursuing extensive reform to restore their former positions as 
transhipment hubs (Song & Lee 2017; Pilcher & Tseng 2017; Brooks et al. 2017).    
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Brooks et al. (2017) argues that the conclusion from scholars studying port reform is that 
despite governments wanting to have a more commercial focus, the results from port reform in 
various countries did not deliver the full benefits that were sought. One of the reasons for this 
is the complexity involved in the reform process which involves policy actors initiating the 
change, successful implementation of the reform process and the transition time, that can be 
affected by many variables. Flaws in the decision making or implementation process together 
with an inconsistent governance framework, have given rise to some unsatisfactory results. 
Therefore, board membership of ports can also determine the outcome of port reform. Good 
governance, accountability and transparency and independence of board directors also have a 
significant impact on the trajectory of port reform. 
 
The empirical evidence on port reform in various countries does suggest that there is no perfect 
model. Tull and Reveley (2002) argue that although there can be a tendency to apply a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach, different forms of privatisation are needed to suit the different 
circumstances of individual ports. Likewise, Brooks and Pallis (2008; 2012) argue that the 
trends in port governance summarise the ‘public versus private’ debate that neither the public 
or private ownership model delivers the best result. Rather, each country has its own 
institutional framework, traditions and culture that best determine the appropriate model of port 
reform, dispelling the myth of the perfect model.  
 
This argument is further strengthened by several authors Debrie et al. (2013) arguing that the 
‘myth of the ideal model’ for port governance does not exists. This is because of a lack of 
strong relationship between the governance framework and port efficiency. Therefore, further 
investigation needs to take place focusing on the relationship between time and space to gain 
a better understanding of the transformations that occur during various waves of port reform. 
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Therefore, Debrie et al. (2013) argues that the World Bank’s Port Reform Toolkit provides a 
very static analysis on port reform that describes the tasks of port authorities whereas a more 
dynamic analysis is needed to evaluate both the short term and long term evaluation of reform. 
This evolutionary approach discussed earlier in the chapter will provide better reasoning in 
evaluating the discrepancies between intended reform and realised reform. However, there is 
consensus in the literature that devolution of port operations does improve efficiency outcomes. 
Likewise, many port authorities that have adopted the ‘landlord model’ have also understood 
the importance of having a more commercial focus in the governance of ports. As port 
operations become automated, cyber security threats have started to pose a challenge to port 
governance. The next section discusses these security risks and measures taken to increase 
cyber security. 
 
2.5 Port Automation and Cyber Security 
 
As the shipping industry develops rapidly with mega sized container vessels and alliances, 
automation and digitisation has begun to disrupt the traditional ways in which cargo is handled, 
interaction with customer bookings and invoicing shippers. Although this is not discussed in 
detailed for the case study ports which have no fully automated terminals, the greater demand 
on the technology platforms used has meant that cyber security is starting to become a dominant 
issue for ports (The Maritime Executive, 22nd  December 2017). The case study ports only have 
partially automated terminals, but industry pressure and competition is pushing for ports to 
invest in automation to improve efficiency, productivity and lower costs. Currently, only 4 to 




The challenges in protecting automated terminals from cyber attacks lies in the complexity of 
the network links between mechanical and data networks. These attacks tend to target 
vulnerabilities along a supply chain, allowing cyber criminals to attack from a number of entry 
points. Also, the spread of viruses on port systems with Wi-Fi is much easier. UNCTAD (2017) 
reports that this raises the risk of facing cyberattacks such as hacking, malware, phishing and 
Trojan horses that can be sent from hackers and criminals around the world. Cyberattacks 
aimed at stealing sensitive data can have repercussions for companies and also national 
security. Therefore, security measures for data protection need to be in place in the event of a 
partial or total disruption of facilities. 
 
In the past, there has been insufficient focus on cybersecurity from the States of the European 
Union due to insufficient awareness of security challenges among government, port authorities, 
shipping companies and telecommunication providers. Cyber threats to ships can occur through 
their global positioning systems that exchange data about the ships positions, cargoes, and 
speed. The threat to ports comes as the attackers gain access to systems to seize a ship, close a 
port or terminal or even get access to sensitive information such as pricing documents 
(UNCTAD 2017). 
 
Even small cyberattacks can result in losses of millions of dollars for businesses. In 2001, the 
internet systems of the Port of Houston were attacked in the United States. This affected the 
entire performance of its network including the supply of tides, water depth and weather data 
which affected the ships’ navigation to the harbour. In 2013, the Port of Long Beach 
experienced several cyberattacks. The port responded by increasing its security measures, data 
integrity, installing firewalls and backing up key data. In June 2017, a cyberattack on Maersk 
shipping line affected the company’s worldwide operations and cost the company nearly 
83 
 
US$300 million. This resulted in a logistical catastrophe, delayed shipments, closure of 
terminals in several worldwide ports including the Port of Rotterdam, Netherlands, Jawaharlal 
Nehru Port in India and terminals in the United States. The attack involved ransomware which 
takes control of a computer and demands online payment to gain access to data and systems 
(UNCTAD 2017; The Maritime Executive, 22nd  December 2017). 
 
In response to the cyberattacks, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) has 
advocated the need for guidelines to deal with cyber security threats (The Maritime Executive 
22nd, December 2017). Also, blockchain technology has started to develop as a security 
response to these cyberattacks. Blockchain is a distributed database that creates multiple copies 
of records on different computer systems using cryptography and other techniques to create 
secure records of transactions. This technology has been trialed in finance with the introduction 
of the bitcoin and other digital currencies. Although in its early stages, the use of blockchain 
technology has been recommended for maritime shipping for the transfer and sharing of data, 
including the status of shipments and pilot studies that have been used in logistics and supply 
chains of the transport and maritime industry. Some shipping companies have also been 
trialling the use of blockchain for developing electronic alternatives for traditional paper based 
documents. However, some challenges remain with the use of blockchain. This include 
interoperability, legal issues and devising mechanisms to incorporate substantive maritime 
contract clauses (UNCTAD 2017). Therefore, regulatory frameworks for the maritime sector 
should reflect these cybersecurity concerns and ensure compliance and enforcement of these 
cybersecurity regulations. In the context of the case study ports in Indonesia, this is not 
explored in detail as they are not fully automated . However, this may become a growing issue 
in the future following global trends in port automation that increase cyber security risks and 





In conclusion, seaports as institutions have been shifting governance from public ownership to 
models of corporatisation, landlord ownership and full privatisation.  The governance model a 
port adopts is strongly linked to the cultural or institutional environment in each country. Ports 
as institutions can then develop institutional lock in or path dependency where the port will 
continue to exhibit behaviour in the same manner unless there is a major trigger for reform. 
Therefore, the outcome of port reform will depend largely upon whether a port authority is an 
entrepreneur, facilitator, adapter or leader. This institutionalised thinking influences the level 
of privatisation in the new port governance model.  
 
However, most port authorities have started to have a more commercial focus. Opponents of 
privatisation argue that government should provide port services as they view seaports as 
strategic assets managed by the government in the interest of the public. The counter argument 
is that efficiency gains can be achieved through greater private contracting and the flexibility 
with which the private sector can use resources. However, when ports are partially privatised, 
a determination must be made as to what role should be retained by the public sector or public 
port authority in terms of limits on private operators and safeguards to prevent abuses. Effective 
regulation may be required where natural monopoly power exists. As discussed, there can be 
market failure in seaports in the processes of planning, controlling externalities and promoting 
competition if these are left wholly to the private sector.  
 
The empirical evidence on the trends in port governance in Section 2.4 remains inconclusive 
to answer the question if there is an ideal model for port governance. Different countries have 
chosen to go ahead with different governance models with various drivers for port reforms. 
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Some of these drivers include improving the ports efficiency, balancing budgets, 2008 financial 
crisis bailout and retaining a port’s competitive edge. As these forces change, they place 
pressure on the existing governance model to evolve. However, apart from the UK’s full 
privatization approach, there is consensus amongst most governments to want to retain the 
ownership of ports. Some of the most efficiently managed ports such as the ports of Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Rotterdam are managed by government through a landlord model. These 
ports have undertaken substantial efforts in port reform to increase their performance through 
increasing private sector participation.  
 
From the above cases, we can draw some broad conclusions. The timing of these reforms varies 
from country to country. Along with governance factors, the right legal and statutory 
framework, financial capability, balance of power with government and proactive management 
culture in port authorities also influences port performance (Verhoeven 2010). The general 
trend in the political environment towards privatization and liberalization has also had its 
influence on the port industry. It is also vital for a port to have active economic policy, forward 
planning and timely infrastructure investment to be successful. Port reform is an ongoing rather 
than a one time process. 
 
However, even though fully privatizing the regulatory or monitoring role is unpalatable to 
many governments, privatization can be seen to have a larger role to play in port governance 
today (Brooks and Pallis 2012). The most popular governance model appears to have elements 
of public ownership but has devolved the operations to the private sector through 
commercialization, corporatisation or adopting the ‘landlord model’. Therefore, government 
ownership is still a key feature of port governance. As observed, it is a challenging task to try 
and fit a port’s governance model into the WBPRTK. Instead it might be easier to define 
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governance models into public, hybrid (public and private) or fully privatized mode. 
Ultimately, the appropriate governance structure for a port is one where the balance of private 
and public responsibilities leads to improving port performance. 
 
Therefore, it is difficult to prescribe a ‘one size meets all’ model when there is no ‘perfect 
model’ of port governance (Brooks and Pallis 2012). The governance model will vary from 
country to country depending on both its internal and external environment. It is essential that 
global ports ensure they have institutional flexibility to respond to external challenges through 
medium and long term strategic planning. Brooks et al. (2017) argues that despite the diverse 
trajectories in port reform, there still is inconclusive evidence on which governance model is 
the best (Brooks 2007; Brooks and Pallis 2012). 
 
Although port reform processes have been documented extensively in the academic literature 
in both developed and developing countries, there is a gap in the literature as there has been 
limited research undertaken for port reform in Indonesia. In 2008, the Indonesian government 
undertook port reform to improve the competitiveness of its ports since 2008. The literature 
review set out in this chapter will provide a basis to analyse port reform in Indonesia to evaluate 
its performance and choice of governance model. Before delving further into the analysis, it is 
imperative to have a better understanding of the Indonesian economy to place the port reform 










The previous chapter discussed the various governance models and trends in ports around the 
world. Before evaluating port reform in Indonesia, this chapter aims to provide a background 
on the Indonesian economy and a context for better understanding port reform. Indonesia is the 
world’s largest archipelagic country, consisting of more than 17,000 islands that are spread 
over 5,000 kilometres from east to west as seen in Figure 3.1. As an archipelago of 17,000 
islands, intra, inter and international connectivity are critical between land and sea networks 
and supply chains (Sandee 2016).  
 
           Figure 3.1: Map of Indonesia 
 





The population of Indonesia, estimated at 264 million in 2017 is unevenly distributed across 
the archipelago (Euromonitor 2018). Most of the population is concentrated on the Island of 
Java with Sumatra and the surrounding islands having lower population densities. Since its 
independence from the Dutch in 1945, Indonesia has been a young democracy that has been 
achieving economic growth through strong export growth, generated by high commodity prices 
(World Bank 2014). It is the third largest democracy after India and the United States and has 
industrialised rapidly since the 1970s from a poor nation to a member of the Group of Twenty 
(G-20) (Dick and Mulholland 2016). However, despite being the largest economy in Southeast 
Asia, Indonesia’s port infrastructure has been suffering from low investment, delays and 
inadequate port facilities, leading to high logistics costs (Nathan Associates 2008; State of 
Logistics 2013; OECD 2012a; Worldbank 2014;2017).   
 
Shekhar and Liow (2014) cite the example of how it costs more than three times to ship a 
container within Indonesia from Padang to Jakarta than from Singapore to Jakarta, despite the 
geographical proximity. These high logistics costs to move goods and people across the nation 
have constrained the nation’s economic growth (Negara and Das 2017). Also, the concentration 
of economic activity and population in Java leads to unbalanced trade between Java and the 
other islands of the archipelago, driving up the costs of trade. Many ships leave fully loaded 
from Java to their destinations elsewhere in Indonesia but return almost empty. As a result, 
these transportation costs can be a substantial part of the overall supply chain costs, resulting 
in inter regional price differences (Aswicahyono and Hill 2015).  
 
Sandee (2016) argues that inter island connectivity within the archipelago needs to be improved 
as Indonesia relies more on the production and export of manufacturing products, which require 
more sophisticated and time-sensitive logistics systems. Therefore, more needs to be done to 
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link ports on different islands and connect Indonesia internationally to other regions to remain 
competitive. For an archipelago nation such as Indonesia, an efficient and well run sea freight 
transport system is a crucial element of economic competitiveness.  Investment in 
infrastructure has a critical role to play in driving transport infrastructure costs down but,  
 
To borrow a local term, Indonesian infrastructure is to a large extent jalan 
 di tempat (showing no progress): just as fast as new infrastructure comes  
 online, existing capacity is lost elsewhere (Prakasa 2014, p.6). 
 
In the past, Indonesian ports have been operating through a monopoly of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) or ‘Pelindos’ according to the 1992 Shipping Law and its supporting 
regulations. Their legal and regulatory environment restricted inter and intra competition 
amongst ports. This was one reason why, Indonesia’s main port terminal, Jakarta International 
Container Terminal (JICT), was shown to be the least efficient when benchmarked against 
other Southeast Asia terminals on productivity and unit costs in 2003 (Nathan Associates 
2008). Secondly, trends in the maritime industry of building larger shipping vessels to benefit 
from greater economies of scales is placing pressure on Indonesian ports to invest further in 
infrastructure as these vessels require deeper channel draft, faster cranes and enhanced cargo 
handling facilities.  Lastly, there is an established trend for increased private sector investment 
in developing and operating container terminals in developing countries where the public sector 
was unable to finance investment and expand capacity (Nathan Associates 2008; UNCTAD 
2017). 
 
After four years of development, the government introduced a new Shipping Law in 2008 to 
increase competition and private sector participation at Indonesian ports known as ‘Shipping 
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Law 17 of 2008’. This law consists of approximately 355 articles on maritime issues such as 
shipping, navigation and maritime accidents amongst many others4. Under this new law, the 
port governance administration model will transition to a ‘Landlord Port’ model.  This will 
result in the government or port authority taking on a regulatory role with regards to regulating 
port land, waters and infrastructure while the port operator or ‘Pelindo’ leases these facilities 
and provides port services on a long term contract or concession basis. The new regime was 
given until 2011 to be fully implemented (Nathan Associates 2008). This reform was aimed at 
improving port performance. In 2014, the incoming President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) also 
announced a vision to develop the maritime sector in Indonesia through the ‘Global Maritime 
Axis’ which will be discussed later in the chapter. With intense competition from other 
Southeast Asian ports in the ‘Straits of Malacca’, there is pressure on Indonesia to develop and 
invest in its port facilities to remain competitive.  
 
This chapter begins with Section 3.2, which provide a background to the key features of trade 
and economic development. Subsection 3.2.1 discusses the President Suharto’s rule of thirty 
years while Section 3.2.2 discusses the effect of fiscal decentralisation in Indonesia after the 
fall of President Suharto and Asian Financial Crisis.  In Section 3.2.3, the focus shifts to 
Indonesia’s economic growth following the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis.  Section 
3.3 turns to identify possible policy initiatives to assist Indonesia out of its middle income trap 
to transition into a higher income country. This leads into Section 3.4 which outlines 
Indonesia’s economic development plans. President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) focus on 
developing the maritime sector in Indonesia is discussed in section 3.4.1 while Section 3.4.2 
focuses on the role of Private Public Partnerships (PPPs) and Foreign Direct Investment  (FDI) 
for investment in infrastructure in Indonesia.  However, corruption poses a big challenge 
                                                 
4 Article 67 to 115 of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ are reproduced in Appendix 3. 
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towards economic growth and development in Indonesia and is discussed in subsection 3.4.3. 
Finally, section 3.5 discusses the role of path dependence in Indonesia’s economic 
development before the conclusion in section 3.6. 
 
3.2 History and Macroeconomic Environment 
 
Trade in the Indonesian archipelago began centuries ago. The expansion of China from the 
tenth to thirteenth century, had a profound effect on trade in the Javanese economy which saw 
a huge demand for Javanese produce and an archipelago trading network that led to changes in 
Javanese agricultural practices. Rice was a major commodity exported in the eleventh century 
along with black pepper, beans, fennel, salt and sugar.  By the twelfth century, Java was China’s 
major supplier. (Wade 2009). Portugal was the first European country to arrive in the 
archipelago in 1511, followed by Spain a few years later.  
 
In the early 1600s, as the Netherlands began to industrialise, the Dutch East India Company or 
the ‘Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie’ (VOC) began to colonise the archipelago of 
Indonesia. Its motives were to monpolise trade in Indonesia against the countries such as 
Britain who were their competitors and to find trade opportunities, especially spices such as 
nutmeg which fetched a high value on the Moluccan islands. The concept of Indonesia as one 





However, Negara and Wihardjia (2015)5 argued that there was a perception that Indonesia had 
been colonised by the Dutch for 300 years.  However, only four ships arrived and stayed in the 
Indonesian archipelago in 1602 with the motivation to find trade. The Dutch only resumed 
authority in Java in 1815, after the Napaleonic Wars ended. The Dutch occupied the Mollucas 
(Spice Islands) initially as the source of export commodities before moving their central 
government administration to Batavia, today known as Indonesia’s capital ‘Jakarta’. This was 
due to its proximity to the ocean and its navigable waterways, being located on the estuary of 
the Ciliwung River (Aswichyono & Hill 2015). In the early nineteenth century, the VOC was 
replaced by the Dutch crown and by 1910 had its own military force, the Royal Netherlands 
Indies’ Army (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indische Leger) to impose rust en orde (tranquility 
and order) (Anderson 1990). 
 
During the Dutch occupation, the Dutch exploited their colony’s natural resources and labour 
force in Indonesia through the ‘Dutch Cultivation System’. Under this system, peasants and 
farmers were forced to grow commercial crops for the Dutch and were levied with taxes. This 
left peasants very vulnerable with very little or no fertile land for their own subsistence farming 
(Silean and Smark 2006). Profits from this system were remitted to the Dutch Treasury and 
accounted for half of total national revenues during the period 1851-60 (Negara and Wihardjia 
2015). 
 
The 1870s saw the beginning of a liberal era that allowed private capital to flow into the colony. 
Chinese middleman were used to collect taxes from the local population which resulted in a 
long term resentment among the Javanese population against the Chinese. Very little was done 
to improve the welfare of the people. From the 1900s until the 1920s, the Dutch introduced the 
                                                 
5 The argument used is from a review of Thee (2013) ‘Colonial extraction in the Indonesian archipelago’ 
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‘Ethical Policy’ as they felt responsible for exploiting the Indonesian people. However, this 
failed to achieve any outcome for the welfare of Indonesians, as only 7.4 per cent of adults 
were literate by 1930s (Negara and Wihardjia 2015). The 1930s and 1940s saw very little 
growth in infrastructure in Indonesia. Although transport to the important parts of Java was 
well served, McCawley (2015) argues that transport infrastructure started declining even more 
in the 1950s. This added to the huge cost of transporting basic commodities such as rice by 
carts, carrying poles and bicycles to the main cities in Java. Waterways were, however, a 
valuable means of transport in Sumatra and Kalimantan. 
 
When the Netherlands was invaded by the Germans in 1940, the Dutch correctly feared that 
Japan would conquer Indonesia.  The Japanese came to Indonesia in 1942 and supported the 
Indonesians fight for freedom from the Dutch. The Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 
allowed for national groups who resented Dutch imperialism to form and grow. The Japanese 
surrender in 1945 led to President Sukarno declaring independence on 17 August 1945. The 
Dutch could not accept this upon their return from the Netherlands and clashes and fighting 
continued until the United Nations Security Council called for an end to hostilities in 1948. 
Without the Japanese occupation, Indonesia would have taken a longer time to gain 
independence (Negara and Wihardjia 2015). President Sukarno (1945-1967) established a 
guided democracy in Indonesia in 1945 (Adiputri 2014).  
 
 3.2.1 President Suharto’s era 
 
President Sukarno, aware of the infrastructure condition, announced major infrastructure plans 
during the 1950s and 1960s along with a nationalisation agenda. However, many of these 
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ambitious infrastructure plans did not materialise because they were not supported with the 
required resources. Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’ enabled him to follow his preferred 
alignment with nationalist or communist parties (Adiputri 2014). The United States (US) did 
offer Indonesia much needed foreign aid to improve the nation’s deteriorating economic 
conditions and relations between the US and Indonesia.  However, this eventually came to a 
halt in 1965 with Sukarno choosing politics through his alignment with communist parties over 
economics which led to his political collapse in 1965 (Negara and Wihardjia 2015).This paved 
the way for Indonesia’s second President, President Suharto, to lead the nation from 1967 to 
1998. Suharto’s regime was termed as the ‘New Order’ with the aim to boost economic 
development to achieve macroeconomic stability. Suharto’s leadership can be divided into 
three phases. The first phase if from 1966 to 1973, the second phase is from 1973 to 1983 and 
the third phase is from 1983 to 1996 (Negara and Wihardjia 20156).  
 
The first phase (1966 to 1973) was about economic recovery, stabilisation and partial 
liberalisation of the economy. The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Law in 1967 allowed 
foreign money to help finance its domestic budget deficit, a reversal of Sukarno’s hostile policy 
towards FDI. Economic growth averaged over 7 per cent per annum from 1967 to 1973. In the 
mid to late 1970s, Indonesia relied on the revenue from the exports of resource intensive 
commodities such as petroleum (Hill 2000). As exports earnings increased, this enabled 
Indonesia to qualify for additional loans which helped fund road and infrastructure programs 
in the 1970s and 1980s (McCawley 2015).  With US loans and Korean construction expertise, 
1978 saw the opening of the country’s first toll road known as ‘Jagorawi’ and the first roll road 
                                                 
6 Negara and Wihardjia (2015) make reference to Thee’s (2002) book chapter in The Emergence of A National 
Economy "The Soeharto Era and After: Stability, Development and Crisis, 1966–2000" where Thee divides 




corporation Jasa Marga. Although this toll road was a success and was expected to be replicated 
in Semarang, Medan, Jakarta and Surabaya, the early 1980s recession slowed this process 
(Davidson 2015). The second phase (1974 to 1983) was a period of rapid economic growth 
with rising commodity prices and increased government intervention. Once the government 
succeeded in economic recovery, it reversed its liberal and free market policies to support more 
inward looking, nationalistic policies which were supported by oil revenues. From 1974, 
foreign direct investment could only enter Indonesia through joint ventures with a ‘Pribumi’ 
(native Indonesians) majority ownership. As oil revenues fell further, it led to import 
substitution policies to reduce dependence on oil exports.  
 
Finally, the third phase (1984 to 1996) of Suharto’s regime witnessed a period of slower 
economic growth compared with the oil price boom in the earlier two phases. As oil prices fell 
more steeply, this led to the re-introduction of liberal reform packages as part of the non oil 
export drive including unifying the exchange rate, opening up the capital account and 
welcoming foreign investment (Pangestu et al. 2015). Other reforms also included encouraging 
exports, developing the capital market and banking sector, improving customs clearance 
procedures and reducing investment permit requirements. These reforms helped accelerate 
economic growth in Indonesia and raised the productivity of Indonesia’s manufacturing sector. 
It also resulted in Indonesia strongly supporting an ASEAN free trade area in 1992 (Patunru 
and Rahardja 2015). 
 
By the end of the ‘New Order’ regime, Suharto’s children had become major players in 
Indonesia’s economy under his centralised and authoritative rule. Suharto’s children were of 
age and his older daughter, known as ‘Tutut’ had embarked on a strategy of capital 
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accumulation. By the 1990s, their trading enterprises had proliferated into vast conglomerates, 
securing profitable government contracts, joint ventures with established cronies of their father 
and amassing great wealth that Indonesia’s toll road industry had become so synonymous with 
Suharto’s children. Tutut took control of the lucrative Jakarta Inner Ring Road based on their 
connections and other people’s capital and expertise. Preferential treatment did not end there 
with tariffs on the palace children’s road remaining higher than on other routes. But their deep 
involvement in that sector did not bring the efficiency or innovative gains to the sector 
(Davidson 2015).  
 
The middle class outcry that greeted this new pricing saw President Suharto respond by issuing 
regulation to set initial rates and approve subsequent increases (Davidson 2015). However, 
Davidson (2015) argues that government officials were also concerned about the perception 
that they were spending scarce state resources on a road that only the rich would use, as millions 
in Jakarta clung to subsistence levels. They were reassured by President Suharto that the 
benefits would be shared with Jakarta’s neighbouring areas. Eventually, resentment began to 
grow among native businessmen against the stronghold that the Sino Indonesian conglomerates 
had on the economy. In response, Suharto’s children divided the megaproject into many 
concesssions with ‘pribumi’ contractors to spread the wealth. However, the project was brought 
to a halt by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98.  
 
Crony capitalism resulted in economic activities favouring the elite class with certain business 
groups given the authority to manage State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) with limited oversight. 
Patunru and Rahardja (2015) argue that this included several government projects that were 
given to companies that had links with President Suharto’s family. Negara and Wihardjia 
97 
 
(2015) also argue that deregulation of the financial sector in the late 1980s also resulted in a 
weak banking system because of the lack of prudent enforcements. These policies eventually 
contributed to poor investment decisions by local companies that eventually brought down the 
banking sector and the economy at the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98. This 
eventually ended President Suharto’s three-decade rule and led to a sharp depreciation in the 
value of the rupiah, which significantly affected the revenue flows and balance sheets of 
businesses and government.  
 
As the financial crises intensified, Suharto asked the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) for 
help which opened the door for reformers to start curtailing the privileges and business empires 
of his children and other cronies. The IMF and other reformers set their sights on monopolies 
and projects that under Suharto were distributed without public tender and revealed illicit 
practices such as over pricing of contracts, illegal granting of credit, tax and import facilities, 
the sale of state assets at unjustifiable prices and compensation of intermediary activities. 
(Davidson 2015). 
 
However, the International Monetary Fund’s attempt to run budget surpluses were also 
unsuccessful and efforts to operate deficits ran into financing constraints as conditions for 
promised programme lending were not met. By 2000, public debt in Indonesia had risen to 
almost 100 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Baird and Wihardja 2010). Also, 
attempts by the World Bank were also unsuccessful in imposing fundamental institutional 
changes. Joseph Stiglitz, who was the Chief Economist at the World Bank, argued that without 
strong institutions, unconstrained rent seeking and privatisation programmes would simply 
convert state monopolies into the hands of well connected private and business oligarchs. In 
the end, the collapse of Suharto’s regime was well received because it was expected to bring 
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about demand for reform. However, apart for the liberalisation of the press, no further reforms 
actually took place. In May 1998, President by B.J. Habibie was greeted with widespread 
cynicism as Habibie carried the legacy of the old regime. His family had partnerships with 
Suharto and Chinese conglomerates. However, the end of the ‘New Order Regime’ had not 
signalled a clean break from the past. The system of arbitrary power and predatory markets 
continued (Hadiz and Robinson 2004). 
 
3.2.2 Fiscal Decentralisation in Indonesia 
 
 
The 1998 economic crisis intensified the demand for revenue sharing from resource rich 
regions. Kannan and Morris (2014) argue that this caught the political attention of the central 
government which believed that unless this was resolved, the national unity of Indonesia would 
be at stake. The strongest theoretical argument in favour of decentralization was that it would 
improve the accountability and responsiveness of government by altering its structure (Faguet 
2014). There was a high expectation that fiscal decentralisation policy would lead to an 
improvement in the welfare of local people (Wibowo 2011). This resulted in former President 
B.J. Habibie (1998-1999) passing two laws of decentralisation in 1999 that encompassed both 
administrative and fiscal decentralisation. These were Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999. Under 
these new laws, resource rich regions received a greater share of revenues from natural 
resources and taxes that had been extracted from their jurisdictions.  
 
The controversy was about balancing power between local and central elites interest. Local 
elites were strong supporters of the decentralisation process as it would provide them with 
direct autonomy over revenue sources (Hadiz 2003). The OECD (2016 p.31) argued that the 
implementation of this policy saw Indonesia devolve substantial funds and authority to local 
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government. As part of decentralisation in 2001, local governments took up more 
responsibilities in managing provincial and district infrastructure network (World Bank 2014). 
However, due to the lack of capacity and financial expertise, many regional governments in 
Indonesia struggled to spend all their annual budget allocations. A lot of local governments 
used up their infrastructure budget for building new infrastructure but failed to allocate enough 
money for maintenance because they did not see maintenance as a form of infrastructure.  This 
hampered the central government both in its attempts to pursue national priorities such as 
improving infrastructure and to provide fiscal stimulus during the economic slowdown (OECD 
2016 p.31). 
 
While the law provided a framework for decentralisation, little was done to ensure its 
implementation. In the previous centralised model, there was never a need to develop capacity 
in financial management for local government. Most financing was administered through 
special purpose grants from the central government, with minimal attention paid to the actual 
expenditure of local governments. Therefore, it would have been important for the central 
government to address this gap in preparation for decentralisation by having a proper budget 
management system (Ahmad and Mansoor 2002).  The new ‘Fiscal Balance Law of 1999’ 
created further imbalances as the sources of oil and gas revenue are concentrated in only a few 
provinces and districts as shown in Figure 3.2. This exacerbated the horizontal fiscal imbalance 
with GDP per capita in states such as East Kalimantan which received more than four times 






 Figure 3.2: Per capita GDP across Indonesia's provinces, 2015 (Millions of rupiah per capita) 
 
Source: OECD(2016, pg.12) and Statistics Indonesia 
 
The decentralisation process was optimistically aimed to end corruption, collusion and 
nepotism (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotism, KKN) by empowering local governments across the 
nation. Although the objective of granting greater local responsibility was achieved, the 325 
districts and 91 cities in Indonesia have very different development needs. The more remote 
districts tend not to have the expertise and revenues and are managed by local elites and former 
allies of Suharto’s regime (Transparency International 2012). The impact of decentralisation 
can be summarised in Figure 3.3. It can be seen that the central government can manage its 
own revenue and spending. With limited revenue raising capacity, the regional areas have 
struggled to provide sufficient revenues to meet their expenditures which has worsened since 






Figure 3.3: Impact of Decentralisation (Billion Rupiah) 
 
    Source: Adapted from Ahmad and Mansoor (2002, p.12) 
 
 
Decentralisation also added further complexity, uncertainty and increased challenges of co-
ordination in Indonesia. It has become more difficult to implement and coordinate 
infrastructure projects across the nation because of this diffusion of authority across multiple 
levels of government (OECD 2016; Faguet 2014). Today, decentralisation is viewed as a 
challenge rather than an opportunity for Indonesia. However, Prakasa (2014) and Baird and 
Wihardja (2010) argue that the previous central provision model was also not always effective 
either. Although decentralisation brought the government closer to the people, inter regional 
disparities still exist. Therefore, central government projects that cut across these district lines 






3.2.3 Indonesia’s Economic Growth Post Asian Financial Crisis 
 
Following the Asian Financial Crisis, presidencies that followed were relatively short, with 
weak economic growth rates. The three successors after President Suharto were B. J. Habibie 
(May 1998– October 1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (October 1999–July 2001), and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri (July 2001–October 2004) (Lindblad 2015). In 2002, President Megawati 
revoked Suharto’s 1997 decree, freezing spending on large scale infrastructure projects, except 
the building of the Cikampek Bandung expressway. Megawati’s administration also failed to 
provide government funds to support PPP projects. Her government had insufficient trust in 
the private sector. Only towards the end of her term did liberalising statutory reform take place. 
Therefore, this did not bring much investment (Davidson 2015).  
 
The Megawati government was eventually succeeded by President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono in 2004. In his first term, Yudhoyono made upgrading infrastructure a priority for 
the country and organised an infrastructure summit. However, the uncertain environment 
towards foreign investment meant the summit did not gain much support from investors 
(Davidson 2015). Eventually, the government tried to restore its credibility by passing new 
laws on public financial management and reforming the Ministry of Finance. Tight controls 
were also placed over the budget deficit to reduce public debt. By 2009, public debt had been 
reduced to thirty per cent of GDP. Indonesia avoided the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
with a proactive response from authorities to allow the exchange rate to adjust. The government 
also introduced a responsive fiscal stimulus package that focused on tax adjustment and having 




The Budget had provisions to adjust spending in response to a crisis, allowing twenty four 
hours for parliamentary approval. This crisis preparedness made Indonesia better equipped to 
deal with the GFC (World Bank 2014). There were also arguments that Indonesia was not as 
badly affected during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) because of its inward oriented policies 
that were less engaged in foreign investment. The Yudhoyono government responded to the 
GFC with a modest stimulus package of tax cuts and spending measures (Baird and Wihardja 
2010).  
 
Contrarily, the second term of President Yudhoyono saw the introduction of protectionist 
policies following the GFC. Although commodity prices started to rise, new import restrictions 
were imposed to protect vulnerable domestic industries from competition. This included a ban 
on the import of rice which led to higher rice prices and an increase in the poverty rate. Minerals 
were also targeted with limits imposed on foreign ownership and a ban on ores for export 
purposes (Aspinall 2016). Other protectionist measures, such as various ministries imposing 
tighter controls over imports, distribution of imported goods and adding new products to the 
list of those that required permits to perform economic activities, were also adopted. Dialogues 
on bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Australia, the European Union and South 
Korea were also put on hold (Patunru and Rahardja 2015). 
 
However, policies of increasing domestic value in an economic sector to support output used 
by another sector domestically are not effective in a globalised environment. One of the factors 
for the re-emergence of protectionism was Indonesia’s experience with the IMF during the 
Asian financial crisis. Indonesia had a history of implementing nationalistic and protectionist 
policies to protect its economy from foreign competition. However, the IMF rescue packages 
following the 1997-98 crisis forced the country to open up its economy to foreign investment 
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and trade. The stigma against the IMF’s economic prescriptions for Indonesia still remained 
(Patunru and Rahardja, 2015, p.10). 
 
In recent times, Indonesia’s economic growth has been relatively modest. This is because of a 
slower global economy and lower commodity prices following China’s economic slowdown. 
Inflation which was above the Bank’s headline inflation rates due to increase in food and 
administered prices, has now fallen within the Bank of Indonesia’s target range of 4 to 6 per 
cent (OECD 2016). This has resulted in the Bank of Indonesia reducing its benchmark interest 
rate to 7.0 per cent in 2016 from 7.5 per cent in 2015 (Ray and Ing 2016). Figure 3.4 
summarises Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth from 1965 to 2017.  
 
Figure 3.4: Annual GDP (Real) Growth in Indonesia from 1965 to 2017 
  
 Source: World Bank Data 
 
 
The growth in mining, oil and gas and manufacturing gave rise to the services sector in urban 
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decreased from 24 to 12 per cent from 1999 to 2012. However, growth in Indonesia has not 
been inclusive as the opportunities from growth not being shared widely across the population. 
The World Bank (2014) states that close to 65 million Indonesians are vulnerable to poverty 
as they hover around the official poverty line. This population demographic is vulnerable to 
price increases for food, natural disasters and health shocks.  
 
The commodities boom in Indonesia has also played a role in widening the income gap as the 
rise in commodity prices would benefit the portion of labour force involved in the resources 
sector. The boom in commodity prices also led to a significant wealth effect that saw mining 
assets increase in value. The World Bank (2014) reports that out of the 21 billionaires in the 
Forbes 2010 list of Indonesia’s 40 richest people, 16 owned assets linked to the coal and palm 
oil sector. This rise in asset prices supported income growth for the rich compared with the 
sluggish growth in real wages of the poor (World Bank 2014).  
 
At the same time, Indonesia’s economic growth has also seen rapid deforestation and 
environmental degradation. Indonesia has 91 million hectares of forest cover, making it the 
third largest after Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Deforestation in Indonesia 
averaged around 0.92 million hectares per year from 1990 to 2012. The extent of deforestation 
was the greatest in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Tension’s over Indonesia’s forests between the 
protection of environmental value and the revenue and employment generated from valuable 
commodities such as timber, palm oil and pulpwood continue (Alisjahbana and Busch 2017). 
The air pollution  from the 2015 El Nino fires caused schools and airports to close and damaged 
crops. Fires also spread to nearby Singapore and Malaysia and were estimated to cost $16 
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billion, greater than the $12 billion revenue generated from Indonesia’s palm oil production in 
2014. Deforestation is also responsive to upward movements in agricultural commodity prices.  
 
Due to the devastating El Nino effect, President Jokowi, Indonesia’s current President, issued 
a moratorium to prohibit land clearing even when a concession license was in place. Prior to 
Jokowi, the Yudhoyono administration had a similar moratorium in place for two years. 
However, it was not effective because it was only limited to new concessions and did not affect 
licenses granted before or outside the concession areas.  Indonesia has made a commitment to 
reduce environmental damage and move towards more sustainable economic development by 
becoming a signatory to the Paris Agreement and committing to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 29 per cent by 2030 from their current trajectory. The European Parliament in 
2017 has also called on the European Commission to obtain a commitment from the European 
Union to obtain 100 per cent of its palm oil from ‘sustainable supply chains’, eliminating 
deforestation in the process (Alisjahbana and Busch 2017). 
 
3.3 Middle Income Trap 
 
We now turn to discuss Indonesia’s transition from a middle to high income country. 
Aswicahyono and Hill (2015) have argued that Indonesia has not been able to grow as fast as 
some of its neighbours. The geographical nature of Indonesia with its many islands and the 
uneven distribution of the population places enormous challenges in developing infrastructure 
and tackling regional disparities. The World Bank (2014) reports that Indonesia is at risk of 
being trapped in the ‘middle’ unless its growth strategy focuses on boosting labour productivity 
and structural reform.  To escape this middle income trap, Indonesia needs faster economic 
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growth of  7 to 9 per cent per annum to reach a high income status by 2030 (per annum capita 
income of US $12,000). 
 
 
Despite various policy initiatives, progress on infrastructure has been slow due to challenges 
around implementation and coordination. Indonesia’s infrastructure investment declined from 
an average of 7 per cent prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998) to around 3 to 4 per 
cent of GDP in 2008/2009. This is much lower when compared with neighbouring countries 
such as Thailand and Vietnam where investment in infrastructure exceeds 7 per cent of GDP 
and 10 per cent of GDP in China (World Bank 2014). Figure 3.5 shows GDP per capita for of 
developing economies in Asia. It can be seen that Vietnam is starting to catch up with 
Indonesia. However, GDP per capita of Indonesia is still below from that of China.  
Figure 3.5: Comparison of countries in Real GDP per capita in USD 
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A study by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI 2017) argued that countries 
continuing to rely on the same strategies that transitioned them from lower to middle income 
might be faced with challenges. This is because those strategies may not be effective in 
allowing them to compete with high income countries. Therefore, these countries need different 
growth strategies to improve productivity and innovation which are required to maintain 
growth and diversifying exports as rising labour costs make low costs exports less competitive.  
 
Chan (2014) argues that unless Indonesia considers structural reform in its economy, there is a 
high likelihood of the country being stuck in a middle income trap. Also, achieving a target of 
7 to 9 per cent growth per annum would require major top down efforts to drive reform (MP3EI 
2011). This can only happen when the regulatory climate becomes more favourable to foreign 
investment and when the policy environment does not swing back and forth towards 
protectionism. If Indonesia fails to boost productivity and continues growing at 5 to 6 per cent 
annually, it is forecast to only reach half the income levels of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China) economies. However, Felipe et al. (2017) rejects the concepts of the ‘middle income 
trap’. Instead, their research argues that it is the speed of transition that distinguishes economies 
in their transition from middle to high income. 
 
These challenges and the need for economic reform have become more prevalent since the 
global economic slowdown, the decline in commodity and energy prices, and the slowdown in 
China’s economy. Muhammad et al. (2016) argues that economic reform in Indonesia tends to 
be supported by politicians if it strengthens their political position and rejected when it comes 
to liberalising the economy. On the other hand, bureaucrats would rather maintain the current 
state of affairs as they are aware that political leaders come and go and have concerns that such 
reform might reduce their power to earn more income. The media and civil society have been 
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significant proponents in eradicating corruption and improving institutions. We turn to discuss 
corruption later in this chapter. 
 
Garnaut (2015) argues that Indonesia’s first decade of growth coincided with a strong 
commodity boom. Despite this growth, there was little investment from this revenue for public 
provision of education, health and agricultural services. This commodity boom continued for 
the eight years after 2003 due to strong growth in China which witnessed high terms of trade 
for exports. However, since the boom retreated in 2011, the nation has been facing major 
challenges that need to be addressed through economic reform. Short term measures that 
protect the economy such as encouraging domestic processing of minerals may lead to strong 
domestic investment but impair long term competitiveness. Therefore, further microeconomic 
reform needs to take place to improve productivity instead of relying on commodity boom 
cycles (Garnaut 2015). 
 
Middle income countries such as Indonesia need to change their growth strategy to transition 
to high income status. They require strategies for sustaining high growth for a long period in 
time. In the case of Indonesia, the country needs to increase its investment in human capital 
and education, infrastructure and innovation in economic activities. There has also been a lack 
of innovation in the Indonesian economy with few new products being sold in the export 
markets. The transition to a high income country is possible only if such economic reform can 
be successfully implemented (Muhammad et al. 2016). There have been growth bottlenecks 
because of a large concentration of the labour force in the agriculture sector whereas growth 
has been driven by other capital intensive sectors such as utilities and communication. 
Indonesia also needs to address the problems of corruption, lack of capacity in formulating and 
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implementing policies and uncertainty in the regulatory environment. At the same time, 
Indonesia’s infrastructure has not been able to keep pace with economic growth. This has 
resulted in congestion problems, poor logistics performance and loss of productivity and 
competitiveness. The government has been trying to close this infrastructure gap through a 
kaleidoscope of infrastructure plans which are discussed in the next section (Muhammad et al. 
2016). 
 
3.4 Indonesia’s Economic Development Plan 
 
 
The Indonesian government has been relying on the National Long Term Development Plan 
2005-2025 to transform Indonesia from a developing country into a developed country by 
2025. These development plans are drawn up together with the annual budget and determine 
the budgets to line ministries. The National Long Term Development Plan (RPJPN)7 2005-
2025 was endorsed and became the basis for development programs for a period of 20 years 
commencing from 2005 to 2025.  The vision of the plan was to ‘establish a country that is 
developed and self reliant, just and democratic and peaceful and united’. The RPJPN is divided 
into four five year stages known as the National Mid-term Development Plan (RPJMN). The 
first stage is 2005 to 2009, the second stage is 2010 to 2014, the third stage is 2015 to 2019 
(current) and the fourth stage from 2020 to 2025. Figure 3.6 provides an overview of the 20 
year long term plan (RPJPN) and the individual 5 year plans (RPJMN)8 (Bappenas 2014). 
 
 
                                                 
7 Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional(RPJPN) 
8 Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional(RPJMN) 
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Source: OECD 2012, p.54 
 
 
Each plan provides a foundation for achieving the next stage of mid-term development plan 
objectives. The RPJMN is elaborated into the Government Work Plans (RKP) followed by the 
national annual strategic plans of the Ministries. The RPJMN (2015-2019) has identified 
significant gaps in Indonesia’s transport sector where demand exceeds supply, resulting in 
congestion. There are also significant regional disparities relating to the access and cost of 
transportation. Although, there has been a legal framework in place to support reform, 
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The National Logistics Blueprint set out in Presidential Decree 26/2012 focuses on the 
domestic integration and global connectivity for economic development and improving 
welfare. It provides a long terms strategy to strengthen to strengthen the nation’s transport 
network. This blueprint has been prepared with experts in government, private sector, think 
tanks and universities. However, success in implementing this blueprint has been limited 
because of the coordination between public, private and local government agencies. (Sandee 
et al. 2014) 
 
Despite the kaldeiscope of plans, the Yudhoyono’s government realised that more had to be 
done to meet international commitments, competitiveness and increase private sector 
participation in economic development due to limited fiscal capacity. To achieve this, the 
Yudhoyono government introduced yet another plan known as the Master Plan for the 
Acceleration and Expansion of Economic Development of Indonesia (MP3EI9 2011). This is a 
working document that complements the other existing documents such as the Long Term and 
Medium Term Development Plan for both the national and regional level. The aim was to reach 
a growth of 7 to 9 per cent a year and achieve the Indonesian vision to create an ‘independent, 
well developed, equitable and prosperous society with a focus on acceleration and expansion’. 
This plan had three goals which are developing the regional economic corridors; strengthening 
national connectivity locally and internationally; and strengthening human resource capacity 
and national science and technology (State of Logistics 2013; Bappenas 2014).  
 
Baird and Wihardja (2010) emphasise that a recurring theme in these plans was the importance 
of ‘connecting Indonesia’ to enable the benefits of economic growth to be widely shared. 
Sandee (2016) breaks down these connectivity challenges into intra island, inter island and 
                                                 
9 Masterplan Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia (MP3EI) 
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international connectivity. There is also a lack of hinterland connectivity through road and rail 
infrastructure to ensure a smooth transition of cargo along a logistics supply chain (Oxford 
Business Group 2014). Improved international connectivity will enable domestic products to 
enter foreign markets at competitive prices and domestic manufacturers and consumers 
obtaining imports and consumer goods at affordable prices. 
 
Ray (2014) argues that while the RPJMN is focused on new investment in infrastructure, there 
is also a major issue with current productive infrastructure assets rapid depreciation and failure. 
There also needs to be performance based incentives offered to ensure there is one party 
responsible for building, operating and maintaining the assets. Also, greater engagement with 
the private sector is needed to fill the infrastructure funding gap. However, government also 
needs to play a facilitating role to improve institutional coordination, address land clearance 
problems and provide leadership. Therefore, the RPJMN 2015-2019 should not only be 
addressing issues in the next five years but planning needs to take place for the longer term. 
There is also a need to improve efficiency through removing monopolies in the public and 
private sector to increase competition. 
 
In 2016, Indonesia’s GDP growth averaged 5 per cent as seen in Figure 3.4. This is still behind 
the annual economic growth target of 6 to 8 per cent as laid out in the government’s National 
Medium Term Development Plan 2015-2019 (Bappenas 2014). Although blueprints have been 
developed for more reliable logistics by various government agencies, their implementation 
has been weak (Sandee 2016). Similarly, Ray (2014) argues that these plans lacked a coherent 
strategy for planning and delivery. Indonesia already has various master plans that layout a 
strategy to address this problem of connectivity, regulation, infrastructure investment, 
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bottlenecks and establish institutions (McCawley 2015). However, they do not appear to be 
very effective. 
 
In the past, the nation has seen promises, under fulfilment, delays and cancellations. The 
various infrastructure industries also operate in silos with little coordination (McCawley 2015). 
Therefore, for these plans to be implemented effectively, there must be a greater push for 
improving coordination and communication with agencies. The next section aims to discuss if 
these plans were implemented under the Jokowi administration and the nation’s maritime 
strategies. 
 
3.4.1 Jokowi’s Administration and Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’  
 
President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), formed his administration in October 2014 with just 37 per 
cent minority support in the national parliament. Jokowi’s economic programs were focused 
on infrastructure, deregulation and reducing bureaucracy (Warburton 2016). The KPK and the 
Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre played a role in assessing cabinet ministers 
for corruption prior to selection (OECD 2012c). His cabinet excluded candidates that were 
deemed to have a perceived level of corruption risk (Damuri and Day 2015). Prior to the 
election, he had set out his Vision and Mission statement and action plan in Jokowi’s ‘Visi 
Misi dan Program Aksi’ (Jokowi Jusuf Kalla 2014).  
 
A key objective of President Jokowi’s global maritime axis is to improve inter island 
connectivity and upgrade port infrastructure within the Indonesian archipelago. The impetus 
for this was that many of these islands have operated as self sufficient economies and have 
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been unable to contribute to the national economy (Shekhar and Liow 2014). Therefore, one 
of Jokowi’s aims is to transform Indonesia’s port sector into a global hub by drawing attention 
to the importance of the sea to the country. As Sambhi (2015) argued, this was a bold foreign 
policy doctrine that no President since Suharto had proclaimed. Saha (2016) argues that 
Indonesia’s maritime potential is estimate to contribute up to US $1.2 trillion to its economy. 
As outlined in the quote below from President Jokowi’s inaugural speech below, 
 
We’ve turned our back on the seas, oceans, straits and bays for far too long. It 
is time for us to realize ‘jalesveva jayamahe,’ ‘in the ocean we triumph,’ a 
motto upheld by our ancestors in the past.” (Jakarta Globe, 20th October 2014) 
 
Upon winning the election, Neary (2014) argues that President Jokowi set out a more detailed 
version of his strategy at the ASEAN Summit in Naypyitaw, Myanmar. He broke down the 
concept of the ‘Poros Maritim Dunia’ (World Maritime Axis) into five pillars. The first pillar 
was to rebuild Indonesia’s maritime culture. The second was to maintain and manage marine 
resources.  Thirdly, he wanted prioritise the development of maritime infrastructure and 
connectivity by constructing ‘sea highways’. This project aimed to enhance connectivity 
between the islands and enhance port infrastructure in the country. It also aims to reduce price 
disparity between Java and islands around it to boost trade and commerce in Indonesia. This 
will play a critical role in positioning Indonesia as a hub for international trade in the broader 
ASEAN and Indo-Pacific regions.  
 
This Sea Toll Road project which began in November 2015 is illustrated in Figure 3.7. The 
project aims to connect five major ports which include Belawan in North Sumatra, Tanjung 
Priok in Jakarta, Tanjung Perak in East Java, Makassar in South Sulawesi and Sorong in Papua 
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New Guinea and several smaller ports all over the country. The aim is to reduce logistics costs 
and improve connectivity between the remote islands in Indonesia. However, Negara and Das 
(2017) have argued that the main focus of Indonesia’s maritime strategy has been inward, 
especially with the Sea Toll Road project and that more attention needed to be given to outward 
connectivity.  
Figure 3.7: Sea Toll Road Project (Pendulum Nusatara) 
Source: State of Logistics Indonesia, 2015, p.23 
 
Fourthly, President Jokowi wanted to eliminate conflict over illegal fishing, breaches of 
sovereignty, territorial disputes, piracy and environmental concerns. The final pillar focuses on 
building up Indonesia’s maritime defence strategy to support maritime sovereignty and its role 
in maintaining safety of navigation and maritime security. This strategy also involves 
improving connectivity between islands which is crucial in developing Indonesia’s maritime 
industry (Neary 2014). Jokowi’s plan, which seems rather ambitious, was to upgrade or 





However, the implementation of this ambitious project requires a huge capital investment of 
about IDR 700 trillion (US $53 billion). Negara and Das (2017) emphasise that this amount is 
unlikely to be funded by the government and that Indonesia has to consider foreign investment 
funding options. Jokowi’s administration has undertaken further steps to invest in infrastructure 
through allocating budget expenditure from energy subsidies on fuel and electricity towards 
capital spending on projects such as the New Priok Port at Tanjung Priok in Jakarta (Ray and 
Ing 2016). 
 
The MP3EI did not have a coherent strategy for coordination which saw the planning document 
forgotten, despite the time and effort put to develop it. Unlike his predecessors, President 
Jokowi’s approach to pushing the infrastructure agenda focuses more on injecting funds into 
State Owned Enterprise (SOE) and assign them with important infrastructure projects. 
However, this does raise the issue of whether this approach has the possibility of crowding out 
private investment that is more competitive and efficient in providing the infrastructure.  (Ray 
and Ing 2016). Although the acronym MP3EI is not used by the Jokowi administration, The 
Asan Forum (22nd February 2016), an online publication for the Asia Pacific region, reports 
that similarities between Yudhoyono’s ‘sea pendulum’ concept and Jokowi’s ‘sea toll road’ 
(MP3EI 2011, p.31) existed. This suggests that President Jokowi’s infrastructure agenda seems 
to be the ‘old thing in a new package’. The key difference was the Yudhoyono’s administration 
focused on land connectivity while President Jokowi’s focus is on maritime connectivity.  
 
President Jokowi’s first year in office included conflict with cabinet members and a disruptive 
opposition. In particular, tensions occurred with Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Chair of the 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI–P). This meant Jokowi did not have the 
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unanimous support of the political party of which he was a member (Warburton 2016). By the 
end of 2014, it was clear that the President needed to expand his governing coalition to deal 
with slowing economic growth and rising inflation. To consolidate power, Jokowi had to be 
accommodative of vested interests, negotiate deals with oligarchs, expand his governing 
coalition, and reshuffle his cabinet in July 2016. The previous Yudhoyono government secured 
political stability by allowing parties to extract and exploit state resources which left the 
President beholden to the interests of such parties. However, Jokowi’s leadership differs as he 
allows for a broader support base but ensures a lower level of indebtedness to his coalition 
partners (Warburton 2016). 
 
According to Hamilton-Hart & Schulze (2016), the cabinet reshuffle in July 2016 saw Jokowi 
bringing in nine new people and reassigning thirteen portfolios. This included changes to 
ministerial positions in charge of economic policy, finance, trade, transmigration, 
administration and bureaucratic reform, industry, energy and mineral resources, agrarian 
affairs and transport. The reshuffle also saw the return of Sri Mulyani Indrawati as Finance 
Minister from her role as a Senior Vice President at the World Bank. She was Indonesia’s 
Finance Minister from 2005 to 2010. Warburton (2016) argues that reinstating Sri Mulyani 
Indrawati to a role in which she was widely respected, demonstrated President’s Jokowi’s 
commitment to fiscal management. Hamilton-Hart & Schulze (2016) argue that the strong 
commodity boom from 2003 to 2011 resulted in high rates of economic growth and income, 
but since then, economic growth has slowed. The end of the commodity boom has left 
Indonesia with a challenge for government to deliver macroeconomic stability and improve 





The new Finance Minister cut ‘non essential’ expenditure to allow for greater spending on 
infrastructure, while still maintaining the 3 per cent budget deficit limit. The government also 
passed the ‘Law 11/2016’ on Tax Amnesty that was implemented in the second half of 2016. 
This involved a voluntary disclosure of assets that had not been reported by individuals in 
previous annual tax returns. Individuals disclosing unreported assets were promised that 
overdue penalties would be waived and the taxpayer will not be audited. This Tax Amnesty 
aimed to raise Rp 165 trillion of which current revenue raised is estimated at less than 60 per 
cent of the official target. This is, nevertheless, a strong result in the short term.  
 
The Minister for SOEs, Rini Soemarno, also has a critical role to play in Jokowi’s cabinet. She 
headed the transition team after the 2014 election to design Jokowi’s first cabinet. However, 
she was disliked for her distributions of the cabinet positions by PDI-P and her closeness to the 
President Jokowi was a sore point for the party’s matriarch, Megawati. Megawati had 
continuously demanded ‘Rini’s’ removal from cabinet which Jokowi refused and instead gave 
her a strategic post to manage state resources and direct key government policies. In 2015, the 
government allocated $3 billion of additional state funds to SOEs to merge and streamline the 
enterprises through the establishment of a large holding company. The aim was to increase 
efficiency, raise capital and use it as a vehicle for Indonesia’s development (Warburton 2016). 
 
It has also been argued that many of the infrastructure projects for investment under the Jokowi 
administration were identified in the MP3EI plan by the Yudhoyono government. However, 
Jokowi was able to make a more aggressive commitment to these projects through reallocating 
the removal of fuel subsidies of Rp 290 trillion to infrastructure. Given the budgetary 
challenges, the President is aware that his infrastructure plans require substantial private sector 
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capital and foreign investment to close this gap.  Therefore, Indonesia’s reluctance to borrow 
to maintain fiscal balance, could hurt longer term economic growth (Negara and Das 2015). 
 
3.4.2 Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
PPPs were only formally introduced in Indonesia in 1998 and were defined in Presidential 
Regulation Number 38 of 2015 as a; 
  cooperation between government and a business entity in infrastructure 
provision for the public interest in accordance with a specification previously 
determined by the minister/head of institution/head of region/state owned 
enterprise/region owned enterprise, which partially or fully uses a business 
entity’s resources, with particular regard to the allocation of risk between the 
parties (Siagian 2017,p.73). 
 
 
Davidson (2015) argue that during Yudhoyono’s first term, he had held several infrastructure 
summits in 2006 to attract foreign and domestic investors into projects on power, toll roads, 
railways and seaports. This saw Indonesia reverse its policy towards private sector investment 
in infrastructure projects. Regulations were enacted and institutions established to promote 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).  In 2010, the government passed Presidential Regulation 
No. 13/2010 to support the implementation of PPP. However, it failed to attract investors 
because of the unfavourable investment climate and the lack of trust foreign investors had in 
the government’s policy that had swung between regulation and deregulation. 
 
The MP3EI was launched to offer 99 PPP projects to boost investment. However, due to a lack 
of funds and institutional capacity, only three projects were initiated. As a result, the SOEs 
come across as a corporate conglomerate that have been assigned numerous projects but lack 
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financing ability. The government has also undertaken regulatory and policy reforms to create 
a more conducive environment to encourage private sector participation into PPPs. Regulation 
38/2015 does this by expanding eligible sectors for PPP and offer a more favourable legal 
framework (Davidson 2015).  
 
Indonesia’s national planning agency ‘Bappenas’ (2017) also provides a list of 22 projects that 
have been listed as PPPS as seen in Appendix 1. Despite these efforts, the uptake of PPPs has 
been minimal. According to the Asian Development Bank, Indonesia has received a low 
ranking for its uptake of PPPs, considering its population and size of the country. This is 
because of a fragmented legal framework for PPPs, complex procedures in land acquisition 
and insufficient fiscal support for PPPs. Another reason is also because SOEs perform both a 
regulator and operator function, and also do act as a private counterparty in bids, resulting in 
conflict of interests (Davidson 2015).  
 
Ray and Ing (2016) argue that President Jokowi has also reassigned important projects that 
were meant for the private sector to SOEs since he came into office. These include the Trans-
Sumatra highway, the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport rail link in Jakarta, the Makassar 
New Port in South Sulawesi and private management of small airports. Therefore, the question 
is whether these funds that are injected into SOEs are being used effectively. SOEs also receive 
guaranteed funding through international financial institutions. However, Ray and Ing (2016) 
argue that Indonesia’s infrastructure needs are too large to rely solely on SOEs funding and 




This has also been addressed by the past coordinating minister for economic affairs, Sofyan 
Djalil (2014-2015). The Ministry of Public Works and Housing has also emphasized that the 
Trans Sumatra Toll Road will require partnership with the private sector to be completed. SOEs 
have the advantage in obtaining finance through competitive bidding or by direct appointment. 
The lack of competition causes inefficiency and is a significant downside risk in the SOE 
dominated infrastructure development. The Jakarta Post (9th October 2017) reports that the 
government has started to respond to these risks by improving the PPP scheme for joint 
ventures. However, such partnerships will require vigorous due diligence on the SOEs and their 
projects. The government allocated $3 billion of additional Sate funds in 2015 to SOEs to 
merge and streamline the enterprises through the establishment of a large holding company. 
The aim was to increase efficiency, raise capital and use it as a vehicle for Indonesia’s 
development (Warburton 2016). 
 
Indonesia offers multinational enterprises a lot of opportunities as overseas production 
locations. However, there has always been concerns as to why Indonesia never attracted more 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). This is because FDI performance has been linked to its 
nationalist aim of controlling inflows of foreign capital by policymakers. Although post 
colonial Indonesia did not attract FDI during Sukarno’s leadership, Suharto’s regime did 
radically restore the FDI climate temporarily in the third phase of his rule, resulting in improved 
economic growth. With deregulation from 1986 onwards, this made Indonesia an attractive 
target for foreign investors (Lindblad 2015). By the 1990s, a government regulation permitted 
100 per cent foreign equity in joint ventures for large scale investments in remote locations in 
Indonesia. As much as foreign investors looked favourably upon this change, the government 
took steps in the opposite direction to tighten some regulations by applying the ‘Negative 
Investment List’ (Lindblad 2015). 
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The OECD (2016) survey of Indonesia argues that although FDI inflows have picked up 
substantially over the last few years, they still remain lower than in other countries. The report 
argues that this is due to excessive and overlapping regulation across various levels of 
government that has made it difficult for foreign investors to invest. Compared with 
neighbouring Southeast Asian (SEA) countries, restrictions on FDI remain higher in Indonesia 
as shown in Figure 3.8. Although the Negative Investment List opened up foreign ownership 
to 35 sectors within the economy, FDI in ports still remains capped at 49 per cent, limiting 
economic growth.  
 









Source: OECD 2016, p.34 
Note: The ASEAN 9 include Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam. 
 
3.4.3 Corruption in Indonesia 
 
Despite its economic growth, institutionalised corruption continues to be a political challenge 
that undermines the Indonesian economy, the distribution of resources and its public 
administration. Corruption can result in a loss of economic efficiency with increased 
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transaction costs, inefficient investment and poor allocation of resources. This can be 
exacerbated by the high degree of centralised control (ECB 2016). According to Transparency 
International (2016), a risk based consultancy, corruption undermines the working of markets 
by reducing tax collections, developing barriers to entry and weakening the legitimacy of the 
nation (Transparency International 2016). 
 
Dick and Mulholland (2016) argue that Indonesia’s society operates on a patronage system as 
a way of sharing wealth and power amongst a set of oligarchs. Suharto’s New Order 
government enraged the public when reports of corruption showed how his children leveraged 
upon his political power to secure monopolies for example, toll roads, power plants and 
television stations. Corruption in Indonesia is driven from a number of factors such as vested 
political interests and networks, poorly paid civil servants, officials with significant 
discretionary power, resources allocated with poor levels of accountability and enforcement, 
and a weak judiciary system. The level of corruption also depends on the level of economic 
development and the openness of the economy. Indonesia ranks 90 out of 176 countries in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in 2016. This is a moderate 
improvement from its position of 110 out of 176 countries in 2010. Dick and Mulholland 
(2016) caution that these rankings are only indicative as they measure perceptions which can 
be subjective. 
 
Transparency International (2012) argues that the Indonesian police and the judiciary are 
viewed as the most corrupt institutions and thus create a challenge to control corruption as their 
role is that of law enforcement. This erodes trust in the public of the legitimacy of the 
government. Corruption is also encountered in Indonesia’s political system and through 
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customs and tax services (Transparency International 2012). This is represented in the 2016-
17 ‘Global Competitiveness Report’ which identifies corruption as a major barrier to doing 
business in Indonesia as shown in Figure 3.9. 
 
Figure 3.9: The most problematic factors in doing business in Indonesia, 2016 
 
Source: World Economic Forum (2016) : Global Competitiveness Report 2016-17, pp.204 
 
 
The first anti-corruption measure was introduced in Indonesia in 1960 in the Sukarno 
administration with the enactment of the Law 24/1960 on the Prosecution, Investigation and 
Examination of the Crime of Corruption (Transparency International 2012). However, the 
report argues that corruption in Indonesia has been documented from the beginning of 
Suharto’s New Order regime. Suharto operated based on a patronage system to ensure loyalty 
from his subordinates, members of the national elite and critics in exchange for business or 
political opportunities. 
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His centralized rule made it more predictable for investors and business to know how much 
exactly to keep aside for bribes. This was also prevalent in local government where governors 
and local army commanders had the same privileges but were aware of repercussions from 
higher authority if they pushed too far. After thirty two years of an authoritarian regime which 
ended in 1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis, Indonesia made the transition to a democratic 
nation. However, Hadiz and Robinson (2004) argue that the crisis failed to remove the interests 
and factors that were embedded in Suharto’s regime. They argue that the root cause of the 
problem was not the centralised system of rule; rather, it was the rise of powerful business 
families linked to politicians. The end of the Suharto era and fiscal decentralization saw this 
process of bribe taking becoming fragmented and unclear. The nation’s decentralisation 
programme also led to increased opportunities for corruption by increasing the number of 
decision layers in the policy making process. As transparency, accountability and strong 
institutions are still lacking, this poses a challenge for the fight against corruption in Indonesia 
(Indonesia Investment 2017; Transparency International 2012).  
 
To tackle corruption, the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi or KPK) was established in 2003. Efforts were also intensified further 
after the government ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003 
(Transparency International 2012; OECD 2012c). Since its establishment, the KPK has 
prosecuted high level politicians, ministers and government officials. There has also been an 
increased scrutiny and transparency to make it clear that at least in principle, no one is immune 
from the process (OECD 2012c).  
 
In recent years, high profile cases have been brought to the KPK. The Yudhoyono 
administration (2004-2014) came into power by demonstrating its support for anti corruption. 
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This was especially with the Yudhoyono’s government ministers, high ranked police officials, 
judges and the Treasurer of Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party. However, the resignation of 
Indonesia’s Finance Minister from 2005 to 2010, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, had an impact on the 
Yudhoyono government. The Finance Minister had a reputation of integrity and was in charge 
of reforming Indonesia’s corrupt tax and customs office. Despite being successful, she made 
enemies with those who had high political connections and this led to her resignation. She 
eventually left Indonesian politics to join the World Bank as a Managing Director. Although 
the Yudhoyono term began with a promise to target corruption, it did not end this way 
(Indonesia Investment 2017). This contributed to a fall in his approval ratings towards the end 
of his presidential term (Indonesia Investment 2017). 
 
Dick and Mulholland (2016) argued that highly prized positions within parliament such as 
chairs of parliamentary committees, require ministers and senior bureaucrats to negotiate the 
handling of hearings by distributing payments according to power and influence. These 
payments flow back to the head of the party who has control based on their fundraising power. 
They argue that such a situation cannot be described as a good government but nonetheless is 
a sustainable democracy. As Negara and Wihardja (2015, p.43) quote from the work of Thee 
(2013)  
    
Institutions and practices of extraction, leading to regressive distribution of assets, 
income and wealth, have been sustained during the postcolonial era. ... The abuse 
of public resources by rent-seeking elites (including those during the Soeharto 
era), has been a constant factor in Indonesian history and the Dutch colonial rule 
set the example in its most extreme form. 
 
Corruption in Indonesia continues to persist due to a lack of transparency and clarity regarding 
regulations and lengthy bureaucratic processes (OECD 2012c). The ‘National Strategy for 
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Corruption Prevention and Eradication’ (Government of Indonesia 2012) developed by the 
Indonesian government has a long term vision (2012-2025) of creating an anti-corruption 
nation. The government aims to prevent corruption through educational activities to develop 
the view that corruption is ‘evil’. Further measures taken to eradicate corruption can also result 
in improved tax collection. This includes establishing proper frameworks to monitor the 
efficient use of public resources which were overlooked through the decentralisation process. 
Transparency International (2012;2016) argues that although recent anti corruption efforts 
through the KPK have led to the conviction of high ranking public officials, poor institutional 
capacity, a weak rule of law and poor regulation, still create fertile grounds for corruption. 
However, Warburton (2016) and Negara and Das (2017) argue that building a transparent and 
clean government and human rights have slipped off Jokowi’s political agenda. At the start of 
his campaign, Jokowi aligned himself with the KPK and sought their assistance in fighting 
corruption. He had also requested the KPK to vet the status of his selected ministers.  
 
In 2015, President Jokowi and his energy minister, Sudirman Said, undertook energy reform 
including the removal of petroleum subsidies and organising a team to investigate corruption 
in the mining and oil and gas sector. However, Jokowi’s appetite for reform was lost in six 
months as Sudirman’s technocractic governance earned him many enemies, including Luhut 
Panjaitan who was Jokowi’s loyal strategist. Sudirman and Luhut had many disagreements 
with regards to Indonesia’s mining contracts.  Sudirman also challenged and criticised another 
close ally of Jokowi, Rini Soemarno, who was responsible for the state own electricity 
provider. These conflicts were very disruptive to the President and his cabinet, especially after 




Freeport Grasberg, a large copper and gold mine had a concession with the Indonesian 
government ending in 2021; the company wanted to renew its contract till 2041. Freeport was 
given assurance by Setya Novanto, a past parliamentary Speaker, that the company’s contract 
would be renewed. He used this as a basis to try and extort business opportunities and shares 
out of Indonesia’s largest foreign mining company. Sudirman went public with a recording in 
which Luhut’s name was mentioned to secure presidential support for an early extension of 
Freeport’s contract and he also led charges against Setya. Although the recording did create a 
media frenzy, the casualty was none other than Sudirman as Luhut and Setya proved 
themselves politically useful to Jokowi (Warburton 2016). 
 
Setya was forced to step down from his position as a parliamentary speaker but enjoyed 
President Jokowi’s backing as the Chair of the Golkar party. Luhut was appointed as the 
Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Natural Resources portfolio. This gave him 
complete oversight over the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and the Freeport 
contract.  He also won his case in the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the recording 
was undertaken by a ‘private citizen and not at the behest of law enforcement’ and was cleared 
of all wrongdoings by the parliamentary committee. According to Warburton (2016), Jokowi’s 
view on criminalizing corruption after the Freeport Scandal in December 2015 appears to be 
that it is bureaucratic and slowed down development projects. Courts and police had been 
instructed not to investigate leaders involved in infrastructure projects where there was an 
oversight. Although Jokowi did attempt to bring about institutional reform, the political risk 
was too high and his attention shifted towards the groundwork for re election in 2019. The next 
section discusses the role path dependence has played in influencing Indonesia’s economic and 




  3.5 Path Dependence in Indonesia’s Leadership 
 
The ‘Guided Democracy’ and the ‘New Order’ leadership of Sukarno and Suharto respectively, 
inherited a highly centralised system and authoritarian style leadership from the Dutch. The 
Dutch created additional layers in society by distinguishing between pure blood of Dutch as 
the highest rank, then mixed blood who were Eurasians, followed by Chinese and Arabic 
merchants and lastly, the native Indonesians. This discrimination resulted in Indonesians only 
registering for low positions in government services (Adiputri 2014).  
 
Anderson (1990) argues that the VOC operated initially as a business in Indonesia in the 17th 
century in the Indonesian archipelago with its base in Batavia. This was formally replaced by 
the Dutch crown which saw Java and some parts of Sumatra transform into a colonial society. 
By 1910, the colonial state played a key role in establishing military, law and order, mineral 
exploitation, irrigation, agricultural improvements and education. In 1928, twenty percent of 
the revenue generated was from the profits of state owned mines and plantations, with the 
remainder from corporate tax (10 per cent), land rent (6 per cent), income tax (9 per cent) and 
various regressive and indirect taxes. Therefore, a large source of the revenue for the colonial 
state was from its own monopoly operations and efficient exploitation of human and natural 
resources. Likewise, Suharto’s regime derived most of its revenue from military controlled 
monopolies, state resource companies and institutional corruption. Therefore, Anderson (1990) 
argues that there were strong resemblances between the Dutch colonial state and the modern 
state of Indonesia. 
 
Similarly, the Indonesian Parliament, replicated some of the features of the Dutch parliament 
which operated as an ‘Executive Committee’ that was not open to the public and did not have 
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any debates. The Indonesian Parliament resembles the Dutch as it articulates for rules of 
procedure that tends to avoid voting to reach a solution. The Indonesians, like the colonial 
government, maintained an authoritarian regime especially during the terms of President 
Sukarno and Suharto. Therefore, the culture inherent in the Indonesian parliament today is not 
a legacy of Suharto’s authoritarian regime but continuing a path dependence inherited from the 
Dutch. Although attempts were made to achieve democracy after the departure of the Dutch, 
the institutional forces for change remained weak and path dependence continued (Adiputri 
2014). Also, in the 31 years of President Suharto’s rule, there were no ‘Chinese’ cabinet 
ministers nor were there any generals or civil servants of Chinese ancestry. This is in spite of 
the widely held belief in Indonesia that the Chinese dominate the domestic economy with state 
protection and financial backing from other Asian countries (Anderson 1990). 
 
Similarly, Hadiz and Robinson (2004) argue that Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’ set out as a 
framework of self reliance that saw the foreign companies nationalised to create a new national 
and industrial based economy to replace the old colonial system. This path dependence also 
influenced the role of SOEs and private sector investment into the country. Davidson (2015) 
argues that infrastructure projects during Suharto’s regime, such as toll roads, were funded by 
SOEs that were free from profit making pressures. This led to SOEs playing a central role in 
the national economic agenda as they were insulated from competition. The experience 
demonstrated the authoritarian path dependence approach within institutions. Davidson (2015) 
argues that because of the lack of reform in institutions of Indonesia’s new democracy, the old 
institutional forces from interested oligarchs and rent seeking individuals persisted. President 
B.J. Habibie (1998-2000) who replaced President Suharto did not bring about any institutional 




This path dependence has carried on throughout the remaining presidencies and can play a role 
in explaining the nation’s view towards foreign investment and attempts at liberalising the 
economy. Therefore, to achieve economic success, Indonesia needs to move away from its 
‘colonial period mentality’ that relied on revenues from natural resources and protectionist 




This chapter provided a general overview of the history and key economic trends and 
development in the Indonesian economy from the 1500s until 2017.  The Dutch established a 
monopoly trade in Indonesia in 1602 before colonising it in 1815. The departure of the Dutch 
saw a new era of nationalism and entrenched institutionalised behaviour in Indonesia that was 
inherited from the Dutch.  President Sukarno, the first President, did very little to upgrade or 
invest in Indonesia’s infrastructure which hampered the nation’s economic growth. Economic 
growth was largely driven by rising commodity prices.  It was not until Indonesia experienced 
a slump in commodity prices in 1986, that the government swung the pendulum towards 
liberalisation (Dick 2008). The rule of President Suharto from 1967 to 1998 also saw a high 
degree of crony capitalism and a high degree of corruption, which contributed to the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1998. 
 
As the nation recovered from the crisis, there was a shift towards protectionist measures. 
Indonesia’s reform was well placed to survive the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. However, 
poverty levels had declined significantly as the gains from economic growth have not been felt 
equally across the country. The benefits have accrued more towards the island of Java than 
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other regions and in certain employment sectors such as manufacturing and oil and gas. This 
has left many other Indonesians still being vulnerable to poverty, especially in the rural areas 
(World Bank 2014). Under the Yudhoyono government, policies including deregulation began 
to develop to raise the nation from a middle income to a developed nation status. They included 
the ‘RPJPN’ which was the long term plan for the nation supported by four short term five year 
plans from 2005 to 2025. The MP3EI was also introduced to accelerate the growth in 
Indonesian economy.  
 
Many of Indonesia’s current problems are a result of past policy failures and Indonesia needs 
to free itself from the mindset inherited from the colonial period if it wants to escape the middle 
income trap and move forward. Similarities can be found between the colonial economy and 
Indonesia’s current economic situation, one of which is Indonesia’s dependence on its natural 
resources for revenues (Negara and Wihardjia 2015). Indonesia’s policymakers also do not 
fully embrace liberalisation competition and switch ‘easily’ between introducing restriction to 
relaxing them on trade on industries. However, protectionism and inward oriented policies are 
going to be counterproductive for Indonesia in today’s globalised environment. Instead of 
pursuing interventionist policy, the government needs to consider a structural reform of the 
economy looking at areas of infrastructure, logistics and rules and regulations. The transition 
to a higher income country will also require innovation, investment in education and 
infrastructure which will result in improved productivity. In the past, Indonesia’s policies have 
been characterised as ‘bad times that lead to good policies’. Plunging oil revenue in the 1980s 
pushed the government to implement broad-based economic reforms that boosted industrial 




Despite the kaldeiscope of economic plans, economic growth has not reached the levels for 
Indonesia to transition to a developed economy nation by 2030. Decentralisation has further 
exacerbated the coordination between central and local government, making it difficult to plan. 
The reduction of trade barriers within the region and abolishing tariffs is likely to bring an 
influx of imports and exports to and from Indonesia. The organisation of an efficient logistics 
system is a crucial factor in the socio-economic development of Indonesia (World Bank 2013). 
In particular, efficient maritime infrastructure is essential for Indonesia to remain competitive 
with neighbouring countries (Nederland Maritiem Land 2015). Infrastructure continues to be a 
key priority for President Jokowi’s government. However, further policy changes are needed 
to accelerate the investment in infrastructure. These includes developing pipelines for project 
investment funds, transparency in procurement processes, minimising changes in policy and 
reducing the regulatory burden. At the same time, government needs to reduce the reliance on 
SOEs as they do not always have the management capacity of funding for the allocated tasks.  
 
Although macroeconomic stability has been achieved, further microeconomic reform is needed 
to increase efficiency and competitiveness in the economy and to reduce corruption. If there is 
a period from which Indonesia could learn from, it would be the non oil export drive from the 
mid 1980s that resulted in liberalisation bringing about stronger economic growth. Corruption 
and the government’s view towards foreign investment is also another challenge. However, 
without improving freight logistics and increasing infrastructure investment, the archipelagic 
nation will miss out on opportunities from greater internal and international economic 




In 2008, the Indonesian government introduced the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ to increase 
competitiveness in its port sector by splitting the role of ‘regulator’ and ‘operator’. In 2014, 
President’s Jokowi’s ambitious maritime agenda focused on constructing 24 container ports, 
which consist of 5 hub ports and 19 feeder ports across the archipelago. The investment 
required has been estimated at US $81 billion. Historically, Indonesia’s ‘policy pendulum has 
swung between regulation to deregulation’ (Dick 2008, p.385). Given the uncertainty in the 
political and economic environment, has port reform improved port performance or will 
‘protectionism’ continue to impede the development of an efficient logistics and infrastructure 
investment? The aim of the next chapter examine Indonesia’s logistics system and port 








Chapter 4 : Logistics and Port Governance in Indonesia 
‘The ship must not wait at the quay, but the quay must wait on the ship.’ (Stevens 1999 p.87) 
 
4.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, this thesis provided a brief overview of Indonesia’s economic history 
and macroeconomic growth. Since independence, Indonesia has been transitioning towards a 
middle income country. However, to make the leap from a middle income to a higher income 
country, Indonesia has to overcome several challenges, including increasing productivity 
through investment in infrastructure and innovation, liberalising its economy, microeconomic 
reform and combating corruption to improve its competitiveness as a nation. Within the 
transport sector, logistics can play an important role to bring about increases in productivity. 
Improved logistics supply chains and infrastructure are needed for Indonesia to remain 
competitive amongst neighbouring countries in Asia. With regards to ports, these logistical 
facilities that make up the supply chain include ‘container terminals and parks, seaports, 
freight, airports, rail terminals and multi modal freight transfer terminal’ (Oakden and Leonate, 
p.16). 
 
Patunru et al. (2009) argues that distribution efficiency also plays a key role in improving port 
productivity. Therefore, port logistics, competitive pricing for port services, reliability, port 
infrastructure, information platforms, good intermodal connectivity to the hinterland and time 
in port are all important factors in port selection (Notteboom et al. 2013; Nugroho et al. 2016). 
Talley (1994) argues that ports are not only concerned with whether they can handle cargo but 
also whether they can compete for cargo. A port can become more cost efficient by improving 
its logistics to reduce the time spent in port.  
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The State of Logistics10’ report for Indonesia identifies the need for Indonesia to reduce its 
logistics costs. (State of Logistics 2015). Figure 4.1 shows total port traffic increasing steadily 
in Indonesian ports from 2000 to 2014. The growth in container traffic over this period has 
been strong, increasing three folds from 4 million TEUs in 2001 to 12.4 million TEUs in 2016. 
 
    Figure 4.1: Annual Container Port Traffic in Indonesia (TEUs)  
 
                 Source: Worldbank Data (2001- 2016) 
 
 
As demand for container cargo throughput continues to intensify, the competition within 
surrounding Southeast Asian ports such as Singapore and Malaysia increases. Other developing 
nations such as Thailand, Vietnam and Philippines are also actively competing for cargo from 
Indonesia, thus placing pressure on Indonesian ports. Therefore, infrastructure investment is 
critical for Indonesia. This thesis aims to evaluate the performance of Indonesia’s first and third 
                                                 
10 This report is produced collaboration with the Centre of Logistics and Supply chain, Institut Teknologi 












largest container ports, the Port of Tanjung Priok in Jakarta and the Port of Tanjung Emas in 
Semarang.  
 
Before analysing the port case studies, this chapter provides as an assessment of Indonesia’s 
logistics and port governance framework. Section 4.1 provides a benchmark of Indonesia’s 
logistics performance against neighbouring Southeast Asian countries. In Section 4.2, this 
thesis examines competition for containerised cargo at various Asian ports. Section 4.2.1 
analyse China’s BRI initiative while Section 4.2.2 gives details of the various projects in 
Indonesia that are related to the BRI project. Section 4.3 delves into port governance in 
Indonesia and how Indonesia’s governance structure has evolved since gaining independence 
from the Dutch and the introduction of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’. Section 4.4 discusses the 
level of private investment in Indonesia’s ports. Turning to Section 4.5, this section focuses on 
port labour and industrial relations since independence from the Dutch with Section 4.5.1 
discussing the Belawan Harbour strike and Section 4.5.2 progressing this discussion further for 
the Port of Tanjung Priok. Finally, Section 4.6 provides the conclusion to the chapter. The 
performance of these two case study ports are examined in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
4.1 Indonesia’s Logistics Performance 
 
The ‘State of Logistics’ (2013) report argued that logistics performance plays a key role in a 
nation’s economic growth and its competitiveness against other nations. Therefore, there is a 
need to implement coherent and consistent policies to foster smooth supply chain operations 
as an engine of growth. Efficient logistics connects firms to domestic and international markets 
through reliable supply chain networks. Conversely, countries with low logistics performance 
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face higher costs because of unreliable supply chains and transport costs, thereby increasing 
the cost to businesses. In 2013, logistics costs made up to approximately 27 per cent of 
Indonesia’s GDP (State of Logistics 2013).  This is higher than logistic costs in Thailand and 
Vietnam and far behind Malaysia and Singapore. These costs are summarised in Table 4.1. It 
can be seen that Indonesia has the largest logistics cost at 27 per cent of the nation’s GDP 
compared with Vietnam and Thailand at 25 and 20 per cent of their GDP respectively. 
However, when compared with the logistics costs of Singapore at 8 per cent and Malaysia at 
13 per cent, Indonesia’s costs are relatively high.  
                            Table 4.1: Indonesian logistics costs compared with other ASEAN countries  
Country Logistics Costs (% of GDP) 
United States of America 9.9 
Japan 10.6 






Source: State of Logistics 2013, p.18 
 
To gain a better understanding as to why these logistics costs in Indonesia are so high, we 
analyse a range of indicators. The first is the ‘Logistics Performance Index (LPI)’ developed 
by the World Bank which ranks the logistics performance of 160 countries on six dimensions 
of trade (World Bank Logistics Performance Index 2007-2016). This include customs 
performance, infrastructure quality, ease of arranging competitively priced shipments, quality 
of logistics service, ability to track and trace consignments and the timeliness of expected 
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delivery times. The LPI uses standard statistical techniques to aggregate the data into a single 
indicator or scorecard that can be used for cross-country logistic comparisons. This scorecard 
has been produced in 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. Using this scorecard, Figure 4.2 
provides an overall logistics performance of Indonesia against other developing Southeast 
Asian economies (SEA). The results suggest that Indonesia has made some progress over the 
years with logistics performance. However, despite being a middle income country, 
Indonesia’s score is comparable to a lower income country like Vietnam. Comparing these 
results with other SEA countries, Indonesia’s performance is still lagging behind neighbouring 
competitors such as Thailand and Malaysia.  
 
        Figure 4.2 : Overall Logistics Performance Index Scores (1= Low, 5 = High) 
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The next indicator is the quality of logistic services compared across Southeast Asian countries 
as seen in Figure 4.3. The results show that logistics quality and competence in Indonesia has 
fluctuated between a score of 2.5 and 3 out of 5, with very slight improvement over 2007 to 
2016. Vietnam and Philippines display a similar trend with Cambodia lagging behind. 
Malaysia’s logistics quality and competence leads with a score close to 3.5. 
 
 
        Figure 4.3: Quality of Logistic Services (1= Low, 5 = High) 
 
                 Source: WorldBank LPI Scorecard 2007, 2010, 2012 and 2014,2016 
 
Isolating the impact of infrastructure on the scorecard, Figure 4.4 shows that Indonesia’s 
infrastructure has not improved significantly since 2006. This can be compared with Cambodia 
which has seen its infrastructure scorecard increase to nearly the same levels of Indonesia in 
2016, despite starting from a low base. The infrastructure of Vietnam and the Philippines share 
a very similar scorecard in 2016 which is close to the scorecard achieved by Indonesia. This 
indicates that further investment in infrastructure is required in Indonesia to improve its 
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        Figure 4.4: LPI Infrastructure scorecard (1= Low, 5 = High) 
 
      Source: WorldBank LPI Scorecard 2007, 2010, 2012 and 2014,2016 
 
Finally, the scorecard on international shipments which looks at the ease of arranging 
competitively priced shipments, also suggests that Malaysia has a significant lead in attracting 
international shipments as shown in Figure 4.5. At the same time, Vietnam and the Philippines 
have been outperforming Indonesia when competing for international shipments.  
 
  Figure 4.5: Ease of arranging shipments (1= Low, 5 = High) 
.  
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Therefore, although Indonesia’s logistics performance is catching up with its neighbours, its 
score remains lower than countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. The quality of 
infrastructure also remains weak resulting in loss of time due to congestion, poorly maintained 
roads, ports and airports (Sandee et al. 2016). 
 
Besides the ‘Logistics Performance Index’, The World Economic Forum also produces the 
‘Global Enabling Trade Report’. This report generates a key indicator in measuring efficiency 
and transparency in border administration. The rankings are represented in Table 4.2. Although 
the reporting variables have changed over the last eight years, Indonesia ranked 79 out of 136 
countries for efficiency and transparency in border administration in 2016. This is an 
improvement from its 2008 score of 91 out of 118. However, the ranking of effectiveness and 
efficiency of clearance has worsened from the 43rd in 2008 to the 70th position in 2016. 
Similarly, the customs services index has also fallen from 22nd to 28th position from 2008 to 
2016. On the upside, Indonesia’s position with regards to irregular payments for exports and 
imports as seen an improvement from a ranking of 110 in 2008 to 80 in 2016. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Efficiency and transparency in border administration 
Indicators 2008 
Rank 91/118       
       2016 
Rank 79/136     
Burden of customs procedure 91 - 
Customs service index 22 28 
Effectiveness and efficiency of clearance 43 70 
Time for import 77 - 
Irregular payments in exports and imports 110 80 
Corruption Perception Index 104 - 
Source: World Economic Forum Global Enabling Trade Report 2008 and 2016. Some variables have 





The World Economic Forum also produces an annual country benchmarking report titled ‘The 
‘Global Competitiveness World Economic Report’. According to this report, Indonesia’s 
position for port infrastructure ranking has improved from 97th in 2006-07 to 75th position in 
2016-17 as seen in Table 4.3. This measures the results from the second pillar of the survey 
which is infrastructure, specifically port infrastructure. Similarly, Philippines, Vietnam and 
Cambodia have also seen a slight improvement in port infrastructure ranking from 2010-11 to 
2016-17. However, Thailand’s ranking has seen a further deterioration from the 43rd position 
in 2010-11 to the 66th position. Malaysia’s port infrastructure leads with the 17th position and 
Singapore at the 2nd position. 
 







Indonesia 97 96 75 
Malaysia na 19 17 
Philippines na 131 113 
Thailand na 43 66 
Vietnam na 97 77 
Cambodia na 82 76 
Singapore 1 2 2 
Source: Global Competitiveness World Economic Report (2006 to 2017) 
 
Although it can be difficult to draw definitive conclusions from the above surveys as they are 
indicative and subjective measures, the overall results do provide a guide to suggest that 
moderate improvement in logistics performance for Indonesia has taken place over the last 
decade. However, it is also evident that Indonesia’s logistics performance has started to fall 
behind other developing SEA countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand and 
Cambodia. Many logistics challenges still remain, especially in infrastructure investment as 
other developing nations catch up with Indonesia’s performance.  
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The lack of logistics quality and infrastructure could discourage investment, increase 
inventories and storage cost within the nation (World Bank 2014). Malaysia’s performance in 
the above indicators could also be linked to its lower score on the FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness index being lower than Indonesia and Thailand as discussed in Chapter 3. The 
index suggests that the economies of Vietnam and Cambodia are even more open to foreign 
direct investment. However, Table 4.4 below suggests that Malaysia still has the least 
restrictive FDI policy, with FDI investment in maritime transport allowed up to 69 per cent, 
compared with 49 per cent in Indonesia (OECD 2014). 
 
Table 4.4: General restrictions on transport FDI in eight ASEAN member states 
Source: OECD (2014, p.16-17); Presidential Regulation 4/2016 
 
This could provide an explanation for the quality of port infrastructure and logistics at 
Malaysian ports.  In Malaysia, the phenomenal growth of port throughput has led to an 
expansion of port facilities, maritime services and the establishment of new shipping lines to 
Countries Transport 
Cambodia None 
Indonesia Maximum Maritime Investment in International and Domestic sea transportation is <49 %. 
 
Lao PDR The Government reserves the right to participate in the shareholding of air and sea transport 
companies, as well as in infrastructure construction companies. A joint venture with the 
Government may be required  
 
Malaysia FDI<70% in Malaysian shipping companies.  
 
Myanmar Only joint ventures in marine passenger and freight transport and in local and international 
aviation services.  
Philippines The Constitution restricts ownership of any transport company to Filipinos and to Filipino 
companies (FDI<40%). 
Thailand Air, surface, maritime: FDI<49% but may be allowed up to 75% with approval.  
 




cope with the growth in freight traffic and trade development. Malaysian ports have invested 
heavily in port infrastructure and port capacity expansion projects in anticipation of increasing 
container volumes (Jeevan et al. 2015).  As suggested by the international logistics surveys in 
the previous section, the maritime industry in Malaysia has made progress since the 1970s 
through the government’s plan to transform Malaysia. In 1971, GDP in Malaysia reached 7 per 
cent as the nation adopted an ‘export led’ growth policy as part of its New Economic Policy 
(NEP).  However, transport costs remained high, especially port costs that were responsible for 
transporting 90 per cent of Malaysia’s international trade. Malaysia’s ports had struggled to 
cope with the strong increase in traffic following its economic growth and were suffering from 
dilapidated infrastructure, lack of handling equipment, congestion and low productivity (Tull 
and Reveley 2002; Ghashat et al. 2011). Therefore, to remain competitive, these costs had to 
fall.  
 
Port Klang is the nation’s main port and it is located on the West Coast of Malaysia, at the 
mouth of the Klang River. In 1983, government policy in Malaysia shifted from promoting 
public enterprises to embracing privatisation. Port Klang was chosen for privatisation because 
it was profitable and not politically sensitive and secondly, because it was inefficient by world 
standards due to congestion, poor productivity and pilferage. In the same year, a new company 
Klang Container Terminal Sendirian Berhad (KCT) was established and private sector 
companies came to bid to acquire 51 per cent of KCT’s shares. The winning bid was from a 
joint venture company including Konas Terminal Klang Sendirian Berhad (KTK). This was a 
joint venture between Kontena Nasional Sendirian Berhad (KNSB) which owned 80 per cent 
of the shares and P&O Australia which owned the remaining 20 per cent. In 1986, P&O 
Australia purchased its share in the Klang container terminal. To minimise opposition to 
privatisation from employees, workers were offered a choice of redundancies or remained 
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employees of the Klang Port Authority with no change to terms and conditions. They were also 
guaranteed security for employment for the first five years (Tull and Reveley 2002). In 1992, 
Kontena Nasional was unable to find a partner to privatise the remainder of the port. In the end, 
the remaining operational services such as pilotage were sold to the Nationally owned, Kontena 
Nasional. 
 
The Klang Port Authority (KPA) was eventually corporatized and retained regulatory power 
and responsibility for port planning and development. Unlike many corporatized ports, it was 
granted rights to license the companies carrying out cargo related commercial activities, set 
performance standards and approve tariff changes. The successful privatisation of Port Klang 
led to the privatisation of other Malaysian ports such as Johor (in 1993 and 1995) and 
corporatisation of Bintulu in 1993. Kuantan port was privatised in 1998 without the 
corporatisation stage and Tanjung Pelepas in 2000 (Tull and Reveley 2002). In conclusion, the 
Malaysian port privatisation experience could play a role in explaining why it outperformed 
other Southeast Asian ports and is a possible model for Indonesia to emulate.  
 
4.2 Competition amongst South East Asian Ports 
 
Following from the previous discussion, we now turn to look at competition in the container 
trade in Asia. Container throughput in the SEA Ports (SEA) has been increasing steadily and 
with ports located within close vicinity of each other, competition is inevitable. Port rankings 
are summarised in Table 4.5. The port of Singapore ranks second place behind Shanghai with 
a total container throughput of 30.9 million TEUs in 2016. This is followed by Malaysian ports, 
Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, in the position of 11th and 19th respectively. Thailand’s Laem 
Chabang port holds the 21th position at 7.2 million TEUs with Tanjung Priok falling from the 
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27th position in 2015 to the 30th position in 2016 at 4.95 million TEUs. Although the Port of 
Tanjung Emas is not ranked in the top 50, its volumes have nearly doubled from 0.43 TEUs in 
2011 to 0.62 million TEUs in 2016 and is ranked as Indonesia’s third largest port. 
Table 4.5 : Ranking of Top 50 Container Ports in Asia and the Port of Tanjung Emas 
Source: World Shipping Council (2017), unpublished data from Tanjung Emas Container Terminal 
Note: Transshipment containers are counted twice in Asia. (Journal of Commerce (JOC) Group, 5th September 
2016) 



















1 Shanghai, China 32.53 33.62 35.29 36.54 37.13 
2 Singapore 31.65 32.24 33.87 30.92 30.9 

























8 Qingdao, China 14.5 15.52 16.62 17.51 18.01 
9 
Jebel Ali, Dubai, 
United Arab 
Emirates 
13.27  13.64 15.25 15.6 15.73 
10 Tianjin, China 12.3  13.01 14.05 14.09 14.5 
11 Port Klang, 
Malaysia 
10.00 10.35 10.95 11.89 13.2 
19 Tanjung Pelepas, 
Malaysia 
7.70 7.63 8.50 9.10 8.28 
21 Laem Chabang, 
Thailand 
5.83 6.04 6.58 6.78 7.23 
26 Ho Chi Minh, 
Vietnam 
5.06 5.54 5.37 5.79 5.6 
30 Tanjung Priok, 
Jakarta, Indonesia 
6.2 6.59 5.90 5.2 4.95 
35 Manila, 
Philippines 
3.71 3.77 3.81 4.0 4.52 
38 Haiphong, 
Vietnam 
0.96 3.02 3.45 3.87 4.10 
45 Tanjung Perak, 
Surabaya, 
Indonesia 
2.84 3.02 3.1 3.12 3.31 
na Tanjung Emas, 
Semarang, 
Indonesia 
0.46 0.50 0.58 0.61 0.62 
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The ports of Vietnam and Thailand have been competing closely with Tanjung Priok in terms 
of container volumes. The port of Tanjung Perak in Indonesia is at the 45th position.  
Congestion between the ports and their hinterland are slowing the efficient movement of cargo 
as the development of inland transportation seems unable to match the increase in cargo 
volumes. There are also concerns about custom procedures by importers, exporters and freight 
forwarders in Thailand. Likewise, the Port of Manila in Philippines faces the challenge of port 
and traffic congestion. This is largely due to the lack of infrastructure investment resulting in 
bottlenecks as container throughput increase from 3.71 million TEUs in 2012 to 4.52 million 
TEUs in 2016 (Hongkong Polytechnic University 2014).  
 
In Vietnam, the three largest ports are the Ports of Saigon, HaiPhong and Da Nang. However, 
only HaiPhong Port and Da Nang Port have good connections to their hinterlands. Therefore, 
goods need to be transhipped from other major ports such as Hong Kong and Singapore which 
increases transportation costs. Vietnam’s logistics and infrastructure still requires a significant 
amount of investment, as it does not have the same size and depth to accommodate larger 
vessels (Hongkong Polytechnic University 2014). However, container throughputs at the 
Vietnamese ports have been increasing steadily from 2012 to 2016.  
 
The driver behind this intensifying competition in the shipping industry is the trend towards 
larger and more powerful alliances amongst shipping lines (Notteboom et al.2013) The influx 
of larger ships also increases demand for costly dredging. Therefore, with the current container 
port competition in Southeast Asia, the response of port authorities to the changing market 
environment in which they operate will have a critical impact on the ports performance. 
Although the Port of Singapore still remains the leading port in the region, it faces intense 
competition from neighbouring transhipment hubs. As demand for container throughput is 
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forecast to fall due to slower economic conditions, analysts have warned that competition in 
Asian transhipment hubs is expected to intensify further (JOC Group, 15th September 2016). 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Map of Straits of Malacca and Neighbouring SEA Ports 
 
 
Source: Dang and Yeo (2017) 
 
 
As discussed in the previous section, Malaysia had made substantial progress since the 1970s 
through the government’s plan to transform Malaysia and can be seen as a leader in port 
privatisation with Port Klang attaining the 11th position. With intense competition for volumes, 
Tull and Reveley (2002) argue that the Asian financial crisis resulted in coercive attempts from 
the Malaysian authorities to divert cargo from Singapore to Malaysian ports by using the threat 
of law. As 80 per cent of the shippers were either foreign owned or Singapore companies, this 
did not bring about a favourable response. In March 2000, the Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP) 
started to operate as a transhipment port with its location at the southern tip of the Malaysian 
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Peninsula. The location of major Malaysian ports along main trade lanes such as the Straits of 
Malacca has become a motivating factor for the ports to provide all the services at competitive 
rates. This stiff competition saw the Port of Singapore’s major customer, Maersk Sealand, shift 
its operations to the Port of Tanjung Pelepas in 2000 by taking a 30 per cent stake in the port.  
 
Cullinane et al. (2007) argued that this saw an immediate financial loss of 10 per cent or 2 
million TEUs of container throughput to Singapore. This was followed by Evergreen moving 
its operations to Tanjung Pelepas in 2003 (Tull and Reveley 2002; Jeevan et. al. 2015). 
Cullinane et al. (2007) argues the presence of the Port of Tanjung Pelepas was already 
becoming strong in the region. The Port of Singapore responded by locking in customers with 
new long-term contracts that provided flexibility, discounted rates and berthing priorities in 
return for guarantees on minimum throughput. The Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) also 
responded by establishing PSA International in 2004 to diversify its portfolio of container 
terminal operations on an international scale.  
 
In 2017, the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) International has also announced a joint venture 
with CMA CGM, a French container and transportation shipping company, to operate four 
container berths. This will have an impact on transhipment business from Malaysian ports as 
PSA tries to rein in Evergreen shipping line from Tanjung Pelepas. Evergreen joins the CMA 
CGM and COSCO in the Ocean Alliance that use Singapore as their hub (JOC Group, 2nd 
January 2017). The PSA’s competitive advantage as transhipment hub has been in shipping 
connectivity despite its handling charges being higher when compared with neighbouring port 
such as the Port of Tanjung Pelepas. The PSA is staying ahead of its competition by building 
the next generation mega container terminal which is expected to be fully automated to handle 
large volumes of cargo more efficiently and engage in research and development (Lam 2016) 
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The Journal of Commerce (JOC Group, 2nd January 2017) also reports intensifying 
competition in Southeast Asia ports as container terminals undercut on pricing to attract 
volumes. There are also major port developments taking place in the Straits of Malacca which 
includes capacity expansion projects at Singapore’s Tuas development, Tanjung Pelepas and 
Port Klang. Tongzon (2011) argues that China’s strong economic growth has seen the Port of 
Shanghai surpassed the PSA as the world’s top container port while the top 10 ports have been 
dominated by Chinese ports as seen in Table 4.5. The main ports in China near the Yangtze 
Delta are the ports of Shanghai and Ningbo. The Ports of Shenzhen and Guangzhou are located 
near the Pearl River Delta while the Ports of Dalian, Tianjin and Qingdao are located at the 
Pan-Bohai Rim. China also has projects in the pipeline as it seeks to create alternative ports 
along the Straits of Malacca to secure demand by investing into a four million TEU facility in 
Tanjung Sauh Port on Indonesia’s Batam Island, which is located close to Singapore.  Chinese 
investment is also seen in the Port of Kuantan on the east side of the Malaysian peninsular 
facing the South China Sea.   
 
4.2.1 China’s Belt Road Initiative 
 
 
China is also develop establishing the ‘Belt Road Initiative’ that consists of the ‘Silk Road 
Economic Belt’ and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ The maritime version of the Silk 
Road will stretch from southern Chinese ports to the Port of Piraeus in Greece and include 
sensitive maritime routes such as the Malacca Straits and the Suez Canal along with port 
facilities within the Indian Ocean (Das 2017; Ploberger 2017). This is very much like the 
ancient trade route that linked the Roman Empire in the West to the East with the Chinese 




In 2013, President Xi Jinping unveiled his initiative for greater economic integration in a visit 
to Kazakhstan and Indonesia. This can be seen in Figure 4.7. Cai (2017) discusses that the 
various levels of Chinese government, the national economic planning agency and provincial 
universities are heavily involved in BRI. Cai (2017) argues that the rejection of the Trans 
Pacific Patrnership (TPPs) agreement by the United States helped China sell its BRI more 
effectively. Das (2017) highlights that the TPP involved an agreement among 12 major trading 
countries which had been advanced but faced uncertainty with the President of the United 
States. 
Figure 4.7: Belt Road Initiative 
 
Source: Notteboom and Yang (2017, p.9) 
 
Ploberger (2017) discusses if BRI is an attempt from China to enhance its economic integration 
from Asia to Europe or if it is part of China’s grand strategy. This strategy could see China 
leverage its geopolitical interests to influence and reshape its power within Asia from a rule 
follower to a rule marker. Ploberger (2017) argues that China views the BRI as a means of 
securing access to Central Asia’s regional resources and supply routes and an export market 
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for Chinese products. Also, it will give China more power and influence over Russia in the 
region.  
 
Although some have viewed the BRI as China gaining political leverage over its neighbours in 
the region, China claims the BRI is a means of addressing the nation’s regional disparity in 
income between its inland western region and the wealthier eastern coastal cities as its economy 
industrialises. This has become a huge challenge for the ruling party with cities such as 
Shanghai becoming wealthier compared with the inland provinces such as Gansu. Therefore, 
China is hoping that this will spur infrastructure development within the regions. Xinjiang is 
also a large Turkic speaking muslim population that has grown frustrated with Beijing’s rule 
and wants to gain greater autonomy. It has also become the main source of terrorism within 
China and the ruling party believes that the underlining cause is poverty and 
underdevelopment, which it is trying to address as part of the BRI. With 60 countries 
participating in the ‘BRI initiative’, China is still seeking the participation of more countries. 
This is critical for the success of the BRI (Cai 2017). 
 
Das (2017) argues that some of the projects that have been approved by China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission cover the building of expressways and rail routes 
through Chinese provinces such as Anhui and Xinjiang. A freight train route has also been 
launched to link Anhui to Central Asia. Although the improved connectivity and trade is 





However, China’s strategic initiative is not welcomed by countries such as India. India, a 
growing economic power, has its own geopolitical ambitions and is showing a strengthening 
its relationship with the US and with the ASEAN region with member countries such as 
Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and Indonesia (Ploberger 2017). China intends to pass a node to 
Nepal by passing a railway through Tibet that leads to Qinghai in China. This would benefit 
Nepal’s economy substantially especially its agriculture and tourism sectors. However, given 
Nepal’s links with India and the flow of trade through India, the Nepalese government has 
responded to the proposal with caution. Likewise, China’s relationship with Bhutan has been 
evolving with diplomacy. Bhutan has a good relationship with India which it wants to maintain, 
making the BRI less attractive. Recent developments between China and India have not 
achieved cooperation with regards to the BRI or other issues. India has also not shown interest 
in the BRI because of security and strategic concerns (Das 2017). 
 
However, for a landlocked country such as Afghanistan, concerns around terrorism, security 
and long term stability means the BRI could play a significant role in its economic development 
and connectivity. The BRI is strongly supported by Pakistan. The proposed corridor aims to 
connect Kashgar in Xinjiang in China’s far west with the Port of Gwadar in the province of 
Baluchistan in Pakistan. The proximity to the Persian Gulf could see it as a transshipment point 
for commercial purposes and for China’s energy supplies instead of going through the Straits 
of Malacca in Southeast Asia. The port is deep enough to accommodate submarines and air 
craft carriers (Cai 2017). The China-Pakistan corridor and relationship could also pose as a 
threat to India as military clashes in Kashmir continue. Therefore, India also has to consider 
her own strategic interests which should not be overlooked when assessing the willingness of 




The financing of the BRI projects is coming from China’s Silk Road Fund (SRF), the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB). However, 
bankers and Chinese financers have raised concerns with regards to the risks associated with 
overseas loans due to political instability and economic feasibility of BRI projects. Das (2017) 
argues that two emerging economic powers, China and India, are exerting their economic 
influence in two different strategic pathways. China’s focus has been on developing 
infrastructure in South Asia through the BRI while India has been an integral part in South 
Asia’s connectivity initiatives, albeit on a smaller scale. Ploberger (2017) argues that economic 
cooperation is what China is seeking rather than a ‘grand strategy’ to leverage its power. Thus, 
the BRI may shadow other connectivity projects that are initiated by emerging countries such 
as India’s agreement with Iran to develop the Chabahar Port in Iran. This will develop India’s 
trade link with West and Central Asia by avoiding the land route in Pakistan and the Chinese 
controlled Gwadar Port in Pakistan.  Therefore, the BRI does present an economic environment 
for growing regional trade and development. However, challenges such as national security, 
terrorism, geopolitical relations, cooperation with other countries and funding still pose a risk 
to its development. 
 
4.2.2 Indonesia and the BRI 
 
 
Indonesia’s involvement in the BRI is taking place through high speed rail and its ‘sea toll 
road’. China is also investing in high speed railway technology to establish this route and 
marketing this high speed rail to Thailand, India, Indonesia and Malaysia who are strategic 
partners in BRI. In Indonesia, this includes the building of 142 kilometre of high speed rail line 
that connects the Indonesian capital, Jakarta to Bandung in West Java. China won the bid from 
Japan by offering to fund the project itself. Cai (2017) argues that although the deal is not 
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profitable for China, it is aimed at persuading foreign countries to accept Chinese standards 
and technology. According to PWC (2016), Indonesia has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding of US $20 billion with the China Development Bank (CDB) in June 2015 to 
finance infrastructure through SOEs and finance the planned Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail 
Line. A summary of these BRI projects can be seen in Table 4.6 below.  
 
 
Table 4.6 : Selected Transport Infrastructure Projects Tied to BRI in Southeast Asia 
Project Investment (USD million) Stage 
Trans Sumatra Toll Road 27,000 Pre construction 
Sunda Strait Bridge 24,000 Planning 
Jakarta Bandung High Speed Rail 5,100 Awarded 
Central Kalimantan Coal Railway 
Network 
2,300 Tendering 
West Coast Expressway 2,000 Project signed 
Kertajati Airport 1,800 Tendering 
Soekarno Hatta Airport Train 
Express Line 
1,800 Design 
East West MRT 1,700 Planning 
Balikpapan-Samarinda Toll Road 875 Planning 
New Yogyakarta International 
Airport 
700 Awarded 
Surabaya Monorail 558 Planning 
Kalibaru, First container terminal 393 Project signed 
Manado-Bitung Toll Road 330 Planning 
Source: Das (2017, p.4) 
 
These projects, along with the ‘Sea Toll Road’ have been part of Indonesia’s involvement with 
the BRI. Figure 4.8 shows the key Indonesian ports involved in the BRI. The ASEAN Post 
(22nd September 2017) reports that a handful of Indonesian ports are included because there is 






Figure 4.8: Indonesia’s BRI  
 
    Source: ASEAN Post (22nd September 2017) 
 
 
Therefore, Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board (BPKM) is concentrating infrastructure 
projects in a number of regions to increase Chinese investment. Indonesia has identified three 
provinces which are North Sulawesi, North Sumatra and North Kalimantan as projects to be 
part of the BRI. North Sulawesi and North Sumatra will see investment in infrastructure 
development including seaports, airports and toll roads while North Kalimantan focus’s on 
investment in energy and processing industries (Jakarta Globe, 14th May 2017). However, 
Indonesia has only received USD $5 to $6 billion in infrastructure investment from China. This 
is significantly smaller than the amount received by Pakistan and Malaysia of USD $62 billion 
and USD $32 billion respectively. The aim is to receive funding for its toll roads, sea ports, 
airports and power plant. However, Indonesia is open to investment from countries such as 
Japan and the US, which can also play a critical role in developing Indonesia’s infrastructure 






4.3 Port Governance in Indonesia 
 
 
We now turn to focus on the port governance framework of Indonesian ports. In an archipelago 
nation such as Indonesia, shipping is the key mode of inter-island transport and most islands 
are economically dependent on connections through ports. Almost 90 per cent of trade in 
Indonesia is via sea with most of the non bulk trade being shipped via Singapore or Malaysia 
due to cost competitiveness. Therefore, connectivity plays a critical role in reducing costs and 
further diversifying production and exports in Indonesia. Despite its critical importance to the 
national economy, Indonesia does not have a competitive ports system due to the lack of private 
sector investment and competition among ports (Nathan Associates 2008). In 2008, Indonesia 
had approximately 1700 ports of which 111 ports are commercial and 614 are non-commercial. 
There are also about 1000 special purpose ports that served the mining, oil and gas, fishing and 
forestry industries. These ports were controlled by the four state owned Indonesia Port 
Corporation (thereafter Pelindo). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the departure of the Dutch saw Indonesia experience an economic 
decline until the mid-1960s. Before independence, inter island shipping which included 
shipping to and from Singapore, was the virtual monopoly of the Dutch owned KPM 
(Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij). The departure of the Dutch saw the failure to establish 
a joint venture between Indonesia and the KPM (Dick 1987). Dick (2008) argues that once the 
KPM withdrew its ships, the Indonesian government was quick in ordering vessels from other 
countries to replace the KPM. In 1957, the assets of the KPM and other Dutch enterprises were 





The new Indonesian government established its state owned inter island shipping corporation 
known as ‘Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia’ and regulated tariffs and operating conditions. 
Although shipping capacity increased, the fleet consisted of unfamiliar type of ships, some of 
which were old and did not suit Indonesian conditions. This resulted in more ship companies 
being registered even though they were not running in profit. Instead of focusing on efficient 
operations, the focus of the government on shipping was nationalization and removing traces 
of a colonial heritage which resulted in a deterioration of shipping services after 1957-58 
(Author Unknown 1966). The new Minister of Shipping in the Sukarno government began to 
impose regulations on the maritime sector. The rationale behind this was that the government 
needed to determine the commercial guidelines for the maritime industry in relation to the 
number of firms, shipping routes and capacity, allocation of vessels to routes and freight and 
passage rates (Dick 2008).  
 
In the 1960s, the port environment was characterised by high costs and inefficiencies. 
McCawley (2015) argued that competition and regulation have been central to the policy 
discussion of shipping in Indonesia. There were delays in loading and unloading ships due to 
rigidities in labour supply and lack of infrastructure. This had a significant impact on ship 
turnaround times. It was also difficult to assign responsibilities for loss of goods (Author 
Unknown 1966). In the late 1960s, costs, prices, and competition arrangements all contributed 
to high levels of inefficiency in the shipping industry.  
 
Lobby groups such as the Indonesian National Shipowners Association (INSA) that had pushed 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s to preserve the ‘rights of pribumi’ (indigenous 
Indonesian) companies while giving no support to the expansion of strong and progressive 
companies. Regulation within the shipping industry also resulted in efficiency losses. Dick 
161 
 
(2008) argues that the path dependence seen in Indonesia’s central planning, monopoly 
approach to maritime followed the Dutch style of managing institutions as discussed in Chapter 
3. However, it did have perverse outcomes as ship owners came to the understanding that to 
conduct business and get around inconsistent regulations, bribes could be offered. Dick (2008) 
argues that this resulted in bureaucrats collecting their bribes and industry operating in the 
manner they wanted. Indonesia was not quick to upgrade its port infrastructure which resulted 
in losing cargo to other ports such as Singapore. 
 
The Indonesian government then went on to establish eight state owned enterprises called 
Perusahaan Negara Pelabuhan (I to VIII), today known as the Indonesia Port Corporation or 
‘Pelindo’, in 1960 to operate ports. This corporation was tasked with managing port operations 
across the country.  Between 1964 and 1992, further changes were made to the structure of the 
ports and responsibilities. In 1983, the port structure was further divided into four operational 
areas and placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Transport (Dick 2008; Indonesian 
Investments n.d). As discussed in Chapter 3, the second phase of Suharto’s rule (1973 to 1983) 
saw deregulation policy take effect in 1981 when oil prices collapsed leading to a balance of 
payment crisis. Dick (2008) argues that the 1980s saw the government deregulate the highly 
protected and inefficient shipping industry to facilitate growth in trade and inter island 
shipping. Cabotage restrictions, which serve as a protectionist policy in many countries to 
regulate and restrict domestic cargo by national flagships, were abolished in Indonesian ports 
(Dick 2008). Shipping companies had the opportunities to expand their operations and it was 
no longer necessary to secure good connections with government officials to secure a profitable 
trade. As a result, shipping costs fell and global trade grew, facilitating the expansion of labour 





Corruption in customs clearance in Indonesia was extremely high during Suharto’s presidency 
which led to the outsourcing of custom functions to a Swiss firm Société Générale de 
Surveillance (SGS) in 1985 (Dick 2008). However, these deregulation measures did not last 
very long. By 1988, customs began urging the government to cancel the SGS contract because 
they claimed the company was performing poorly in processing documents and anti smuggling 
operations. In 1992, a new shipping law (Law 21/1992 on Shipping) was introduced that 
strengthened regulatory power as the reforms came under pressure from rent seeking agents. 
Once non oil exports started performing, President Suharto allowed the new Director General 
of customs, who was his son in law, to restore the customs services to its former role (JOC 
Group, 13th September 1989). The Asian Financial Crisis and the end of Suharto’s government 
in May 1998, saw many elements of the former maritime regulatory regime restored under the 
Habibie government. The deregulation of inter island shipping that was introduced in 1988 was 
overturned by President Habibie during 1999 in the last few weeks of his presidency. Also, 
long term lobbying efforts by the Indonesian National Ship owners Association (INSA) and 
the DG of Sea Communications, resulted in restoring cabotage restrictions in 2005 by the 
Megawati government. The crisis saw a return of economic nationalism that restored the old 
protectionist devices. (Aspinall 2016; Dick 2008).  
 
The legal structure of the port authority transformed further from multiple individual entities 
into a single public corporation called ‘Perusahaan Umum’ (Perum) and became limited to 
managing commercialized ports. In 1992, the public corporation was changed into a Limited 
Liability Company and the names of its entities were changed into Indonesia Port Corporation 
(IPC) I to IV, otherwise known as ‘Pelindo I to IV’. The ports administered under each of the 




Table 4.7: Ports Operated under Pelindo (year) 
Port Corporation Coverage (Provinces) Ports Administered 
Pelindo I Aceh, North Sumatra, Riau Belawan, Pekanbaru, Dunai, Tanjung Pinang, 
Lhokseumawe 
 
Pelindo II West Sumatra, Jambi, South 
Sumatra, Bengkulu, Lampung, 
Jakarta 
Tanjung Priok, Yanjing, Palembang, Teluk 
Bayur, Pontianak, Cirebon, Jambi, Bengkulu, 
Banten, Sunda Kelapa, Pangkal Balam, 
Tanjung Pandan 
 
Pelindo III Central Kalimantan, South 
Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, 
East Nusa Tenggara 
Tanjung Perak, Tanjung Emas, Banjarmasin, 
Benoa, Tenau/Kupang 
 
Pelindo IV Sulawesi, Maluku, Irian Jaya Makassar, Balikpapan, Samarinda, Bitung, 
Ambon, Sorong, Biak, Jayapura 
 
Source: Ray (2008) 
 
 
The Pelindo controlled the management of commercial ports in Indonesia by acting as a 
regulator and operator. As the port authority, it had monopoly control over freight and shipment 
in ports. There was also no incentive to perform financially as only Pelindo II and Pelindo III 
recorded profits and subsidised the other two port corporations (Pelindo I and Pelindo IV) that 
incurred losses, as reflected by the low maintenance and investment in port infrastructure. The 
Pelindo also control tariffs to users. Patunru et al. (2009) argues that these tariffs did not reflect 
efficiency levels because of the lack of competition inside the ports and the cross subsidy 
system. Patunru et al. (2009) argues that shipping companies, freight forwarders and 
stevedoring companies had lodged several complaints against Pelindo for the loss of time due 
to poor infrastructure and inefficiency in port operations.  
 
After four years of development, the Indonesian Government introduced ‘Shipping law no. 17 
of 200812. The law aimed to provide a comprehensive reform of the maritime industry to align 
it with Indonesia’s port sector vision for the country’s ports to be efficient, competitive and 
responsive (Shipping Law 2008, p.33 Article 67 of Part VII).  
                                                 
12 Relevant sections of the legislation have been included in Appendix 3. 
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This Law removed the Pelindo’s monopoly of port services and opened up the port to private 
operators, increasing competition and putting downward pressure on prices. As part of the port 
devolution process, the role of the regulator and operator was separated. Under existing 
regulations, the Indonesia Port Corporation consisting of the four Pelindos, would have 
regulatory authority over other ports within their geographical regions of control. With the new 
law, the regulatory authority at the port level will be vested with the newly formed port 
authorities. Therefore, in this ‘landlord’ model, the government is represented by the port 
authority that owns, provide and regulate access to port land, water and infrastructure. The port 
operator (Pelindo) leases these facilities to the private sector through a long term contract or 
concession and provides port services such as mooring, towage and cargo handling.  According 
to interview responses by an industry participant13, these concessions are to make sure that all 
parties are protected under the law in order to ensure smooth flow of logistics services in every 
Port of Indonesia. 
 
This law allowed for a radical transformation of Indonesia’s port system but the concern that 
arose was whether Indonesia’s port authorities would have the technical and financial expertise 
to undertake these responsibilities. This is because the law initially allows only public servants 
to staff the port authorities, restricting its recruitment abilities to attract more skilled staff. Also, 
Indonesian ports operating environment has had little competition. For instance, in the late 
1990s, two concessions for its JICT and Koja terminals were sold to Hutchinson Port Holdings 
(HPH) (Nathan Associates 2008).  
 
Also, depending on the relationship port authorities have with the incumbent Pelindos, this 
could shape discriminatory behaviour against new investors such as unfair access to key 
                                                 
13 Interview conducted on 19th January 2017 while visiting the Port of Tanjung Emas TPKS terminal 
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facilities and services or discriminative pricing. Lastly, prior to port reform, basic infrastructure 
was provided by the Pelindos. Under the new structure, port authorities need to be able to fund 
the provision of basic infrastructure. Therefore, they would require their own sources of 
funding which could be concessioned by the port authorities through a Build Own Transfer 
(BOT) basis. Although the new shipping law allows port operators to set their own tariffs, the 
wording in the legislation suggests that this can be determined by the government, 
contradicting the role between regulator and operator. Cabotage continues to remain in the 
‘2008 Shipping Law’ despite the law seeking to achieve competitiveness and efficiency 
(Nathan Associates 2008).  
 
Under this new structure, the Port Authority is responsible for the individual port masterplan, 
the provision of basic infrastructure and also to determine and regulate port operator access to 
facilities (Shipping Law 2008). This new model of port governance will see Indonesia 
transition towards a ‘Landlord Port’ governance model as discussed in Chapter 2 (World Bank 
2004; Nathan Associates 2008). In February 2012, it was finally decided that for budgetary 
reasons, there would be only four port authorities which include Belawan for Pelindo I, 
Tanjung Priok for Pelindo II, Tanjung Perak for Pelindo III and Makassar for Pelindo IV 











Figure 4.9: Port Governance Structure in Indonesia Post 2008 Reform 
 
 





The 2008 'Shipping Law No. 17’ laid the foundation for the Company known as the Indonesian 
Port Corporation (IPC) which manages Pelindo I to IV, to focus more on its role as an operator. 
In the past the IPC’s responsibilities included port related regulations. The company was 
established as a limited liability, profit making company with the central government retaining 
control of tariffs that are set at a national level. The IPC controlled cross subsidization between 
ports controlled by each Pelindo. The Company is governed by a ‘Board of Commissioners’ 
who act as a representative of the government (Annual Report 2012). The IPC then reports to 




A critical supporting document meant to assist with the transition was the ‘Draft National Port 
Master Plan’ (Nathan and Associates 2012). This was the key policy document developed by 
the Ministry of Transport which determined the location and hierarchy of current and planned 
ports. The plan also aimed to minimize the number of ports that have direct international 
shipping linkages to address the issues of smuggling and cabotage. Initially, the law required 
each port authority to prepare a master plan for ports under its area which would be linked to 
the National Ports Master Plan (NPMP) (OECD 2012d). Although the responsibility of major 
ports rests with the central government, the shipping law has a clear role assigned to local 
governments for developing collector and feeder ports. However, the issues of central 
coordination also failed as local governments did not always consult the central government. 
This reflected the problems brought about by the fragmented fiscal decentralisation process 
discussed in Chapter 3. (OECD 2012d). The new shipping law also continues to provide 
subsidies to the remote archipelago regions. However, the new structure does not detail if there 
will be a change in the structure of financial support offered and on what basis decisions on 
subsidy allocation will be made, suggesting difficulties in national coordination (OECD 
2012d). Therefore, the draft plan is ambiguous with regards to central planning for port 
development (OECD 2012).   
 
The current arrangements have port authorities established as operating units with the Ministry 
of Transport. However, a better structure as suggested by the OECD (2012d) would be for port 
authorities to operate outside of the public service as corporate entities with a Board of 
Directors that have a substantial degree of autonomy which is essential in operating as a 
landlord port. The relevant Pelindos and the Finance and Development Supervisory Board 
(BPKP) have been discussing the transfer of assets from the Pelindos to the Port Authorities. 
The OECD (2012d) argues that basic infrastructure should be transferred to the port authority 
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while operating equipment should be retained by the Pelindos (OECD 2012d). The timeline in 
Fig 4.10. summarises how the structure of Indonesia’s port governance system has evolved 




















Figure 4.10: Evolution of Indonesian Port Structure from 1960 to 2017 
 












































 Source: Dick (2008); Ray (2008); Annual Report (2012); Author Unknown (1966) 
 
After the departure of the Dutch, the Indonesian 
Government established 8 state owned enterprises 
called ‘Perusahaan Negara Pelabuhan’ to manage port 
operations 
The ports legal structure was merged from eight 
individual entities into a single public corporation 
called Perusahaan Umum (Perum). 
The port structure was further divided into four 
operational areas and placed under the supervision of 
the government’s Transportation Ministry. 
In 1992, the public corporation was changed into a 
Limited Liability Company and the names of its 
entities were changed into Indonesia Port 
Corporation I to IV (Pelindo I to IV).  
 
A new shipping law was introduced in 2008 by the 
Indonesian Government to provide a comprehensive 
reform of the maritime industry in Indonesia. This 
law removed long held legislated monopoly power at 
ports and replaced it with a more competitive and 
responsive system. This saw the governance structure 
of the ports begin to evolve towards a Landlord 
model with the separation of the operator and 
regulator role. 
Pelindos have been adapting to the new structure. 
However, the transition towards the landlord model 
still has elements of central government control, lack 
of foreign competition and regulatory constraints.  




4.4 Private Sector Investment 
 
 
The level of private investment in Indonesian ports is still limited to 49 per cent of foreign 
ownership based on the ‘negative investment list’ in 2008. This remained unchanged at 49 per 
cent after a review of limits on foreign investment in 2016 (Presidential Regulation 4/2016). 
Table 4.8 shows the level of foreign ownership in terminals in Indonesia terminals. The Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1998-99 led to foreign investment in Indonesian ports exceeding the limit 
of 49 per cent. This was due to a shortage of government funds. Hutchinson Port Holdings 
(HPH) operated the Jakarta International Container Terminal (JICT) at a 51 per cent interest. 
Although this contract has been renewed, the new terms result in HPH’s ownership reverting 
back to 49 per cent. This will be further discussed in Chapter 5. Similarly, Dubai Ports(DP) 
















Table 4.8: Ownership of key container terminals in Indonesia 
Container Terminal Ownership 
 






Joint venture between Pelindo II and Hutchison Port 
Holdings (HPH), with HPH holding a 51 per cent interest 
in the operating company till 2019. This reverts back to 49 









Operated by joint venture between Pelindo II and 
Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) with Pelindo having a 
holding interest of 52 per cent.  
 
 




Both terminals operated by Singapore-based Portek under 
operating agreements with Pelindo II. 
 
 





Newly built joint venture in Kalibaru to accommodate 
modern containership. The company is owned by four 
shareholders which include Pelindo II, Mitsui Co. Ltd., 
PSA International and Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisa 
(NYK Line). This terminal began operation on 18th August 
2016. (IPCa n.d.) 
 
 
PT. Terminal Petikemas Surabaya in Tanjung Perak 
 
 
Operated as a joint venture between Dubai Ports World 
(DPW) and Pelindo III, with Pelindo III holding a 
controlling interest of 51 per cent. However, this contract 
has not been renewed further because of differences over 
renewal terms (The Financial Times, 18th September 2017) 
 
 




Operated by International Container Terminal Services 
Incorporated (ICTSI) under a 10-year co-operation 
agreement with Pelindo IV. This has now been renewed for 
another ten years till 2023 (Port Strategy 2012). 
 
 




Although the shipping goals of efficiency, competitiveness and development are recognised in 
the ‘2008 Shipping Law’, these goals are overridden by nationalistic concerns as seen in the 
restrictions of foreign ownership in Indonesia’s maritime sector (Dick 2008). Similarly, the 
government has committed to increasing trade while its logistics and infrastructure systems 
require further upgrade. Ray (2008) argued that despite the new laws, corruption continues to 
exist in berth assignments with informal payments made to reduce queuing time stemming 
from a lack of infrastructure facilities. These informal payments are in addition to other 
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payments required at customs. The insurance premium on cargo shipments from Indonesia is 
30 to 40 per cent higher than cargo from Singapore because of sea piracy and organized crime 
at ports. Therefore, Dick (2008) describes the attempts to liberalise the port sector to the ‘swing 
of the policy pendulum from regulation to deregulation and back to regulation’. It has been 
close to a decade since this new law came into place and it provides an opportunity to evaluate 
the effectiveness of Indonesia’s new port governance framework.  
 
4.5 Port Labour and Industrial Unrest Post Independence 
 
Along with political unrest, there was also a surge in industrial unrest following independence, 
with workers demanding better conditions at the Javanese ports of Jakarta, Semarang and 
Surabaya and the Port of Belawan in Sumatra (Ingleson 2016). Workers, unions, employers 
and government officials, struggled to develop a new industrial relations framework.  In 1948, 
a report by a Labour Inspectorate survey showed that dockworkers not only worked for low 
wages but under difficult conditions that involved long hours of work, lack of drinking water 
and poor sanitation facilities. Workers having no paid sick leave or a social security net, had to 
struggle to work on the job while sick instead of losing their jobs. The report recommended 
establishing a minimum wage, improving in-kind allowances, regulating the maximum 
working hours, rest days, overtime work, improving access to sanitation and drinking water 
and providing medical care for sick workers (Ingleson 2016).  
 
The unions that emerged for dock workers in the late 1910s and early 1920s were small and 
ineffective. There were no major unions for Indonesian dockworkers until late 1939 which saw 
the creation of ‘Persatuan Sekerja Paketvaart Bumiputera’ (Association for Native Shipping 
Workers) for KPM workers and ‘Sarekat Pelajar Bumiputra’ (Union of Native Sailors) for non-
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KPM workers, but both ceased to function with the Japanese occupation in March 1942. Unions 
for dockworkers emerged again after the declaration of independence in August 1945 and 
operated under constrained conditions in Dutch controlled ports. ‘Serikat Buruh Kapal dan 
Pelabuhan’ (SBKP, Union of Ship and Dockworkers) had been formed in Jakarta in April 1948 
as an amalgamation of several small Jakarta unions. In March 1950, it joined the communist 
led union ‘Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI)’ (All Indonesia Federation of 
Labour Unions). The second union with national aspirations was the Serikat Buruh Lautan dan 
Pelajan (SBLP, Union of Dockworkers and Seamen) which had its headquarters in Surabaya 
(Ingleson 2016). 
 
Colonial mindsets took a long time to change and acknowledge that the race based coercive 
power of the State had ended. European employees earned much more than Indonesians and 
had better employment conditions and received a higher percentage of bonuses. In February 
1950, the dominant shipping company, KPM, dismissed union demands to end race 
discrimination. The unions challenged the existence of the path dependence colonial structure 
where Europeans were ‘tuan besar’ meaning ‘the master’. Some of the disputes were planned 
strikes and others were spontaneous actions by workers (Ingleson 2016). 
 
4.5.1 The Belawan Harbour Strike 
 
The process of collective bargaining was triggered in Indonesia with the beginning of strikes 
at the Belawan Harbour, located on the east coast of Sumatra. On December 29, 1949, five 
hundred permanent and casual workers at three small stevedoring companies went on strike 
two days after sovereignty was transferred to the state. The strike was a demand from workers 
for better pay and employment conditions, including paying permanent workers Rp.5 a day 
and overtime for Sundays and national holidays and a free meal instead of a subsidised meal. 
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They only received Rp.2 a day with subsidised rice, salt and palm oil for a 48 hour, 6 days 
work week. This modest uproar that started as a small action from workers ended up as a three 
week strike.  Initially, employers were convinced that the industrial action could be stopped by 
making an offer to double wages and improving conditions. However, the workers refused and 
continued the strike. They continued to load and unload ships but refused to move goods from 
the warehouses (Ingleson 2016)..  
 
Finally, on January 19, 1950, employers reached a deal with the SBKP for a daily wages of 
Rp. 4.75 and a premium per ton for goods loaded and unloaded and a 48 hour week. Workers 
would also be paid an extra ninety cents for overtime and paid a full day’s pay for working on 
Sunday. There was also provision for sick pay and free health care for workers and their 
families.  This collective agreement that the Shipping Employer’s Association negotiated with 
the SBKP formed the framework for union demands at the ports of Java in Jakarta, Semarang 
and Surabaya. The two major unions, SKBP and SBLP developed their strategy to focus on 
one harbour at a time to maximise the impact of industrial action. However, management 
continued delaying improving wages and conditions until further industrial action was taken 
(Ingleson 2016). 
 
4.5.2 Port Labour at Tanjung Priok 
 
The Dutch shipping group KPM, Rotterdam Lloyd and the Netherlands Shipping Company, 
owned housing complexes or ‘Unie Kampung’ in Jakarta, Surabaya and Belawan. The ‘Unie 
Kampung’ at Tanjung Priok housed 4,800 dockworkers and their families, that made up of 
about the quarter of the daily labour force. Casual labourers were employed by labour 
contractors who had contacts with their home villages. The demand for labour varied 
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depending on the number of ships in the harbour. Clerks would inform the foremen of labour 
requirements on a daily basis and they would be paid according to the number of workers in 
their ‘gangs’. In the 1950s, wages at the Jakarta Harbour of Tanjung Priok for a day shift of 
between eight to twelve hours ranged from Rp 2.35 to Rp 4.50 and for casual workers between 
Rp 2.35 to Rp 2.65. Overtime was not always paid and not all companies provided a free 
midday meal. Bonuses at the end of the Ramadan fasting month varied from companies 
(Ingleson 2016). 
 
Following the Belawan Port strike in Sumatra, workers unrest began in Tanjung Priok on 1 
April 1950 due to the widening gap between wages paid by stevedoring and shipping 
companies in the same harbour. The industrial dispute with the shipping companies resulted in 
increased wages and improved conditions of Indonesian sailors and administrative workers, 
including the creation of a pension fund. This angered the workers in the Unie Kampung in 
Tanjung Priok who had made attempts previously to attain improved employment conditions 
(Ingleson 2016). 
 
Their demands included a reduction in the work day by an hour, overtime pay outside the 
standard eight hour work day, a 50 per cent wage increase, improved food and water for 
consumption and sanitation, ending restrictions on the use of electricity in the evenings and 
company payment of burial costs. To maintain support of the workers, the SKBP increased 
pressure on KPM by threatening to organise a strike until their demands were met. On April 
3rd  1950, the SKBP organised a strike of nine thousand workers that brought the Port of 
Tanjung Priok to a standstill. The strike lasted until the 4th of April and the conclusion of  a 
multi union agreement from SBKP, SBLP and SBKPM and the Shipping Employer’s 
Association (Ingleson 2016). 
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The outcome included a 43 hour work week, a minimum wage for casual workers of Rp 3.50 
which included a mid-day meal and 500 grams of rice while Unie Kampung workers received 
Rp. 3 a day plus three free meals and a rice allowance for their wives. The strike showed 
employers would only improve employment conditions after a strike. Eventually, the three 
unions merged into a single union to gain more bargaining power over Jakarta, Surabaya and 
Belawan. Therefore, Indonesia’s transition to independence saw the beginning of collective 
bargaining between unions and employers and an end towards the discriminatory and 
exploitative wages and employment conditions that were inherited from the colonial era 
(Ingleson 2016).  
 
However, Irfan (2001) argued that the transition in leadership to Suharto witnessed the port 
being controlled by the military. This prevented workers from striking. On the 29th of June 
2000, the ‘Solidaritas Buruh Maritim dan Nelayan Indonesia (SBMNI)’ consisting of four 
unions was established. These were the ‘Solidaritas Buruh Pelabuhan Indonesia’, SBPI 
(Dockers Union) which had 3.000 members. The second was the ‘Solidaritas Buruh 
Transportasi Pelabuhan Indonesia (SBTPI)’ (Container Transport Workers Union) that had 
12,000 members and the ‘Solidaritas Pelaut Indonesia (SPI)’ (Seafarer Union) consisted of 100 
members. Lastly, the ‘Solidaritas Nelayan Indonesia (SNI)’ (Fisherman Union) that had 2000 
members.  
 
The SBMNI is an independent and democratic union that is registered with the Ministry of 
Manpower and have the strongest base at the Port of Tanjung Priok in Jakarta with ports in 
Semarang and Surabaya also building union bases. On November 9th and 10th in 2000, the port 
of Tanjung Priok saw its largest strike in decades with 3,000 dockers and 7,000 truckers 
demanding an improvement of wages and refusing the government decision to stop oil 
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subsidies as increases in oil prices would have a significant impact on drivers. Workers also 
wanted permanency rather than remaining as contract workers, pensions, abolition of illegal 
money for the officers and reform of the port management to make loading and unloading more 
efficient. This was because corruption at ports was rife with truckers having to pay bribes at 
every gate which included, taxes, customs and bribery of security and military which could 
easily costs Rp. 30,000 in a day. Also, the arrival of international terminal operators such as 
Hutchinson Ports Holding (HPH) has seen increasing levels of automation that have resulted 
in job losses. In the 1980s, there were 12,000 employees at the Port of Tanjung Priok. 
Automation resulted in a loss of 5,000 jobs, leaving a workforce of only 7,000 employees 
towards the late 1990s (Irfan 2001). 
 
Therefore, port unions have seen significant transformations since gaining independence from 
the Dutch. Although the unions were never seen as an impediment to port operations, their poor 
working conditions and unity gave them a strong voice to strike to negotiate better pay and 
working conditions with their employers. However, during Suharto’s era, unions did lose their 
power with ports being controlled by military personnel. This left dock workers with no 
opportunity to strike. The end of the Suharto era resulted in HPH owning a 51 per cent stake 
in the port and increasing automated operations resulted in further job losses. As the trend for 
terminal operators is to move towards fully automated operations, this would eventually reduce 
union power and employment for dock workers significantly. On the upside, it could also see 








Ports today can no longer be viewed in isolation to the rest of the transportation system and 
play a critical role to the economic development strategy of a nation. Therefore, the 
organisation of an efficient logistics system, equipped with infrastructure investment is a 
requirement for Indonesia to unlock the potential in its maritime sector and make the transition 
from a middle income to a high income country. Infrastructure development needs to go hand 
in hand with regulatory reform that allows traders, freight forwarders, manufacturers, and 
others to make optimal use of the available and expanded infrastructure.  
 
However, it is evident from the data that Indonesia’s port performance is still lagging behind 
that of major SEA ports and countries such as Vietnam and Philippines are catching up more 
rapidly. The port capacity in Indonesia’s largest port, Tanjung Priok, has been limited to 
approximately 5 million TEUs due to capacity constraints. Expansion at the Kalibaru Terminal 
will see annual capacity increase to 18 million TEUs once completed. However, ports around 
the region such as Thailand and Singapore are also working simultaneously on ambitious 
expansion plans (World Bank 2014). This stiff competition amongst neighbouring ports places 
enormous pressure on Indonesia to further invest in infrastructure in order to remain 
competitive. As discussed, the performance of ports in attracting cargo is determined by many 
factors. This includes the local port environment, its governance model, and the port’s 
strategies and capabilities.  
 
The departure of the Dutch resulted in Indonesia’s port system evolved with the Indonesian 
government establishing its own State owned inter island shipping corporation known as 
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‘Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia’. Their approach to managing the ports did bear resemblance to 
the Dutch rule of central planning, authoritarianism and monopoly. Further changes were made 
to the structure and responsibilities of the ports from 1964 to 1992, which divided the 
Indonesian Port Corporation into four entities known as Pelindo I to Pelindo IV that managed 
ports within the specified geographical regions and were both operators and regulators. Unions 
at Indonesians ports also gained a stronger voice and demanded better working conditions once 
the Dutch left. However, their role was supressed once again during Suharto’s ‘New Order 
Regime’. Gradually, this port governance structure resulted in inefficiencies in port operations 
with high dwell times, a lack of infrastructure investment and congestion which resulted in 
increased transportation costs and regional price disparities. After four years of development, 
the Indonesian government introduced the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ to increase competition and 
efficiency in the port sector by separating the role of ‘operator’ and ‘regulator’. 
 
It has been close to ten years since the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ came into practice which gives 
sufficient time to evaluate its impact on port performance. The successful application of this 
law depends critically on how the reform process is implemented. This law was introduced as 
part of the comprehensive reform of the maritime industry in Indonesia with the goal of 
increasing competition in port services. The next chapter aims to evaluate the performance of 
these reforms using the ports of Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Emas in Indonesia as case studies. 
This will be done using a range of indicators to assess if port performance has improved. In 
Chapter 6, the ‘Matching Framework’ will then be applied to the ports to evaluate their 
performance since the introduction of the new shipping law. This framework will assess the 
structure, strategy and environment to assess if the reform process has resulted in the best fit 




Chapter 5 : Methodology 
 
5.0 Introduction 
Recent decades have witnessed extensive port reforms that have challenged the conventional 
models of port organisation. As discussed in Chapter 2, governments of both developed and 
developing countries have devolved port operational responsibility through corporatisation, 
commercialisation and privatisation. Niekerk (2005) argues that the main reasons behind 
reforms include improving productivity and efficiency, management capability, diminishing 
the role of government in the operations of ports to landlord functions and redeeming debt 
obligations following the GFC. Although some of these reforms can be measured by financial 
and economic gains, some public ports also have socio economic functions to fulfill. Therefore, 
the choice of a reform process is never straightforward. In some ports, the public sector still 
plays a supervisory and monitoring role despite devolution. However, there are extreme cases 
such as that of the United Kingdom, where ports have been completely privatised with no 
national port monitoring agency (Brooks and Pallis 2008).  
 
In Indonesia’s case, the process of port reform officially began with the passing of the 
‘Shipping Law No. 17’ in 2008 as explained in Chapter 4. Although the focus of Indonesia’s 
government is on getting the reform underway, the success of port reform is crucially 
dependent on the post reform governance model it implements. Everett (2003) argues that a 
framework with poor implementation could result in numerous problems such as adverse 
principal agent effects or rent seeking behaviour (Everett 2003). Therefore, it is necessary to 
evaluate the reform in Indonesian ports to assess if these reforms have been successful and 
identify scope for further reform to take place to assist in the transition of Indonesian ports to 
the ‘landlord’ model. Global experience with port reform has shown that results are not always 
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satisfactory. This is because of the difficulty of linking port reform to port performance (Brooks 
and Pallis 2008; Brooks et al. 2017; Pilcher and Tseng 2017). Performance can be measured at 
the level of individual ports or terminals but also relates to operations and logistics, market 
trends and structure, environment and societal integration, socio-economic impact and 
governance. 
 
The challenge in port evaluation is not just about adopting the right appraisal methodology or 
performance matrix. There may also be instances where collection and analysis of quantitative 
data is limited. For instance, data on port performance may not be collected before or after 
reform and this makes it difficult to evaluate port performance before and after reform. 
Therefore, it can be desirable to adopt a mixed methods approach that combines various 
methods to provide insights that neither approach would produce on its own (Rao and 
Woolcock 2003: Rao et al. 2010).  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the mixed method methodology approach to evaluate 
port reform in Indonesia. These mixed methods approach uses three multi disciplinary 
methodologies to evaluate port reform  which include an indicator analysis approach, the 
‘Matching Framework’ developed in strategic management literature that analyses the 
alignment of the strategy, environment  and structure and institutional analysis approach to 
study the effect of path dependence and institutional ‘lock-in’ on port reform. Acknowledging 
the challenges of linking port reform to port performance, it intends to provide an assessment 
into the performance of the Ports of Tanjung Emas and Tanjung Priok pre and post reform. The 
findings will provide policy recommendations for current and future port governance reform 
in Indonesia. In this chapter, section 5.1 explores the various methodologies in the literature 
that have been used to study port performance challenges and limitations. Section 5.2 discusses 
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the first methodology used and the selection of port performance indicators and section 5.3 
discusses the literature on the matching framework methodology. Section 5.4 discusses the 
third methodology used in this research, which is the institutional approach, and its application 
to the case study ports in Indonesia. The discussion on how data is collected for this case study 
is in section 5.5 with the conclusions in section 5.6. 
 
5.1 Port Reform Evaluation Methodologies Literature 
 
National governments are constantly making decisions and implementing policies that have 
the potential to impact on all aspects of the economy and society. However, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC 2010) argues that it can be difficult to 
measure the impact those decisions have on society. Therefore, tools of evaluation can provide 
an assessment for governments on where further action is needed. However, Pilcher and Tseng 
(2017) argue that evaluating reform is not without difficulties. They argue that evaluation of 
port reform is challenging because of ‘defining key terms and their ambiguity, aspects of time 
and geography and issues of methods and context’ Pilcher and Tseng (2017, p.2). 
 
 
Various quantitative methods such as cost benefit analysis, productivity studies, and 
econometric studies have been used to analyse port reform. The existing literature measuring 
port performance has been relying heavily on Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
methodologies. These models measure inputs and outputs in a port to investigate whether the 
ports are technically efficient. This is done by measuring if their throughputs are at their 
maximum level using the available resources. These frontier statistical models use data 
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envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques to derive efficiency ratings on ports. DEA techniques 
make no assumptions about the stochastic properties of the data but relies on panel data to 
calculate port efficiency (Talley 2007; Pilcher and Tseng 2017). Other approaches include 
econometric models that help forecast volatility and future prices changes in the dry bulk and 
tanker markets (Pilcher and Tseng 2017).  
 
Other studies such as Cheon et al. (2010) test whether a port authority with a more decentralised 
corporate structure and administration is more efficient in its terminal operations.  Using the 
Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI)14, Cheon et al. (2010), however, do not find evidence for 
this hypothesis.  Despite this, there is still limited quantitative research dealing with the 
economic impact of port authority reform. This is because isolating the impact of specific port 
reform from the wider reform package can be challenging. Also, performance indicators related 
to increased output and revenue do not provide an indication of productive efficiency.   
 
However, Pilcher and Tseng (2017) argue that the MPI would not be able to include other 
qualitative aspects such as corruption or the number of aged employees in port authorities. 
Therefore, simply relying on such quantitative approaches could result in only a partial picture. 
Brooks and Pallis (2008) question the validity of these models by decomposing port 
performance into efficiency and effectiveness. They argue that past studies using DEA and 
SFA have attempted to capture port performance by relying only on operational efficiency 
indicators. Although empirical methods such as DEA can measure terminal efficiency, 
effectiveness is measured relative to the objectives being sought and cannot be determined 
through these empirical methods but through qualitative approaches.  
                                                 
14 The Malmquist Productivity Index(MPI) is an efficiency measure for input combinations that allow for obtaining the 
outputs between two periods of time. This methodology can be used in the presence of institutional reforms, ownership 
changes and measuring technological progress (Cheon et al 2010). 
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Brooks and Pallis (2008) argue that indicators on effectiveness such as ‘user satisfaction’ or 
‘quality of service’ are critical performance indicators that need to be assessed as well. Port 
authorities that are effectiveness oriented also tend to be more customer focused by developing 
and retaining customers that are profitable. Therefore, there is a need to broaden the indicators 
to measure effectiveness. Brooks and Schellinck (2013) identify three user groups to measure 
effectiveness, namely cargo interests, shipping lines and supply chain partners.  
 
Likewise, Ha et al. (2017) argues that studies on port performance management have not taken 
into account new challenges faced by ports. The current literature has focused on terminal 
efficiency studies, while port effectiveness studies have been limited to customer satisfaction 
indicators which are qualitative in nature. Therefore, Ha et al. (2017) intends to fill the gap in 
the literature through using a multi dimensional approach to assess port performance. This is 
done through developing the modelling of interdependent port performance measures and their 
respective weights through qualitative and quantitative evaluations from multiple stakeholders. 
Using this approach, the performance of container terminals in four major ports in South Korea 
is evaluated. This is then aggregated to measure port performance which port managers can 
use to benchmark the performance of different terminals in the same port. However, the 
challenge with this approach is that port authorities and other stakeholders do not respond to 
surveys as they do not want data released (Brooks and Pallis 2008: Verhoeven and Vanoutrive 
2012). In the case of Taiwan, Pilcher and Tseng (2017) argue that there was not much 
improvement in ship numbers and operational efficiency after the reforms of 2012.  Thus, it is 
difficult to isolate the outcomes or gains from the reform process as they might have accrued 




Bilodeau et al. (2006) developed a statistical approach to measure the impact of corporatization 
on Canadian government agencies. This methodology compared the performance before and 
after corporatization, allowing for a structural break to provide time for the corporatization 
process to run its course. De Langen and Heij (2014) analysed performance effects of the 
corporatisation of the Port of Rotterdam Authority by comparing a series of performance 
indicators for the port authority prior and after corporatisation.  They found that, in terms of 
yearly growth rates before and after corporatisation, improvements were most significant for 
market share, turnover per employee, operating costs and Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA). Verhoeven (2014) cautions that reforming the port 
authority should not be a goal in itself. Rather, the aim should be an improvement in the 
competitiveness of the port.  
 
Pilcher and Tseng (2017) argue that a structural break allows the transition period of the reform 
programme to be completed. If the transition is not complete, it would be difficult to evaluate 
if the current situation is a result of reform or previous policy. However, it can be difficult to 
pinpoint when the transition has ended. Therefore, the time series data should be sufficiently 
long to cover before and after reform. However, this analysis could still be limited by data 
availability or data being biased. There could also be times when insufficient time, perhaps five 
years have passed to enable a large enough dataset to be assembled for quantitative analysis. 
Also, port reform does not take place in a vacuum. Instead, there can be other government 
policy changes that are implemented and global economic conditions that can affect the pace 
of reform such as the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ in 2008. Therefore, Pilcher and Tseng (2017) 
argue that evaluation can be a challenging task, given that many internal or external factors can 




The discussion above highlights the challenges in developing methodologies to evaluate port 
performance. Therefore, the complexity of port operations makes it difficult to find a single 
methodology for performance measurement. However, some of these challenges can be 
overcome by focusing on the reasons behind the port reform and having a benchmark period 
to compare before and after performance. It is also vital to understand the process of how the 
reform was delivered and devised to measure its effectiveness. Considering the above 
challenges, this thesis uses three different qualitative approaches to evaluate port reform at the 
case study port of Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Emas. This includes an indicator approach that 
discusses various operational and financial indicators relevant to the port authority, the 
‘Matching Framework’ to assess the ‘fit’ of the new governance model and the institutional 
approach to study the role of path dependence and institutional ‘lock-in’ in Indonesia’s port 
reform.   
 
5.2 Methodology I: Performance Indicators Approach 
 
Ports can use a series of indicators to evaluate their performance. These indicators provide an 
insight into the port management (De Langen et al. 2007). Talley (2007) argues that the 
selection of indicators will depend on the port’s ultimate economic objective which could be 
to maximize profits or deliver a service. However, port operating objectives can differ 
depending on whether it is a private or public port. A private port will be concerned with its 
objective to maximize profits while a public port may focus on the broader economic gains 
apart from maximizing throughput.   
 
Pilcher and Tseng (2017) argue that the methodology applied in evaluating port performance 
is largely dependent on the availability of data. For instance, there is no reliable international 
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database collecting specific information such as labour on ports, nor is there a national port 
monitoring agency in many countries including the UK, leaving the public sector with only a 
supervisory and monitoring role. Brooks and Schellinck (2013) argue that although it may be 
easy for an individual port to identify and collect data on its own efficiency improvements, this 
only happens in a few countries such as Australia where port performance indicators have been 
collected since 1989 by the Australian Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional 
Economics Annual Waterline Report. On the other hand, Canada does not share such data 
publicly but sets efficiency measures for ports to track their own performance using these 
indicators. The literature review also found no consensus on appropriate methodologies for 
evaluating port performance.  
 
Bichou (2006) argues that measuring port performance is difficult due to the complexity of 
interactions of port missions, institutions and functions. This raises the question of whose 
perspective (regulator, operator or customer) one has to consider when undertaking 
performance benchmarking. Port authorities may have different or conflicting objectives. 
Futhermore, if an external institution such as a shipping line acts as a port operator, a port’s 
performance is often equated to ship’s efficiency at berth or in port hence blurring the 
boundaries between the objectives of the shipping line as a customer and those of the port as a 
service provider. On the other hand, a port where job generation and environmental 
sustainability are the primary missions may find its performance manifesto and objectives 
being fundamentally different from those of a profit focused port or terminal. In this respect, it 
is worth noting that many performance studies tend to overlook this dimension when 




Productivity is another indicator of interest to ports and is usually measured through port 
operations. Indicators such as berth productivity between a ship’s arrival and departure from 
berth, with no adjustments for labour or equipment down time, is a common measure of 
productivity. The methodology behind this benchmarking study was to calculate a standard 
measurement unit of gross moves per hour. With this common reference point, terminal 
productivity could be compared across regions and countries (Tirschwell 2014).Although 
terminals do have other metrics of measurement, this data can be difficult to obtain as there has 
been reluctance to share operating data for benchmarking purposes.  
 
Talley (1994) sets out a criterion for selecting performance indicators for ports by comparing 
a port’s actual throughput against its optimum throughput. Since it can be difficult to obtain 
reliable estimates, Talley suggests selecting performance indicators related to the port’s 
economic objective to evaluate its performance. Stevedoring performance indicators include 
number of ships and cargo handled, cargo handling rate, containers handled per crane and units 
per man ship. Shipping line performance indicators include dwell time and delay in ships to 
berth.  
 
Lastly, port authority indicators measure port facility utilisation and throughput and include 
truck turn time, tonnage handled and facility utilisation. However, the difficulty in this 
approach is evaluating the outcome when numerous indicators have been selected. This is 
because some indicators could improve over a period of time while other indicators may 
deteriorate, making it difficult to conclude if the overall performance has improved or 
deteriorated. Thus, Talley recommends using a single, overall indicator to address this issue. 
However, De Langen & Nijdam (2007) argue that although port throughput is usually seen as 
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a variable of obvious choice, it is not the port authority that is directly responsible for handling 
operations (De Langen & Nijdam 2007). 
 
Verhoeven (2014) argues if cargo or passenger volume is selected as a proxy variable for 
output, then this assumes that the corporatised port authority has powers to increase the 
efficiency of terminal operators and that it can attract more business to the port. Other 
indicators such as labour input, capital, land, revenues and expenditure could also be relevant. 
Talley (1994) argues that the selection of output and input variables may generally have to be 
linked to the economic objectives of the port authority.  However, with the trend towards full 
terminal automation, in future some of these variables such as labour may be a less useful 
indication (UNCTAD 2017). 
 
According to UNCTAD (2017) report, port performance benchmarking is expected to increase 
in the next five years as port users become engaged in improving their own competitiveness 
and creating value for customers. The report acknowledges similar challenges in assessing port 
performance such as the number of parameters involved, lack of up to date and reliability of 
data and interpreting results. Also, they differentiate between the needs of users such as 
policymakers, port customers, managers of port authorities and political and maritime 
economists. For instance, a policy maker may be interested in cross national performance and 
explanations for performance quality, while a port customer would be more interested in 
operations and financial measures relating to cargo. Policymakers may also want to assess the 
environmental impact of port operations, socioeconomic returns, quality of competition and 
the economic benefits of port activities. Port users seek information that has a direct impact on 
their business and the commercial decisions that they make. Therefore, their focus would be 
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more on operational factors such as dwell time or labour productivity. Likewise, port authority 
managers may be focused on the volume of cargo they are attracting and the port’s competitive 
position. Therefore, the UNCTAD scorecard assesses the four key performance areas which 
include financial, operational, human resources and customer dimensions. However, the 
challenge still exists with obtaining operational data as operators do not willingly share key 
data for commercial reasons (UNCTAD 2017). 
 
In 2010, the European Union funded the ‘Port Performance Indicators: Selection and 
Measurement’ (PPRISM) project that was managed by the European Sea Ports Organisation 
(ESPO). The aim of this project was to identify port performance indicators to measure and 
assess the impact of the European port system on society, environment and the economy. 
However, one of the challenges in developing a common set of indicators was the reluctance 
of ports to share certain data with others due to commercial sensitivity (UNCTAD 2016). 
Following the ‘PPRISM’ project, the European Union funded the ‘PORTOPIA’ project 
coordinated by the Free University of Brussels in 2013. The aim of the project was to build 
upon the ‘PPRISM’ project and focus on ‘effectiveness’ indicators to develop a port 
performance scorecard.  This was undertaken with the intention of creating an integrated 
knowledge management system of port performance to improve the sustainability and 
competitiveness of the European Port System.  
 
The ‘PORTOPIA’ project aims to modernize data collection and assessment on six dimensions 
from more than fifty European ports which voluntarily submit this data through the European 
Seaport Organisation’s (ESPO) platform. This include market trends and structure, socio 
economic indicators, environmental and occupational health, safety and security indicators, 
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logistics chain and operational performance indicators, governance indicators and user 
perception on port quality indicators. After four years, the project completed in November 2017 
and will provide benchmarking of ports in the European port industry (European Port Industry 
Sustainability Report 2017).  We now turn to discuss the range of financial indicators that have 
been used to assess port performance. 
Financial Indicators 
Accounting measures are the most common and readily available means of measuring a port’s 
performance (Richard et al. 2009). These include variables such as cash flow from operations, 
earnings before interest and tax, market share and return on equity and assets. However, 
financial indicators need to be interpreted with caution as financial performance may not 
improve immediately with reform. Tongzon (2008, p.116) argues that this was the case in 
interpreting financial indicators when analyzing port reform at the Port Authority of Singapore 
(PSA). After corporatisation, it was expected that the average rate of return on assets and profit 
margin would increase. However, between the period prior (1991-1997) and post (1998-2004) 
corporatisation, the average rate of return of assets went from 12.9 to 12.1 percent over this 
period. The average profit margin fell from 45.7 per cent to 37.8 per cent over the same period. 
This fall in financial performance was attributed to the significant rebates and discounts 
provided by the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) to attract shippers from competitors. 
Therefore, these indicators did not see any improved financial performance when measured as 
net profit after tax. Therefore, it is necessary to have a range of indicators and consider the 
competitive environment as well before reaching a conclusion.  
 
Tull and Affleck (2007) used various indicators to assess the performance of the eight port 
authorities in Western Australia. This included measuring financial performance indicators 
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such as return on assets, profit margin per cargo tonne, dividend payout, operating profit and 
debt to equity ratios. Pricing indicators included revenue and cost per unit of cargo. Their 
assessment also included productivity indicators such as berth occupancy, turnaround times 
and cargo throughput. Performance indicators from stakeholders at various ports included 
service quality, community service obligation and employment. The results for Western 
Australia showed a maximum return on assets of 15 per cent which do not suggest monopoly 
rents. Tull and Affleck (2007) conclude that this result was consistent with Fremantle Port’s 
position as a major mixed cargo port that handles containers. We will now discuss the 
operational and other performance indicators. This methodology was also previously been 
employed by Reveley and Tull (2001) to evaluate the performance of selected Australian and 
New Zealand ports.  
 
Operational Indicators 
Operational indicators also provide insights into how certain performance is achieved. Ports 
have traditionally evaluated their performance by comparing their actual and optimum 
throughputs. However, in an environment in which ports are not in competition with one 
another, a port should not only be concerned with whether it can physically handle cargo, but 
also whether it can compete for cargo. In a competitive environment, dwell time costs, in 
addition to port charges incurred by shippers and carriers, are important determinants in port 
selection. This includes operational indicators such as dwell time, berth utilization and labour 
productivity (UNCTAD 2003; De Langen et al. 2007). There are still many other indicators 






Brooks and Pallis (2008) find that ‘customer-led’ ports where port authorities that leverage off 
their core competencies and understand the needs of their stakeholder, are more likely to 
succeed. These ports include variables such as customer satisfaction, value added, environment 
and intermodal connectivity. Although not an exhaustive list, Table 5.1 provides a summary of 
the above discussed indicators.  
 
Table 5.1:Port Performance Indicators 




Cash flow from 
operations, Earnings 
Before Interest and Tax 
(EBIT), Market Share, 
Net Operating Profit, 
Return on Equity, Return 
on Investment, Current 
ratio, Debt to equity ratio, 
Revenue or cost per ton 
of cargo, 
 
Dwell time, Berth 
Utilisation, Inland carrier 
vehicle loading and 
unloading service rates, 
annual average port dues 
per gross tonnage, Time 
ocean carrier spent in 
port, Annual average 
number of strikes, Crane 
utilization, gate 
throughput, Number of 









Source: Talley (2007); Verhoeven (2014); ACCC – WP (5); Brooks and Pallis (2008); UNCTAD (2003; 
2016), Richard et al. (2009), Kaplan and Norton (1992); Verhoeven (2014); Affleck and Tull (2007);De 
Langen and Sharypova (2013) 
 
Therefore, it can be observed from the Table 5.1 that no single measure provides a clear 
measurement of performance. This is because traditional financial accounting measures such 
as ‘return on investment’ or ‘earnings per share’ can give misleading signals for improvement 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992). Customer or stakeholder satisfaction is also another important 
measure as it indicates what operational changes need to be made to meet customer needs. 
However, Verhoeven (2015) does highlight the ‘wear-off’ effect when using stakeholder 
satisfaction indicators while evaluating port reform at Rotterdam Port Authority.  The evidence 
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from the evaluation of port reform at Rotterdam showed that customer satisfaction effect 
gradually wore off as the time elapsed after a new governance structure was put in place.  
 
Thus, it is essential to provide a broad and balanced measure of indicators when measuring 
performance. Talley (2007) states that the advantage to a port in having individual performance 
indicators to evaluate its performance over time is that the performance of its various services 
and service areas can be evaluated. This will enable the port authority to observe where 
performance is improving or declining. This list of performance indicators will also evolve 
with time as issues such as environment and automation become more important. 
 
In summary, the limitations in undertaking such evaluation studies include data availability, 
identifying economic goals of port reform, linking port reform to performance when port 
reform is often part of a wider reform package, as was the case with microeconomic reform in 
Australia (Verhoeven 2014; Reveley and Tull 2012; Niekerk 2005; Talley 2007). Although 
data can be gathered from a variety of primary and secondary sources, measures of the 
preferred indicators are sometimes not available and the use of proxy indicators may be 
necessary (ACCC WP. 2). Brooks and Pallis (2008) also argue that performance evaluation 
should also factor time lag for the change to be implemented.  However, Talley (2007) cautions 
that although it can be tempting to compare the performance of one port to another, 
consideration must be given to the fact that ports operate in different economic, social and 






5.3 Methodology II: The Matching Framework 
 
As interest in the economic performance of ports in Indonesia continues to grow, it is important 
for government to assess the port devolution process. The ‘Matching Framework’ is an 
analytical tool that has been developed from strategic management theory and it focuses on the 
alignment of three key variables which are structure, strategy and environment to evaluate 
performance. The more aligned these three variables are with each other, the greater the 
performance or ‘fit’ of the organisation. This methodology has been used to study port reform 
in Canada and Philippines (Balthazar and Brooks 2001), Italy (Lamonarca et al. 2007), Libya 
and Malaysia (Ghashat et al. 2011) and Chile (Wilmsmeir and Sanchez 2017). It is a useful 
methodology to evaluate the post port governance ‘landlord’ model in Indonesia as a 
governance model does have interaction with its environment, strategy and structure, allowing 
for an assessment of an appropriate ‘fit’ (Wilmsmeir and Sanchez 2017). Before applying this 
framework to study Indonesian port reform, it is important to understand the theoretical 
background behind this framework.  
Structure 
Burns and Stalker (1961) argue that a relationship exists between the structure of an 
organisation and its performance. In their seminal paper, Burns and Stalker (1961, p.119) 
outline two key organisational structures which are the ‘mechanistic’ or ‘organic’ structure. 
Mintzberg (1989) defines the mechanistic organisation as a configuration that is highly 
specialised with centralised decision making, focusing on routine operating tasks and has a 
bureaucratic administration structure. Roles and routines and formally embedded in the 
structure and management functions can operate in silos. Due to the layers of bureaucracy, 
senior management is also separated from the reality of global changes that prevents the 
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organisation from responding well to sudden changes in the environment. Therefore, this 
structure is more suitable for a stable environment. 
 
Contrarily, the ‘organic’ structure is better suited to an uncertain environment. The organic 
structure is usually described by an absence of a formal hierarchy, lack of rigid procedures to 
empower employees to promote communication and teamwork in multidisciplinary teams. 
Decision making is decentralised and less formal within the organisation. The organisation 
functions as a group of specialists in function units which can be deployed to smaller project 
teams to complete their tasks (Mintzberg 1989, p.105).  Although the organic structure is not 
hierarchical in the same sense as a mechanistic structure, positions are still differentiated 
according to seniority. The lead is taken by seniors while project responsibility is assigned to 
whoever shows themselves to be the most informed and capable. This makes an ‘organic’ 
structure more suited to a dynamic environment as it can more readily adapt to changing 
conditions. 
Strategy 
Strategy represents how an organisation chooses between product and its market scope to 
maintain its competitive edge. Depending on the structure, Porter (1980) argues that the 
organisation may choose a cost leadership strategy or a differentiation strategy to respond to 
the environment. The former is an efficiency strategy while the latter is focused on innovation.  
A cost leadership strategy focuses on providing an efficient delivery of a basic service at a low 
cost whilst the differentiation strategy focuses on developing products for which customers are 
willing to pay a market premium. Porter (1980) links strategy with the structure of the firm by 
arguing that a ‘mechanistic’ firm will tend to focus on cost leadership or efficiency strategy. 
This will enable the firm to produce efficient and low cost products. Due to its less rigid 
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structure and rules, the ‘organic’ structure will instead focus on a differentiation or 
effectiveness strategy to create a unique product.  
 
In the case of ports, Balthazar and Brooks (2006) argue that the two dimensions of strategy that 
are relevant to economic performance include the competitive emphasis on product and market 
scope. This refers to the range of specific products and services an organisation offers and the 
markets to which it makes these offerings. For ports, the market choices include where the port 
decides to compete such as cruise, transhipment or the automobile handling market. The 
facilities provided would then depend on how firms differentiate themselves from their 
competitors. This occurs either through a cost leadership or differentiation strategy. For 
example, a basic product for ports would be a berth or dredged channels. Therefore, a firm 
offering superior performance in the basic product would be required to become more efficient 
than the average competition or, as Porter (1980) phrases it, a ‘cost leader’. 
 
Hence, Balthazar and Brooks (2006) argue it will be important for a port that is providing a 
basic product or service such as available berths or dredged channels to be able to provide this 
more efficiently than its competitor. Alternatively, the port could focus on products beyond the 
basic product such as repair facilities, specialised cranes or twenty four hours stevedoring 
labour that would be provided by the private sector to differentiate their offerings from other 
ports. An example is the Port of Singapor Authority that is competing with other ports based 
on its higher premium services. However, the opening of a lower priced option at Tanjung 
Pelepas in Malaysia resulted in Singapore losing two of its key clients, Maersk in 2000 and 
Evergreen in 2002, together with a loss of container throughput. Cullinane et al. (2007) argues 
this move has been attributed to various factors including lower costs at Tanjung Pelepas, 
investment in the Port of Tanjung Pelepas to influence control and the Port of Singapore not 
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granting dedicated terminals for berthing. Instead of lowering pricing to match Tanjung 
Pelepas, the Port of Singapore decided to reduce the uncertainty in its environment by offering 
customers the option of a dedicated or joint venture terminal in exchange for long term leases. 
These strategies allowed the organisation to cope and adapt to its environment. 
Environment 
The strategy adopted by an organisation is ultimately a response to its environment. The 
environment plays a critical role and consists of a myriad of complex combination of factors. 
Mintzberg (1989) defines the environment to refer to characteristics outside of the organisation 
such as markets, political climate and economic conditions, government, industry or 
technological change. The industry environment includes factors that affect an industry’s 
participation and profitability. The internal environment or sources of changes could be culture, 
knowledge or changes in organisational resources.  
 
Therefore, any organisation operating in a globally competitive environment must be able to 
adapt to the forces that impact the environment. Uncertainty evolves from change that occurs 
in the operating environment and the best way to deal with uncertainty is by adjusting the 
organisation structure (Burns and Stalker 1961; Ghashat et. al. 2011). The operating 
environment also consists of factors that an organisation interacts with on a regular basis. This 
includes competitors, buyers, sellers and potential new competitors. The operating 
environment has the greatest influence on organisations (Balthazar and Brooks 2006). 
However, Ghashat et al. (2011) argue that although a change in strategy is the solution to facing 





As argued by Burns and Stalker (1961), the more certain an organisation’s environment, the 
more likely for its structure to be hierarchical and formal. Contrarily, an uncertain environment 
will benefit from a structure which is more horizontal and less rigid to promote flexibility to 
adapt to changing conditions (Mintzberg 1980, p.108).  Uncertainty arises in an environment 
due to the complexity of various elements that are continuously changing. Therefore, the 
combination of structure, strategy and environment helps to configure the matching framework 
to understand how this match or fit affects an organisation’s performance. Margretta (2012, 
p.141) highlights the importance of ‘fit’ in Porter’s strategy (Porter 1980). The ‘fit’ refers to 
how the activities in a chain work with one another. It increases a firm’s competitive advantage 
of a strategy by lowering costs or raising customer value. The more focus a company has on 
fit, the harder it is for rivals to copy their strategy. The better fit will result in an improved 
performance while the poorer fit would lead to an unfavourable performance. This framework 
is summarised in Figure 5.1. 
 
























In summary, the configuration theory can be divided into an efficiency oriented or effectiveness 
orientated configuration. Therefore, if an organisation’s environment is highly certain, it would 
perform better if it adopted a cost leadership strategy with a mechanistic structure. Contrarily, 
if an organisation’s environment is highly uncertain, a differentiation strategy in a organic 
structure would be more suited. This is summarised in Table 5.2. However, Brooks and 
Balthazar (2001) highlight that regardless of the configuration, some minimum level of both 
efficiency and effectiveness is critical to organisational survival. 
 
   Table 5.2: Configuration in the Matching Framework 
 Efficiency oriented configuration Effectiveness oriented configuration 
Environment Low uncertainty High uncertainty 
Strategy Narrow product market scope with 
focus on delivery of the basic product. 
Broad product market scope with a focus 
on differentiating products and services 
Structure Centralised decision making Decentralised decision making 
   Source: Balthazar and Brooks (2001) 
 
 
Application of the Matching Framework 
 
The ‘Matching Framework’ was applied by Baltazar and Brooks (2001) to ports in Canada and 
the Philippines to assess their ‘fit’. Port reform began in Canada with the implementation of 
the 1995 National Marine Policy in the Canada Marine Act 1999. Canada’s strategy was to 
build a financially self-sustaining, autonomous port system. Although some entities such as the 
airports were privatised and had greater flexibility, there was a reluctance to privatise assets 
which were seen as part of its national infrastructure network such as ports. Therefore, the 
governance structure changed and National Port Systems ports became federal agencies. The 
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port now had boards which had members who were appointed by the Minister. The decisions 
of the Board of Directors determine the strategy of the port in setting its commercial standards, 
functions and financing. However, appointed board members were often politicians and 
bureaucrats that made ‘rubber stamp’ decisions that defeated the purpose of devolution. The 
outcome resulted in an efficiency focused cost effective strategy in which ports operated in a 
very predictable manner despite changes in the environment which included globalisation, 
growth in world trade and containerisation (Balthazar and Brooks 2001). 
 
In the Philippines, reform was driven by the pressure to separate port regulation from port 
operation. Just like Canada, Balthazar and Brooks (2001) argue that the trigger behind the 
devolution was to drive commercial decision making as the Philippines economy is highly 
dependent on trade. The Philippine Port Authority is a government cooperation responsible for 
the management and operation of ports in its archipelago. The strategy was to develop a 
network of ports to serve as hubs and spokes, with smaller ports developing as multipurpose 
feeder ports to transform its economy. Attempts at alternative service delivery were made along 
with privatisation programmes. However, leases of periods of five years did not result in 
significant infrastructure investment and port authorities were managed by existing staff rather 
than independent directors. The prediction was that devolution would fail due to the highly 
uncertain environment that was not matched with the right structure and strategy. Therefore, 
the model does suggest that a better fit was needed in Canada and the Philippines between the 
environment, government’s port strategy and goals to achieve better port performance.  
 
The ‘Matching Framework’ has also been applied to the Italian port reform.  The structure of 
the Italian port sector up till the 1990s could be characterised as having a very centralised 
policy and organisation. The State had monopoly control of port land, infrastructure, equipment 
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and financing of investment.  The strategy that was adopted with this structure did not require 
the ports to focus on productivity, efficiency and competitiveness. However, the environment 
in which the ports were operating was continually changing with the Mediterranean basin 
becoming a key hub for container transhipment, resulting in an increased demand for port 
services (Lamonarca et al. 2007). The uncertainty and complexity in the environment that 
brought about the 1994 port reform was meant to decentralise the powers of the ports by 
separating port operations from the task of controlling and directing port activities. Although 
the outcome did see decentralisation of power in most ports with more management autonomy, 
the legacy of the centralised management structure did not change. This left ports with 
bureaucratic administration and little operational flexibility and financial autonomy to develop 
ports strategically, resulting in a poor alignment between the environment, strategy and 
structure (Lamonarca et al. 2007). However, neighbouring ports such as Spain, France and 
Croatia had already been undertaking port reform since 2003 to improve their port 
competitiveness. This resulted in Italian ports registering lower growth rates than ports in the 
region (Lamonarca et al. 2007). 
  
 
Although the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 affected the Italian port system more than 
its competitors, the political stability in the government resulted in port reform as an agenda 
item for government only in 2014 (Parola et al. 2017). In 2015, a formal document highlighting 
the weakness of the ports included insufficient funding, low competitiveness, poor hinterland 
connectivity and sub optimal port size. In June 2016, the government decided to reduce the 
port authorities from 24 to 15. However, Parola et al. (2017) argues that the outcome was 
ineffective due to the widening divide between centralised and decentralised management. 
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Therefore, the reform process was unable to create a more flexible structure that could match 
the port’s changing environment.  
 
We now turn and discuss the Malaysian and Libyan reform in more detail. Ghashat et al. (2011) 
also applied this matching framework to compare Malaysian and Libyan ports. Although Libya 
and Malaysia have very different geographical locations they are both Muslim countries that 
have similar cultures and have ports operating in similar environments. In Malaysia, this is the 
Straits of Malacca which is one of the busiest trade routes. Libya is located on the southern 
side of the Mediterranean basin where many ports compete to attract large transhipment 
volumes from the East to West shipping lines. The Libyan port sector consists of state owned 
enterprises that have seen strong growth in the economy since the lifting of sanctions that were 
imposed by the United Nations in 2000. The government announced a privatisation programme 
in 2003 to encourage the country’s movement towards a market economy.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the privatisation experience at Port Klang led to increased 
investment in the port and improved cargo efficiency that has seen Malaysian ports rise to the 
ranking of the top 20 global container ports in the world.  The reason for Malaysia’s success 
was the government’s identification of the mechanistic and centralised structures that limited 
the development of the port. Therefore, the right ‘fit’ can transform and improve port 
performance. Malaysia was well aware of the competition in the region and took steps to 
position itself for the competitive environment through a gradual privatisation process.  
 
Libya’s port situation bears resemblance to Malaysian ports prior to 1986. Located in the 
Mediterranean basin, ports within the region compete aggressively to attract a higher 
proportion of transhipment cargo. Countries such as Tunisia compete by bidding for a 
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transhipment hub at Enfida and Algeria, by giving concession to Dubai Ports World to operate 
the Port of Tangier in Morocco (Ghashat et al. 2011). As the economy grew, the Libyan port 
strategy does suggest that the government was keen on converting some of the country’s ports 
namely the Ports of Benghazi and Elkhoms into hubs to compete for cargo. The government 
ensured that the port sector had equipment and storage areas and made attempts to reduce 
congestion and dwell time at ports (Ghashat et al. 2011).  
 
The structure of the port was developed in 1985 as the Socialist Port Company (SPC) and was 
100 per cent owned by government with a centralised structure that was responsible for all 
activities and services of the ports. Only some functions such as stevedoring were outsourced 
to the private sector. In 2008, the Libyan Marine Transport and Port Authority (LMTPA) was 
empowered and given more financial autonomy which resulted in more organised port 
functions. However, the role of the SPC has been limited to the operator function even though 
some its operator functions have been transferred to the LMPTA. However, there has been no 
private sector involvement in the ports, except in transportation. Although the Libyan 
government had made strong efforts to introduce a privatisation policy, its port sector 
infrastructure, management and operations had remained unchanged since the 1970s. This had 
led to inefficiencies and Libyan ports lagging behind other countries in the region. It has also 
resulted in a loss of container traffic to neighbouring ports.  
 
Therefore, the matching framework analysis suggests that Libyan ports are a poor ‘fit’ as its 
structure was not adjusted to match its environment and strategy. The governance structure of 
the ports need to be more decentralised and privatising the port operations would be a desirable 
move.  Therefore, following the Malaysian experience, the privatisation of container terminals 
on a concession basis could play a role in port development. This evidence suggests the 
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operating environment in Libya’s port sector could benefit from an organic instead of a 
mechanistic structure. Also, a key factor in the case of port success in Malaysia was 
government policy which encouraged private sector participation which resulted in attracting 
port operators that competed successfully in an uncertain environment. However, Ghashat et 
al. (2011) argues that the private sector can be introduced gradually into Libya through 
different means such as a concession arrangements with global terminal operator or shipping 
lines that aim to establish a dedicated terminal within the region.  
 
Wilmsmeir and Sanchez (2017) also applied this framework in conjunction with the life cycle 
theory to assess performance of Chilean ports. As discussed in Chapter 2, prior to reform the 
Chilean ports operated as tool ports with minimal competition. The introduction of a 
concession scheme in 2000 to improve productivity at ports resulted in each terminal being 
operated by a private operator. However, the Chilean ports face challenges as container traffic 
grows and the need for expansion arises. The matching framework analysis suggests that the 
environment changed from low to high uncertainty as competition between ports increased. 
The structure of the terminal operators evolved from mechanistic to organic during the growth 
phase of the ports from 2001 to 2007 to adapt to its changing environment, with limited central 
decision making. This allowed for rapid development at ports. However, the GFC in 2008 and 
the final maturity phase (2011-2015) suggests a misalignment in the fit as the highly uncertain 
environment is affected by changes in liner shipping. The strategy of Chilean ports have not 
changed as they continue to focus on efficiency and effectiveness. The ports decentralised 
structure in the new environment has also started to limit growth; perhaps the government 




Analysing the outcomes of the Chilean port reform, Wilmsmeir and Sanchez (2017) argue that 
it was necessary to differentiate the levels of ‘uncertainty’ further from ‘high’ and ‘low’. This 
differentiation is necessary to provide a more accurate analysis. Therefore, Wilmsmeir and 
Sanchez (2017) renamed these categories to ‘more uncertain’ and ‘less uncertain’ to allow for 
more flexibility and precision in their analysis. Also, these configurations can also be better 
analysed from the perspective of the public (port authority) and private (terminal operator 
perspective) which could also result in different results. Wilmsmeir and Sanchez (2017) 
highlight that the perspective of the port industry, port authority and the private sector can 
produce different results and interpretations of the same configuration. The application of this 
framework in the case of Chile took the perspective of the public sector, identifying current 
and future governance challenges (Wilmsmeir and Sanchez 2017). 
 
 
The maritime industry operates in an extremely dynamic environment led by globalisation, 
international trade, containerisation and technological change. Several factors such as time 
efficiency, geographical locations and services offered play a key role in port competitiveness. 
Thus, an effectiveness oriented strategy with an organic structure and flexibility may be better 
placed to implement port devolution policies to modernise terminals, increase efficiency and 
investment and attract greater cargo (Ghashat et. al. 2011). Hence, this framework is useful in 
evaluating port reform in Indonesia as the governance model exhibits exposure to elements of 
the variables of ‘strategy’, ‘structure’ and ‘environment’ which can change over time 
(Wilmsmeir and Sanchez 2017). This framework can be used to assess Indonesian port 
performance as the nation transitions from a public port to a landlord model.  
 
 
Therefore, the matching framework application will analyse the variables strategy, structure 
and environment from a public sector perspective over the time frame prior reform (pre 2008) 
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and post reform 2012 to 2017. The timeframe from 2008 to 2011 is left out as this was the time 
the government provided for port authorities to transition to the new changes in the 2008 
Shipping Law (Shipping Law No. 17 of 2008). 
 
5.4 Methodology III: Institutional Approach 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the institutional environment in a country is determined by its legal 
and administrative framework through which firms, individuals and governments interact. The 
quality of institutions has a significant role to play on the competitiveness and growth of a 
nation. Good institutions of public decision making and competent governments enable 
societies to choose growth-enhancing policies and sound development strategies which reduce 
the opportunities and incentives for corrupt behaviour, thus strengthening trust and institutional 
effectiveness (Productivity Commission 2014). Likewise, ports are also institutions that have 
seen traditional governance structure change to become more flexible to adapt to an 
environment of increasing competition (Notteboom et al. 2013). Path dependence can explain 
the differences in port governance structure and the trajectories of port reforms. In the case of 
seaports, this is largely due to sunk costs of infrastructure, historically developed socio 
economic structure or technological lock-in which results in a port ‘locked in’ to an existing 
pathway (Tongzon 2015). 
 
Debrie et al. (2013) argues that an evolutionary analysis instead of a static analysis is important 
when evaluating port reform as it enables the examination of embeddedness within port 
institutions. This could then explain why the outcome of an intended reform differs from the 
actual reform. Thus, port reform should be studied as a ‘complex evolutionary process’ which 
could result in different outcomes and deviation from traditional pathways based on the country 
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and the individual port (Wilmsmeir and Monios 2016). This was seen in  Australia and New 
Zealand ports with containerisation serving as a ‘trigger point’ (Reveley and Tull 2012). 
 
In the case of Indonesia, Dick (2008) argues that shipping was a monopoly operated by the 
Dutch owned ‘Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij’ (KPM) during colonial rule. Despite their 
departure, the Dutch’s port management style became entrenched in the manner in which 
Indonesia managed its ports. After the departure of the Dutch, the failure to operate a joint 
venture between the State and KPM resulted in maritime transport falling under central 
planning by the Indonesian government. Therefore, applying this institutional approach to the 
Port of Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Emas, will provide an evolutionary analysis that will better 
explain the outcomes of port reform at the case study ports. This approach will enable an 
assessment of path dependence of the level of ‘lock in’ present, whether ‘plasticity’ can be 
observed in the trajectory of path reform and if there is ‘stretching’ or deviation from the 
traditional path dependent route to adapt to a more competitive environment. It will also be 
able to provide further analysis into whether the case study ports are path followers, path 
adaptors, path resistant and path leaders. The next section discusses how data has been 
collected to support the analysis using the above methodologies. 
 
5.5 Data Collection for Case Study Ports 
 
 
The choice of using the Port of Tanjung Priok as a main port and Tanjung Emas as a growing 
port was to provide a broader perspective of the outcome of port reform. Also, the leading ports 
of Indonesia are on the island of Java. The literature argues that the challenge in evaluating 
port reform is due to the complex nature of ports and the approach used is largely dependent 
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on the availability of data. Nathan and Associates (2008) and Patunru et al. (2009) argue that 
it is difficult to obtain performance data on Indonesia’s main gateway port and case study ports 
at port level. The researcher did find challenges in collecting data on operational or productivity 
indicators as there is no database available that collects this information and port authorities do 
have concerns that this information could be used for benchmarking purposes.  
 
Selecting indicators to assess port performance at Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Emas had its 
challenges. Data on port performance and traffic is patchy and dependent on the processes and 
procedures of the Pelindos. As mentioned earlier, data on port operations is not public and is 
provided at the discretion of the port authorities. However, port authorities have been helpful 
in providing other forms of data such as dwell time, crane productivity and publicly available 
financial data in annual reports. Also, the usage of too many operational indicators can also 
make it difficult to evaluate an outcome as discussed in Section 5.1 and 5.2. Therefore, the 
indicators for Tanjung Priok are going to be based on limited operational and and financial 
ratios. As data is not available at the port level, these ratios are approximated based on Tanjung 
Priok’s share of Pelindo II’s revenue. As the Port of Tanjung Emas contribution to Pelindo III’s 
revenue are nominal, it is difficult to calculate similar financial rations for the TPKS container 
terminal at the Port of Semarang. 
 
Although the Worldbank and OECD have access to further port data such as dwell time, these 
unpublished datasets have been difficult to obtain. Clearly, timely and accurate data on port 
trade and performance is useful for port planning and management (OECD 2012d). Therefore, 
this analysis will be complemented with other productivity and financial indicators and 
unpublished data obtained from field interviews. Therefore, a summary of the indicators to be 
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used to evaluate port performance at the two case study ports of Tanjung Priok and Tanjung 
Emas can be seen in Table 5.2.  
 
  Table 5.3: Port Performance indicators for Case Study Ports 
 Performance Operating 
Port of Tanjung Priok Container throughput, Net 
operating profit, financial ratios 
Dwell time, labour 
Port of Tanjung Emas Container throughput, Net 
operating profit, 
Dwell time, labour, 
international and domestic 
boxes moved per crane per 
hour 
 
Reliance on indicators is insufficient to provide a holistic evaluation of port reform. Thus, a 
qualitative analysis is required to fill in the gaps due to limited data. Therefore, a combination 
of field visits, surveys and detailed interviews with a selection of key stakeholders have also 
been conducted. Stakeholders interviewed include employees, terminal manager, academics, 
representatives of port authorities and economic and infrastructure policy think tank in 
Indonesia. Interviews were held face to face, followed by email exchanges. Qualitative data 
drawn from interviews provided useful information to evaluate the port reform process in 
Indonesia. The qualitative approach will be undertaken using a ‘Matching Framework’ 
approach by Brooks and Balthazar (2001).  Considerable time has also been spent at the Centre 
of Maritime and Air Transport Management (CMAT) at the University of Antwerp to interact 
with a broader range of stakeholders such as academics, industry representatives who have 
interests in port development in Indonesia, and representatives from the Indonesian port 
authorities. The information gathered from these interviews and conversations provide a better 
understanding of the relationship between the Indonesian and Netherlands governments in 






The aim of this chapter was to discuss the challenges in evaluating port reform and to outline 
the methodologies that will be used.  Section 5.1 discussed the key issues surrounding an 
appropriate methodology to evaluate port reform which were selecting a quantitative or a 
qualitative approach. The quantitative approaches involved methods such as the Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) that measured terminal 
efficiencies, and Malmquist Productivity Index and financial indicators before and after reform 
(De Langen and Heij 2014). However, the literature also argues that relying on quantitative 
analysis provides an incomplete picture as the SFA and DEA methods as they only measure 
operational efficiency. Therefore, there is a need to have more qualitative indicators that can 
measure effectiveness such as ‘user satisfaction’ (Brooks and Pallis 2008). However, Ha et al. 
(2017) argues that there is a need to adopt multi dimensional approaches to assess port 
performance such as including both quantitative and qualitative analysis.  
 
Section 5.2 discussed the various indicators that can be used to evaluate port reform, 
highlighting that the methodology used is largely dependent on data availability. Some of these 
productivity indicators include berth productivity, port throughput, stevedoring indicators, 
cargo handling rate and dwell time (Talley 1994). However, the difficulty in including too 
many indicators is that one variable could improve and another deteriorate, making it harder to 
provide a clear evaluation. Therefore, where the measures of the preferred indicators is not 
available, the use of a proxy indicators may be necessary (Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission 2010). Section 5.3 introduced the qualitative ‘matching framework’ 
that aims to provide another dimension to the analysis by analysing how the variables 
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‘structure’, ‘strategy’ and ‘environment’ have aligned after port reform to improve its 
performance or ‘fit’ for an ‘efficiency’ or ‘effectiveness’ configuration. 
 
The discussion in Section 5.4 focused on the institutional approach methodology to study the 
effect of path dependence and institutional ‘lock in’ at the case study ports. This analysis will 
provide a better understanding of the port reform outcomes and whether new trajectories have 
developed over the course of time. Section 5.5 discussed the issues around how the data was 
collected for this research to evaluate port reform in Indonesia and the challenges around it. 
This includes selecting financial indicators from annual reports and collecting data from field 
visits from a variety of stakeholders including port employees, terminal managers, port 
authority representatives, academics and experts from Indonesian policy think tanks. Further 
information was also gathered from experts at the Centre of Maritime and Air Transport. The 
responses drawn from this method of data collection are used to supplement the results in 
Chapter 6. 
 
In conclusion, analysing port reform is challenging because it is difficult to know when the 
transition is complete and government policy changes can influence reform. Also, it is difficult 
to evaluate the operational efficiency of a particular port to measure port competitiveness as 
other physical and institutional factors can influence productivity which makes this indicator 
incomparable. Although this thesis is examining the effect of port reform on two different case 
study ports, there is no standard to compare two or more ports on a national or international 




Chapter 6: Results 
 
 6.1 Results for Methodology I: Port Performance Indicators 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Port of Tanjung Priok falls under the administration of Pelindo 
II while the Port of Tanjung Emas falls under the administration of Pelindo III. Pelindo II 
operates the biggest and the busiest port in Indonesia, the Tanjung Priok port. It manages 12 
ports across 10 provinces. Apart from port management, the company is involved in equipment 
maintenance, port energy supply and port development. Through partnership with other private 
companies, there is also cooperation on tug boats, management of other port facilities and 
Terminal Operator cooperation (Annual Report Pelindo II 2017). Figure 6.1 below shows the 
geographical boundary of ports in Pelindo II. Although the focus of the this chapter is to 
evaluate the port performance at the Port of Tanjung Priok, this section aims to provide an 
overview of the ports in Pelindo II and discuss the outcomes of port reform to the broader port 
section in Pelindo II.  
 
The key port in Pelindo II is the Port of Tanjung Priok. It is Indonesia’s largest port serving 
domestic and international cargo and passenger services. An expansion of the port can be seen 
in the new Kalibaru terminal that started operating in September 2016 as a Joint Venture with 
Mitsui Co. Ltd. The Port of Palembang is the largest river port in Sumatra which is central to 
economic growth in that region. Loading and unloading activities are dominated by dry bulk 
goods and containers. Port of Panjang is one of the biggest ports in Sumatra that is located at 
the crossing point of Sumatra and Java. Panjang Port serves ships with many kinds of goods, 
such as general merchandise, goods in bags, liquid bulk, dry bulk and containers. The flow of 
containers continue to grow each year due to growth in industrial activities, mining and 
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plantations in the region. In addition, agricultural land and plantations that stretched in 
Lampung province is very fertile for agribusiness activities(Annual Report Pelindo II 2017). 
 
Figure 6.1: Geographical Boundary of Pelindo II 
 
Source: Annual Report Pelindo II (2017), p.188 
Note: Ports in Figure 6.x are identified below 
01: The Port of Tanjung Priok and New Priok/Kalibaru port, 02: Palembang Port, 03: Panjang Port, 04: Pontianak Port, 05: 
Teluk Bayur Port, 06: Banten Port, 07: Cirebon Port, 08: Bengkulu Port, 09: Jambi Port, 10: Pangkal Balam Port, 11: Tanjung 
Pandan Port, 12: Sunda Kelapa 
 
Pontianak is West Kalimantan’s main port that is supported by subports within that area. Teluk 
Bayur is the largest and busiest port in West Sumatra. Teluk Bayur Port branch has been 
equipped with modern equipment that is capable of handling various kinds of goods including 
bulk goods such as coal, cement, clinker, CPO and commodities using containers such as 
cinnamon, tea, molding, furniture and rubber, which are the main export commodities to the 
United States, Europe, Asia, Australia and Africa. Pontianak Port has a container terminal, 
equipped with 3 container cranes and other modern equipment to support optimal loading and 
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unloading activities. The presence of sub-ports in the vicinity, further strengthened the position 
of Pontianak Port as the main port in West Kalimantan.  
 
The Port of Banten is located on the Java Island is a transit destination and trading hub for 
spices. Banten Port has potential to grow rapidly because it is sustained by industrial areas that 
are growing rapidly, such as metal processing industry, machinery, chemical, and oil palm. 
Banten Port has three coal terminals and a multipurpose dock equipped with loading and 
unloading of containers. Stevedoring activity in Banten Port is dominated by liquid bulk cargo 
and dry bulk (Annual Report Pelindo II 2017). 
 
The Port of Cirebon is located towards the strategic business gateway between West Java and 
Central Java. Cirebon is a very strategic port as the gateway for the business activities of the 
broad hinterland, namely West Java province and part of Central Java province. Cirebon Port 
has also become very strategic since it is located close to the track lane highways and railways 
to all cities in Java. Cirebon Port is equipped with a container and bulk terminal that has 
facilities for coal and palm oil. Cirebon Port services dry bulk, liquid bulk and goods in sacks. 
The Port of Bengkulu is equipped with three coal loading conveyor belts to accelerate the 
stevedoring process.  
 
The Port of Jambi consists of the Ports of Talang Duku, Kuala Tungkal and Muara Sabak. The 
Pangkal Balam Port specialises in export and import material transportation, interisland trade 
and commercial transport. Jambi Port hinterland produces rubber, plywood and molding, which 
are commodities exported to USA, Europe, Middle East, Japan and Korea (Annual Report 
Pelindo II 2017). 
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Pangkal Balam Port is equipped with various facilities, including a 787m long port, stacking 
facilities, passenger terminals, and a parking lot. Pangkal Balam Port serves the transportation 
of imported and exported goods, interisland trade, and the transportation of passengers to 
Jakarta by ferry boats/roll-off vessels and to Tanjung Pandan by jetfoil boats/ speedboats. 
Tanjung Pandan port is located on Belitung island and has a hinterland covering 80,000 
hectares of palm oil plantations. To support the development of tourism, the passenger’s 
terminal in Tanjung Pandan Port has also been modernized to accommodate up to 200 
passengers and is equipped with VIP rooms and shops.  Lastly, Sunda Kelapa port is a historical 
port used for stevedoring inter-island ships and commercial vessels. Inter-island ships and 
commercial vessels visit this port, carrying commodities. These commodities include wood, 
essential supplies, haberdashery, and building materials, nation, and other commodities such 
as kaolin, granite, and quartz sand (Annual Report Pelindo II 2017). 
 
Figure 6.2 provides an analysis of the type of cargo traffic at Pelindo II over the period from 
2012 to 2017. The total cargo traffic transported in 2012 by Pelindo II was 106.9 million tons. 
This fell steeply and was halved to 55.4 million tons in 2016, with a slight increase to 57.2 
million tons in 2017 (Annual Report Pelindo II 2017). This decline since 2015 can be seen 
especially for dry bulk and liquid cargo. This decline has been largely due to a combination of 
factors including slower global economic growth, a decline in commodity prices, rupiah 
currency fluctuations and a weakening of investment activity. This resulted in the weakening 
of trade and volume of goods that flowed through the port and ship traffic  (Annual Report 





Figure 6.2:Pelindo II Cargo Traffic in Million Tons (excluding container cargo) 
 
Source: Annual Report Pelindo II Data (2012-2017) 
 
The oil and gas industry, both in Indonesia and globally, have also experienced significant 
volatility in the last five years due to global geopolitical and economic factors. The United 
States, which was the biggest net oil importer for Indonesia, has built greater reliance on 
development of shale technology, leaving an oversupply for oil producing countries (PWC 
2018). As such, Indonesia’s contributions from oil revenue has fallen from 14 per cent in 2014 
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The data presented in Figure 6.3 shows all the international ports in Pelindo II. The major 
international terminals in Pelindo II are in Tanjung Priok vicinity and include the Tanjung 
Priok International Terminal, New Priok Terminal, TPK Koja and JICT Terminal. Tanjung 
Priok’s International Terminal has been experiencing an increase in container throughput from 
2015 to 2017. Likewise, the New Priok terminal has seen a significant increase in container 
throughput from 2016 to 2017 as it gradually began operations. In 2017, the TPK Koja terminal 
has also seen a steady increase in container throughput while the JICT Terminal has seen a 
gradual decline in container throughput as excess capacity as been shifted to the New Priok 
Terminal. Many other smaller ports at Palembang and Panjang serve as international container 
terminals but their contribution is much less than the Port of Tanjung Priok.  
Figure 6.3:Pelindo II International Container Throughput (TEUs) 
 
Source: Annual Report Data (2015-2017) 
 
 
In terms of domestic container terminals, figure 6.4 shows the various ports such as Palembang, 

















container throughput comes from Tanjung Priok’s domestic terminal. Domestic container 
throughput at Tanjung Priok’s Domestic terminal has increased from 1.5 million TEUs 2015 
to 1.8 million TEUs in 2017.  
Figure 6.4:Pelindo II Domestic Container Throughput (TEUs) 
 























Therefore, the reason behind the choice for Tanjung Priok as a case study is largely because of 
its contribution to Pelindo II. This can be seen in Figure 6.5 which shows that most of the 
container cargo to Pelindo II is from Tanjung Priok. However, the trends from 2015 to 2017 
suggest that other ports have started to gradually increase the contribution of container 
throughput to Pelindo II. 
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Obtaining time series data for operational indicators is a challenge as there is a reluctance to 
share this information due to benchmarking. However, a range of indicators obtained from 
Annual Reports suggest that there have not been significant improvements in productivity, 
except in container productivity which increased from 41.13 B/C/H in 2016 to 46.83 B/C/H in 
2017 as seen in Table 6.1. However, as the data is patchy, it does not provide a longer term 
view on productivity growth and is one of the challenges of obtaining time series data on 
productivity for Indonesian ports. 
Table 6.1: Operational Indicators for Pelindo II 
Indicators Unit 2015 2016 2017 
Waiting time for pilot Hours 0.15 0.15 0.3 
Container Productivity 
 
B/C/H n/a 41.13 46.83 
Cargo Productivity T/G/H n/a 47.64 n/a 
Dry Bulk Cargo Productivity T/G/H n/a 258.31 260.70 
Yard Occupancy Ratio % n/a 35.97 42.29 
Source: Annual Report Pelindo II Data (2012-2017) 
 
Figure 6.6 shows that container throughput from 2001 to 2017 for the Port of Tanjung Priok 
has started to show positive results with increasing container traffic to the port. In 2009, this 
was approximately 3.8 million TEUs but has nearly doubled 6.2 million TEUs in 2012 due to 
strong global economic growth.  Prior to 2009, container traffic grew by an average of about 5 
per cent, in line with Indonesia’s annual economic growth. This mainly reflected the capacity 
constraints at the Tanjung Priok seaport. In 2012, container throughput was 6.2 million TEUs 
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and increased to 6.6 million TEUs in 2013. However, this throughput has started to gradually 
decline to 5.2 million TEUs in 2015 and to 4.95 million TEU in 2016. This decline in container 
throughput was attributed to a slowing global economy which had an impact on trade and 
shipping. However, there has been rebound in container traffic to 6.08 TEUs in 2017 that is a 
reflection of stronger economic conditions. It can be argued that container throughput is a basic 
port performance indicator but information collected from port interviews15 reflect that port 
authorities do use it as a key measurement of performance. 
Figure 6.6: Container Throughput at Tanjung Priok from 2001 to 2015 (Million TEUs) 
 
 
Source: Nonto, n.d, World Shipping Council (2017); Annual Report Pelindo II Data (2012; 2016; 2017) 
 
In 2008, 65 per cent of cargo from Indonesia had to transit in Singapore because of high costs. 
This was brought down to 18 per cent by 2011 (Nonto, n.d.). Further interview responses 
suggest that since 2011, Pelindo II has been making further attempts and plans to ensure the 
Port of Tanjung Priok becomes an international trade hub to compete for a slice of the 
transshipment market from Singapore which would result in cost savings for Pelindo II.  
                                                 



























This has been achieved by streamlining activities, infrastructure investment and turning the 
ports into 24-hour port operations and improved efficiency in loading and unloading goods 
(Nonto n. d).  Tanjung Priok is also expanding with a two phase redevelopment that will see 
its channels deepened and widened to a berth of 850 metres to accommodate ships with a draft 
of 16 metres from the current 14 metres. Its new terminal operated by PT New Priok Container 
Terminal One (NPCT1) with Japan’s Mitsui Corporation, NYK Line and Singapore’s PSA 
International was opened on 18th August 2016. This added an additional 1.5 million TEUs to 
the ports existing 6 million TEUs capacity. The next two terminals NPCT2 and NPCT3 are 
expected to be completed by 2019, adding a further 3 million TEUs. This will see the port’s 
container capacity expand close to 11 million TEUs. It also embraces elements of a ‘green 
terminal’ to reduce emissions and adopt environmentally friendly facilities (Reuters 13th  




Another key indicator used to measure port performance is dwell time. Dwell time measures 
the time from the arrival of a vessel until it leaves the port (Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative 
2012). This process can be separated into three parts. Firstly, the upstream process when the 
ship arrives to the submission of import declarations to customs. The second process is custom 
clearance and the third is the downstream process from custom clearance until the ship leaves 
the port (Asian Development Bank 2015). Lengthy dwell times have a significant impact on 
logistics costs for domestic businesses, the prices paid by consumers and choice of port by 
shipping lines. The ‘State of Logistics Report’ (2013) finds that most delays at Tanjung Priok 
are caused by the pre-clearance stage. Customs clearance time is competitive by international 
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standards, accounting for an average of one day. On the downstream component, faster removal 
of the containers would require larger investments in infrastructure to improve road 
connections. Thus, port operators find it easier to impose delays on shipping companies than 
to invest in new capacity. 
 
Time series dwell time data is difficult to obtain, especially for benchmark comparisons. 
However, Figure 6.7 shows the average dwell time of ships at various ports in Asia over a six 
month period in 2014. It is evident from the chart that dwell time in Indonesia still averaged 6 
days over March to September 2014. Comparison with the port of Singapore and Hong Kong 
show that these ports have a third of the dwell time of Tanjung Priok. However, comparisons 
must be made with caution as Singapore, Hong Kong and Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia are at 
a different stage of industrialisation than Indonesia and are transhipment hubs. It makes a 
difference if a port is a transhipment hub or a port of last call; in the former case there would 
be no need to undergo custom clearance, which would reduce the dwell time. In that regard, 
Thailand’s port, Laem Chabang, provides a more accurate comparison. The average dwell time 










           Figure 6.7: Container Dwell time comparison among selected Asian ports (Mar to Sep 2014) 
 
          Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2015) 
 
The import clearance process involves a multitude of agencies. In principle, import declarations 
can be submitted online via the Indonesia National Single Window (INSW). However, in many 
cases electronic signatures are not yet recognized requiring importers to consult agencies 
personally. A crucial issue for importers is the unpredictability of the import system which 
requires importers to complete the relevant paperwork before a container can be discharged in 
an Indonesian port. This can be a challenge given the short time frame it takes for the ship to 
travel from Singapore or Malaysia to Jakarta which makes it difficult to obtain clearances, 
driving up costs and uncertainty (Sandee 2016).  
 
Tirschwell (2014) argues that international evidence on turnaround times for ships of 10,000 
TEUs or more shows a delay longer than 12 hours, with nearly a quarter of ships delayed by 
more than 24 hours (Tirschwell 2014). However, Ray (2008) argues that another cause of long 
dwell time in Indonesia is unfairness in berth assignment which may not be done on a ‘first 















of minor discrepancies in paperwork and released in exchange for an illegal fee paid to a 
customs official. Ray (2008) argues that this use of illegal payments to reduce dwell time arises 
from the lack of infrastructure, such as gantry cranes and storage spaces. These costs are in 
addition to other informal payments required at the port for imports and exports. This further 
exacerbates the corruption issue as shipping companies might find it easier to pay pilferage 
than be imposed with a fine. As discussed in Chapter 4, Indonesia’s ranking for ‘Efficiency 
and transparency in border administration’ has improved from the 91st position in 2008 to the 
79th position in 2016. The biggest improvement has been in ‘irregular payments in exports and 
imports’ while the variables ‘customs service index’ and ‘effectiveness and efficiency of 
clearance’ have deteriorated. 
 
Figure 6.8 shows the dwell time at Tanjung Priok from 2008 to 2016. In 2008, the dwell time 
at Tanjung Priok averaged 17 days. By 2011, this was reduced significantly to approximately 
5.6 days. However, it did increase slightly to 6.2 and 6.5 days in 2012 and 2013 respectively. 
This was due to new regulation issued by the Ministry of Trade for ‘new’ importers, 
automatically classifying them as red lane importers (Sandee et al. 2016). However, in 2016 
and 2017 , the trend has been for dwell time to decline and has been averaging around 3 to 4 
days. In terms of operations, the effort to reduce the dwell time to under 3 days was conducted 
through the development of the Integrated Container Freight Station (CFS) Centre at the Port 
of Tanjung Priok and the modernization of port infrastructure and superstructure. The 
President’s Post (19th  September 2016), an online global business media news for the greater 
Jakarta areas, also reports President Jokowi raised the issue of abolishing illegal fees charged 
by port operators to customers which delay the development of Tanjung Priok developing into 
a modern port. The results suggest that there have been significant improvements in dwell time 
from 2008 to 2017. 
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    Figure 6.8: Tanjung Priok Dwell Time (Days) 
 
Source: Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative (2012); Nonto, n.d.; World Bank Status Report (2017); 
Sandee et al. (2016); Annual Report Pelindo II (2012-2017) 
 
Further data has also shown that the average wait time for vessesls before getting access to 
berth averaged 2.4 hours in 2017 at the Port of Tanjung Priok (JOC 2018). This was a very 
similar time to the Port of Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia and the Port of Singapore Authority 
that averaged 2.4 hours. This does suggest that the attempts at reducing port congestion are 
taking effect (JOC 2018). 
 
Indonesia’s national logistic team has also set up various government committees to improve 
its logistics performance. These committees have agreed on a few initiatives including 
establishing an integrated clearance system to assist customs inspection, electronic payments 
and increase the number of importers with priority lane status. Cikarang Dry Port is also being 
promoted as an alternative to Tanjung Priok for imported containers. We now shift the focus 
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Net Operating Profit 
Net Operating Profit estimated for the port of Tanjung Priok has nearly doubled from IDR 
1,365 million Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) in 2012 to 2,280 million IDR in 2017. However, net 
operating profit fell to $948.5 million IDR in 2015. This can be seen in Figure 6.9 below. The 
key factors for this include expenditure on the new Kalibaru terminal16 and slower growth in 
the economy.  Revenue rebounded in 2016 mainly driven by ship services, terminals and 
containers.  
            Figure 6.9 : Estimate17 Net Operating Profit for Tanjung Priok (million IDR) 
 





                                                 
16 Also known as the New Priok Container Terminal, the Kalibaru Terminal will assist in dealing with 
overcapacity. This terminal will bring Jakarta’s port facilities on par with the world through its deep drafts and  
latest equipment.  
17 The Port of Tanjung Priok’s revenue has been estimated from the total revenue in Pelindo II’s Annual Report. 
The financial ratios have been estimated in a similar manner. The contribution of the Port of Tanjung Priok to 
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We now turn to analyse the financial ratios to assess the financial performance of Tanjung 
Priok. To derive the financial ratios, the estimated revenue for the port of Tanjung Priok have 
been estimated based on its share to Pelindo II. These ratios are summarised in figure 6.10. 
below. The current ratio measure’s the ability of a company to pay short term and long term 
obligations. A ratio above 1 indicates the company’s assets are greater than its liabilities. The 
current ratio for Tanjung Priok over the period 2004 to 2015, shows an increase from 1.18 to 
8.36 as seen in Figure 6.10. 
 
    Figure 6.10: Financial ratios for the Port of Tanjung Priok 
 
                 Source: Annual Report Pelindo II (2004 to 2017) 
 
 
This would indicate that the Pelindo’s holding of assets is more than debt. However, from 2010 
we saw a fall in the current ratio from 9.26 to 1.53 in 2013 before rising back to 8.36 in 2015, 
indicating that the current assets are greater than the current liability. The next ratio analysed 
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equity ratio has been less than 1, but increased from 0.56 in 2004 to 2.89 in 2015, which means 
that the company has been taking on more debt and a more aggressive growth strategy that 
requires increased borrowing. This is reinforced by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, 
which increased from 2013 onwards. However, this has decreased from 2.89 in 2015 to 1.55 
in 2017. 
Operational Ratios  
The analysis now shifts to operational ratios for Tanjung Priok. Using the net profit margin 
formula, it can be observed how much of a company’s revenue is kept as net income. Figure 
6.11 summarises the key operational ratios from 2004 to 2017.  
Figure 6.11: Operating ratios for Tanjung Priok  
 
 Source: Annual Report Pelindo II (2004 to 2017) 
 
The net profit margin had seen a steady increase from 37.9 per cent in 2004 to 42.6 per cent in 
2008 except for a decline in 2006. It then started to decrease in 2012 from 36.7 per cent to 17.6 
per cent in 2015. Similarly, the return on equity ratio has fallen from 23 per cent in 2012 to 12 
per cent in 2015. This implies that the profit the company is generating from shareholder’s 
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until 2011, the focus of the port was on streamlining activity at Tanjung Priok instead of huge 
investments in infrastructure. A long term plan was developed for the construction of Port of 
Tanjung Priok extension otherwise known as the ‘New Priok Container Terminal’ or the 
Kalibaru Container Terminal in Jakarta. This was meant to be undertaken in conjunction with 
the ‘Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economy (MP3EI)’ to improve 
the nation’s national logistics.  The new Kalibaru Terminal is being built as a phased project 
to handle increased container capacity. The first phase of the project involves the installation 
of container terminal infrastructure and the construction of a new petroleum product terminal. 
Once completed in 2019, the project will expand Tanjung Priok’s Port capacity from 5 million 
TEUs to 18 million TEUS. It will also be able to facilitate container ships with a 18,000 TEU 
capacity (Annual Report Pelindo II 2012). 
 
The Company’s focus in 2014 was to prioritise the completion of the Kalibaru Terminal and 
commence stage II of terminal construction which could explain the decrease in operating 
profit to total asset ratio over 2014 and 2015. The Company also made further improvements 
to efficiency and productivity which was important to their management, including the 
Terminal Operating System programme that enabled matters relating with infrastructure and 
facilities in the port to be more thoroughly managed. The implementation of technology based 
port services system that connect to the Head Office at all port branches allowed a more 
accurate and fast data or information access.  However, 2015 saw a slowdown due to slowing 
global growth and falling commodity prices. This resulted in lower revenues and port dues for 
port authorities accompanied with increased expenses for dredging related activities and other 
costs which had an impact on trade and operational performances. Despite the downturn, 
further investment into the Kalibaru Terminal construction to increase the port’s capacity and 
productivity is underway (Annual Report Pelindo II 2015). Since 2016, the net profit margin 
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and return on equity have increased reflecting increased cargo throughput with the opening of 




Labour productivity can also be used as an indicator for port performance. A focus of the 
previous President of Pelindo II, Richard Lino (2009-2015), was to invest in his staff. He did 
this by ensuring his staff were paid higher wages compared to any other SOE, including 
bonuses which would be equivalent to the concept of ‘efficiency wages’ (Nonto, n.d). The 
concept behind the efficiency wage hypothesis is that a firm can maximise its profit by paying 
workers a wage rate higher than the market rate. In other words, the model suggests that effort 
is a function of wage and output is a function of effort holding everything else constant (Yellen 
1984; Akerloff 1982). Staff from the Indonesian Port Corporation (IPC) were among the 
highest paid compared to any other state owned company. In order to ensure that there were 
skilled staff available to work at the Kalibaru Terminal when it is ready, the company recruited 
candidates to study logistics, port and transportation management in different international 
universities through a programme the company financed from its internal revenue stream 
(Nonto n.d). 
 
Prior to the introduction of the new shipping law, only public servants could staff the port 
authorities. However, in recent times there has been the establishment of a government 
regulatory and supervisory agency known as Badan Layanan Umum (BLU). This is a 
government agency that allows more flexibility in the recruitment of professional staff. 
However, the Transport Ministry has made it clear that they expect the port authorities to be 
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staffed by a combination of Ministry officials from the Sea Communications Directorate and 
Port Administration offices (Nathan Associates 2008).   
 
Port Unions and dock workers post reform 
 
Although the unions were never seen as an impediment to port operations, their poor working 
conditions and unity gave them a strong voice to strike to negotiate better pay and working 
conditions with their employers following independence. However, during Suharto’s era, 
unions did lose their power with ports being controlled by military personnel. This left dock 
workers with no opportunity to strike. Port unions have continued to be active since 2012 with 
protests taking place from time to time due to wages, automation and job security. The labour 
movement in Indonesia has started becoming more active in the political arena with the 
appointment of a number of union leaders to parliament in the 2014 election. However, there 
has been no genuine representation from the working class in Indonesia’s national and local 
parliament for fifty years (Nugroho 2015). 
 
Union agendas in the past involved increasing wages, freedom of association and resisting job 
termination as part of this framework. Post reform , unions have argued for a more effective 
social security system that would compensate workers for job insecurities. The focus of the 
demands has been to transform the social welfare system. Although many unions are 
conservative, national unions have progressed two strategies which involve building relations 
with the working class, peasants and vendors and getting involved in politics to gain broader 
support. This has raised major questions about the interest of the unions’ national leaders who 
have used the union for their own political benefits (Nugroho 2015; Ingleson 2016).  
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Unions continue to play a significant role at the Port of Tanjung Priok. The International 
Transport Workers Federation (ITF), is a global union federation that represents over 700 
labour unions and more than 4.5 million union members around the world. It has a long history 
of promoting the employment and welfare of seafarers, stevedores and other transport workers 
around the world. The ITF reported (ITF 2017b) that more than 600 union members went on 
strike at JICT from the 3rd to the 10th of August 2017 for performance bonus and pension rights. 
According to the ITF President, this strike signals that there is an issue with labour relations at 
the port.  However, Reuters (7th August 2017) reports that the strike was forced to end on the 
7th of August 2017 because of ‘national interests’ and workers facing intimidation during the 
strike and the loss of revenue to JICT clients. Ships had been redirected for loading and 
unloading to other terminals due to the strike. 
 
At the International Container Terminal Services Inc’s (ICTSI) terminal at Tanjung Priok, 
industrial action by the workers’ union, the ‘Federasi Serikat Buruh Transportasi dan 
Pelabuhan Indonesia’(FBTPI), was taken in 2017. The International Container Terminal 
Services International (ICTSI) is a Philippines owned port company which operates 28 ports 
worldwide. It has a 15 year contract to operate the OJA terminal next to Hutchinson’s (KOJA 
and JICT) terminal. It employs approximately 139 people at the terminal, of which 100 are 
stevedores and the rest involved in administration. However, workers at ICTSI’s terminal 
receive a wage of US $250 per month while wages for KOJA and JICT average at around 
US$1,500 per month (ITF 2017a). Apart from the low wages, the union has documented 
concerns regarding industry practices such as illegal outsourcing of labour, illegal 
underpayments and refusal to conclude a collective agreement with the union at ICTSI. The 
Secretary General of the FBTPI, Didik Doank, reported that on March 17th 2017 workers were 
called by the company and asked to resign from the union or their contracts would not be 
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extended. Out of the eight workers who refused to resign, only three had their contract extended 
while those who resigned from their union, retained their jobs.   
 
However, according to the union, workers at ICTSI have been accumulating up to 300 hours 
in overtime in a month to make ends meet due to their low pay, placing their lives at risk. An 
Indonesian worker was crushed to death at the ICTSI facility in Jakarta on the 10th of November 
2017 when a refrigerated container fell onto his truck (Port Technology 2017). State regulation 
in Indonesia stipulates a 14 hour work day, with workers only allowed to work an additional 
of three hours per day. Once again, the ITF reiterated that this was the second workplace fatality 
in three weeks caused by extreme fatigue. 
 
In summary, it is evident that ‘Shipping Law No. 17 of 2008’ was a clear focus for the Pelindo 
that acknowledged the change in the role played from ‘regulator’ to ‘operator’. Pelindo III’s 
Annual Report (2012) states that the IPC had engaged in significant improvements to enhance 
its operational and service performance. Prior to 2011, there was minimal infrastructure 
investment in the port of Tanjung Priok until the construction of the new Kalibaru Terminal. 
Therefore, we can conclude that there have been performance improvements at the port in 
reducing dwell time, the introduction of 24 hour operations and increased container throughput.  
Prior to the port moving to a 24 hour basis, there was an underutilisation of port facilities and 
this limited the potential for efficiency improvements. However, Nathan and Associates (2008) 
argues that even for ports that operate on a 24 hour basis, 6 out of every 24 hours result in 
losses due to rigid break periods that affect the continuous servicing of vessels.  
 
Port labour continues to be an ongoing issue as terminals become more automated resulting in 
job losses and unions begin to lose the bargaining power they once had.  This could possibly 
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explain the resentment towards privatisation by international terminal operators and why the 
unions took action against Pelindo II for renewing HPH concession for another twenty years 
from 2019 to 2039. This will be discussed further in Section 6.2.  However, other ongoing 
industrial relations issues such as occupational health and safety standards, higher wages and 
collective bargaining continue to persist. The phased construction of the new Kalibaru 
Terminal should play a role in improving the port’s competitiveness in attracting larger ships 
and greater throughput. Although most of the port indicators suggest an improvement, it is 
difficult to attribute this mainly to the port reform process that began in 2008. We now turn to 
examine the port indicators of Tanjung Emas. 
 
Port Performance Indicators for Tanjung Emas 
 
Pelindo III manages five public ports in seven provinces in Indonesia. As a provider of port 
facilities, Pelindo III has a critical role to ensure continuity and smoothness of ocean freight to 
drive the nation’s economy. From 2011, Pelindo III’s role has evolved to ‘terminal operator’ 
as part of the shipping reform in Indonesia (2012 Annual Report). Similar to Pelindo II, Pelindo 
III is one of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that plays a large role in the advancement of 
industry and trade to support the economy of Indonesia, especially for eastern Indonesia. 
Pelindo III has a working area of seven provinces, covering East Java, Central Java, South 
Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Bali, East Nusa Tenggara and West Nusa Tenggara. It also 
plays a vital role as a terminal operator to improve the distribution of goods and services in 
Indonesia, particularly the Port of Tanjung Perak in Surabaya which is the second largest port 





Figure 6.12: Geographical Boundary of Pelindo III 
 
Source: Annual Report Pelindo III (2012), p.19 
 
Profitability 
Pelindo III is considered to have a high level of profitability with stable cash flows from the 
operations of various ports in central and eastern Indonesia. The strategic location of ports 
within the region of the Company, especially in Tanjung Perak Surabaya and Tanjung Emas 
Semarang, can be a mainstay for supporting the Company’s cash flows and profitability. This 









     Figure 6.13: Cargo Throughput for Pelindo III from 2013 to 2017 
 
                     Source: Annual Report Pelindo III (2017), p.8 
 
Cargo throughput remained steady in 2013 and 2014 at 100,000,000 tons before declining in 
2015 to 80,000,000 tons as seen in Figure 6.13. The slowdown in 2015 and 2016 has been a 
challenge for Indonesia, especially with falling commodity prices. This has resulted in a fall in 
demand for liquid bulk. The decline in dry bulk over 2015 and 2016 has been largely due to 
the shipping pattern shifting more from general cargo to containers and a decrease in 
commodities such as steel coil, steel slab, cement and corn commodity through Tanjung Perak 
port. However, 2017 did witness an increase in production of soya bean, corn, raw sugar and 
fertiliser commodity at Tanjung Perak Port. There has also been a slight increase in coal 
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Container throughput has been growing steadily for Pelindo 3 from 4.1 million TEUs in 2013 
to 4.9 million TEUs in 2017, despite a slowdown in 2013 and 2014. This is seen in Figure 6.14. 
 
      Figure 6.14: Container Throughput for Pelindo III from 2013 to 2017 
 
                     Source: Annual Report Pelindo III (2017), p.8 
 
Turning to the case study port of Tanjung Emas, there are two branch office of Pelindo III in 
Semarang as discussed in Chapter 4. This includes the Tanjung Emas Branch and Terminal 
Petikemas (TPKS) Semarang Branch. Tanjung Emas Branch handles general cargo and TPKS 
Branch handles only containers. For the purposes of this research, reference will be made to 
the TPKS Branch in Tanjung Emas that handles containers only. Figure 6.15 provides an aerial 























Figure 6.15: An aerial view of the TPKS Container Terminal, Semarang 
 
Source: Google Earth 
 
TPKS’s revenue is approximated to be 20 percent of Pelindo III’s total revenue. The 
approximate revenue for Tanjung Emas nearly doubled from $147.9 million in 2010 to $314.6 
million in 2013. Once again, it is difficult to isolate the increase in revenue to the reform 
process. This is because the port’s throughput also increased during this time which could be 
attributed to stronger demand. From 2015, there has been a decline in revenue from $314.6 
million in 2013 to $232.6 million, reflecting a slower economic growth which has had an 









    Figure 6.16: Net Income after tax for Pelindo III and TPKS ($m) 
 
    Source: Annual Report Pelindo III (2012-2017) 
 
Although 2015 did see a slowdown in economic growth and Indonesia’s currency crisis, this 
did not last long as the revenue stream for Pelindo III in 2017 increased from $1,163 billion in 
2014 to $2.034 billion by 2017. For TPKS, this has been an increase from $232.6 million to 
$406.8 million, with net income nearly doubling over three years. Indonesia’s economic 
growth in 2017 was 5.07 per cent, the highest recorded since 2014 of 4.79 per cent. The increase 
in net income for Pelindo III is largely due to an increase in container traffic. 
 
Figure 6.17 shows throughput nearly doubling in the port since 2010 from 350,000 TEUs to 
just above 600,000 TEUs in 2016. This is almost twice the throughput which the port was 
handling 6 years ago. However, the 2016 throughput falls short of its target forecast of 658,000 




























    Figure 6.17: Container Throughput at the Port of Tanjung Emas (TPKS) 
 





In 2005, turn around time at the Port of Tanjung Emas was 41 hours, or just under 2 days 
(Patunru et al. 2009). Figure 6.18 shows dwell time data obtained from Pelindo III on a monthly 
basis from 2016 to 2017. It can be seen that dwell time at the port has increased from 4.83 days 
in October 2016 to 5.83 days in November 2017, after a sharp increase in dwell time to 7.34 
days in May 2017. Based on unpublished data obtained from interviews, the initial 
improvement in dwell time was driven by better coordination among customs, quarantine and 
terminal through greater communication and exchange of information. The port also 
implemented a progression tariff which was lower compared with other terminals to deter 
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              Figure 6.18: Monthly dwell time in days at the Port of Tanjung Emas (2016 to 2017) 
 
                  Source: Unpublished data from Semarang Container Terminal (TPKS) 
 
 
Dwell time18 has been a challenge for Semarang for the past three years, especially since the 
customs in Semarang have implemented a strict red channel in April 2017. Many importers 
were not prepared for this as Semarang used to only have a green channel. Therefore, containers 
have been staying longer in the yard resulting in higher dwell time. As paperwork from some 
importers is not submitted prior to the vessel’s arrival, this would increase congestion and dwell 
time in the terminal. Therefore, a progression tariff that was introduced at the port in February 
2017 to reduce this delay. The Ministry of Transportation has implemened a 3 day strict dwell 
time policy only at the Ports of Belawan, Tanjung Priok, Tanjung Perak and Makassar. Perhaps 
automation in customs in the future could support faster cargo clearance and dwell time. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Data for Tanjung Emas is collected over field interviews on the 18th-19th of January 2016 with personnel from 




















Productivity measures are also an important indicator used to measure port performance. It is 
a measurement that is closely linked to dwell time and shows port and terminals working at 
their best to unload a ship and get it back into sea. The data provided by the TPKS shows 
international and domestic boxes moved per crane per hour. The port’s goal is to aim for a 
movement of 25 boxes per crane per hour (B/C/H), a modest target compared to international 
standards. The average B/C/H for international containers varies between 20 and just below 25 
boxes. Although there was a decline in productivity, this has picked up and remained close to 
25 boxes per hour. Comparing the movement with the domestic containers, the productivity of 
the domestic and international containers is quite close. This is seen in Figure 6.19 below. 
 
Figure 6.19: International and Domestic Boxes Moved Per Crane Per Hour (B/C/H) 
 














Figure 6.20 shows international and domestic boxes shipped per hour. Productivity of boxes 
shipped per hour rose from 35 boxes per hour in 2007 to 49 boxes per hour in 2010. The target 
for the port is to move 50 boxes per hour. Domestic boxes shipped per hour averaged at 15 
boxes in 2013 to 12 boxes in 2016.  
Figure 6.20: International and Domestic Boxes Shipped Per Hour(B/S/H) 
 
Source: Semarang Container Terminal (TPKS) 
 
In an interview19, the port manager explained that difference in quay productivity between 
international and domestic containers differs because the domestic frequency is lower 
compared to international frequency, which affects the number of cranes deployed. As the 
number of containers on domestic vessesls is much less than international, sometimes one or 
two cranes are sufficienct to load and unload 50 to 75 containers per vessel. The port manager 
also explained that  the difference between the domestic and international boxes shipped per 
                                                 












hour is because the port is receiving more inbound vessel internationally. This spreads more 
equipment for international vessels and is not due to a reduction in demand.  
 
The port has an average of 55 to 65 ship calls a month with 70 per cent consisting of feeder 
shipments and 20 per cent domestic shipments. According to the port authority, a feeder service 
is defined as ‘transportation operations in which cargoes are shipped by water in smaller vessels 
to or from a load-center port for loading or unloading from larger ocean-going 
vessels20’. Therefore, the domestic trade involves shipping directly from TPKS to Pekan Baru 













                                                 
20 Interview conducted January 16th 2017 
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Source: TPKS, Unpublished Data  
Since receiving ‘international status’ in  2017, the Port of Tanjung Emas has expanded its 
feeder and domestic routes to include direct international shipments to Hong Kong, China and 
Taiwan21. This can be seen in Figure 6.22. In 2017, international shipments make up 10 per 
cent of the ship calls at the TPKS terminal. The port had already started to attract larger 
shipping lines such as Maersk in 2003 on its feeder routes to transhipment hubs such as 
Surabaya, Singapore and Malaysia. With direct international shipping routes, this has attracted 
other shipping lines including Evergreen, Yang Ming, Container Maritime Activities, Global 
Putra Indonesia Maritime, Tresna Muda and Supra Shipindo. The port is very active in its 
marketing strategy to attract cargo and shipping to TPKS.  
                                                 




Cargo from TPKS still continues to be transshipped to Singapore despite TPKS becoming an 
international port. According to the port manager22  this is because some direct shipping vessels 
still face draft problems when entering the channel and basin of Tanjung Emas. If this improves 
in the future, the port authority is positive that  more direct vessels will be coming to 
Semarang’. The draft of the Port of Tanjung Emas has also been deepened in 2016 to 9.3m to 
enable vessels up to 3,500 TEUs to berth (Terminal Petikemas Semarang 2016; Annual Report 
2015 Pelindo III; Unpublished data from TPKS). 
 












Source: Unpublished Data from TPKS 
 
Pelindo III’s port authority, Tanjung Perak, has also identified that further investment is 
required in addition to the development of strategic ports included in the Marine Highway 
Programme. This has seen Tanjung Emas undertake significant investment in infrastructure, 
                                                 
22 Interview conducted 18th October 2018 
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especially investing US$24 million in purchasing 11 Automated Rubber Tyre Gantry Cranes 
in 2014 to modernise the port. These cranes started operations in 2016. This involved 
lengthening the quay at Tanjung Emas Port in Semarang for 105 metres more to a length of 
600 metres, purchasing new equipment and expanding the container yard for another 5.4 
hectares as seen in Figure 6.23. (Terminal Petikemas Semarang 29th January 2016; Annual 
Report  Pelindo III 2015).  
 
Investment in container cranes has allowed the port the capacity to handle the loading and 
unloading of three ships that dock at the same time simultaneously and significantly reduce 
dwell time for ships. Container throughput is forecast to increase to 800,000 and then to 1 
million TEUs in the future as growth in the industrial sector in Central Java continues with the 
new industrial park opened in November 2016. (Terminal Petikemas Semarang 2016; Annual 















Figure 6.23: Infrastructure investment at TPKS branch at Tanjung Emas 
 
Source: Unpublished Data from TPKS 
Pelindo III also developed a longer term plan to improve connectivity for the ports, especially 
those in Eastern Indonesia. This is attributed to the newly developed Kendal Industrial Park in 
Semarang which is a joint venture between Indonesian property group PT Jababeka and 
Singapore’s Sembawang Corporation. This industrial park is an industrial zone for various low 
cost labour intensive sectors including manufacturing, furniture, fashion and technology as 
seen in Figure 6.24 (The Jakarta Post, 15th November 2016). This industrial park is located 
twenty five kilometres from Tanjung Emas port in Semarang and will provide additional 
volume for imports and exports (Terminal Petikemas Semarang, 29th January 2016; Kendal 







Figure 6.24: Kendal Industralia Park 
 
Source: International Enterprise Singapore (13th September 2016) 
 
In order to improve the port’s connectivity to its hinterland, investment planning is being 
undertaken in phases to improve rail connectivity to the terminal in Phase 1. Phase 2 involves 
railway connectivity to the general cargo terminal and Phase 3 involves railway connectivity 
to passenger terminal. The port is also linked by a toll road and has connections to the nearby 
airport. Therefore, the port has developed its own long term plan to build the Tanjung Emas 































Following independence, the dominant union in the harbour of Semarang was ‘Gabungan 
Buruh Pelabuhan’ (GBP, Federation of Dockworkers), formed in 1947. In 1951, it joined 
SOBRI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Federation of Labour 
Unions), the labour union federation created by the national communist Partai Murba 
(Proletarian Party) as a competitor to the PKI-controlled Sobsi, while in Makassar the dominant 
union was the ‘Organisasi Buruh Proletar Indonesia’ (Organization of Indonesian Proletarian 
Workers). Similar to the other ports around Indonesia, industrial action began in Semarang in 
late January 1950 when the GBP led a strike with casual day workers that made up half of the 
6,000 port workforce. A collective agreement was reached quickly by the Shipping Employers 
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Association which was a win for the union. Casual wages for day workers increased three fold 
to Rp. 1.75 and they were eligible to receive two free meals, overtime pay for working more 
than the standard forty eight hour week, free medical services and lodging in camps. However, 
as the collective agreement only included casual workers, it triggered a further dispute with the 
permanent workers. This was resolved with an increase in minimum wage to Rp. 9, a six day 
work week and penalty rates for overtime or Sunday work. Industrial action, once again, served 
as the means by which poor post-colonial employment conditions could be changed (Ingleson 
2016). In the past, strike actions would break out at Tanjung Priok and spread across key ports 
in the archipelago. However, the Suharto era saw military controls on ports and unions lost 
their power. 
 
Since 2012, responses from field interviews with key port staff indicate that unions still operate 
and are active at the Port of Tanjung Emas. One respondent stated ‘We never experience any 
strikes from unions. They are very happy23.’ Strike actions have been minimal and not 
disruptive. Automation at the port has seen the port authority upskill and hire additional 
operators as they move operations from the conventional Rubber Tyre Gantry (RTG) cranes to 
the Automated Rubber Tyre Gantry (ARTG) crane operations. The port has also moved to a 
paperless system to verify documentation and has automatic gates to identify trucks and 
containers as they arrive in the terminal, leaving little room for levying additional fees. As the 
port develops it continues to modernise with advanced technology with plans to build a green 
terminal in the future, switching from diesel equipment to electric.  
 
 
                                                 





This chapter sets out to evaluate port reform in Indonesia that came about as a result of the 
‘2008 Shipping Law’. Deriving an indicator or performance matrix to evaluate reform can be 
a challenge. As De Langen (2006) argues, measuring performance is more complicated as a 
port is a cluster of economic activities. Moreover, the weakness in the indicator approach for 
Indonesia is that data is patchy and there is no public database that collects producitivity and 
operational indicators for port benchmarking. Also, the difficulty of using this approach is that 
it can be difficult to conclude if the overall performance has improved or deteriorated as some 
indicators improved over a period of time while others deteriorated (Talley 1994). In summary, 
the limitations in undertaking such evaluation studies include data availability, identifying 
economic goals of port reform, linking port reform to performance when port reform is often 
part of a wider reform package, as was the case with microeconomic reform in Australia 
(Verhoeven 2014; Reveley and Tull 2012; Niekerk 2005; Talley 2007). 
 
Despite that, there are still a few meaningful observations and conclusions that we can draw 
about the performance of the ports since their governance role has changed. In summary, both 
ports have been very focused on acknowledging their new governance role from a port 
‘regulator’ to a port ‘operator’ in their annual reports. The data also shows increased levels of 
throughput into the ports. Productivity indicators at the Port of Tanjung Emas TPKS branch 
show that there have been moderate improvements in boxes per crane per hour and boxes 
shipped per hour. Likewise, dwell time data for the Port of Tanjung Priok has also shown 
significant improvements. The issue with Tanjung Priok appears to be with the upstream 




From a financial perspective, it must be noted that the operating and financial ratios for Tanjung 
Priok and net operating revenue for Tanjung Emas are estimates that have been derived from 
the annual reports of Pelindo II and Pelindo III. The results for Tanjung Priok suggest a 
significant increase in revenue until 2012. This was accompanied with an increased in port 
throughput. However, the subsequent fall in revenue has largely been attributed to a slower 
global economy and investment in the ‘New Priok Project’ or Kalibaru terminal. Tanjung 
Priok’s new Kalibaru Terminal is also looking promising for the port with its increased capacity 
and ability to attract ships of 12,000 to 15,000 TEUs, doubling the size of the ships that can be 
handled at the current terminal (Annual Report Pelindo II 2012-2017).  
 
Likewise, the Port of Tanjung Emas has witnessed its revenue doubling from 2010 to 2013. 
Container throughput through the Port of Tanjung Emas has also doubled from approximately 
300,000 TEUs in 2010 to over 600,000 TEUs in 2016. The port is no longer a feeder port and 
can now handle ship calls to international destinations and has been attracting international 
ship lines. There has also been a great amount of investment in infrastructure at the port to 
lengthen the quay. The purchase of new automated gantry cranes have also assisted in 
improving productivity within the port. Dwell time at the port has also been nearly halved from 
2016 to 2017. Although the port volumes are small compared with Tanjung Priok, Tanjung 
Emas is a very innovative port that is quick in adopting technologies to modernise its facility. 
The development of the Kendal Industrial Park and the planned hinterland investments in rail 
and road will better link customers and their products to their destinations (Unpublished data 




The question that remains to be answered is whether port performance has improved as part of 
this reform or has it been driven by other economic factors? This can be challenging to draw 
out because there can be other government policy changes that are implemented and global 
economic conditions that can affect the pace of reform. Based on the data analysed from the 
Port of Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Emas, the results present a mixed view on port performance. 
The results suggest that there have been improvements in infrastructure investment and 
productivity.  It is also unclear from the analysis whether the increase in port throughput has 
been brought about by the port authority changing its role from ‘regulator’ to ‘operator’ through 
the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ or because of an increase in global demand that is driving port 
competitiveness to attract cargo and investment. Although throughput volume is a widely used 
indicator in the port industry, it does not provide an insight into the impact on the port industry 
and wider economy (Patunru et. al. 2009). Most of the long term port planning undertaken at 
the Port of Tanjung Emas is not directly linked to the National Ports Masterplan but around 
developments taking place in Semarang such as the Kendal Industrial Park. 
 
In conclusion, the process of change is always dynamic with the performance of a reform 
process having influence on the next round of reform. Further reforms from government are 
still required to streamline upstream processes, integrate technology and operate with increased 
transparency. The effect of the new Kalibaru Terminal on the competitiveness of the Port of 
Tanjung Priok will become clear in years to come. As Talley (2007) argues, in a competitive 
environment, the concern should not only be on how much cargo a port can handle but it should 
also focus on whether it can compete for cargo and how it minimises port time related costs 
which are incurred by shippers. The next section aims to use the ‘Matching Framework 








The discussion in Chapter 4 focused on the introduction of the new Shipping Law in 2008 by 
the Indonesian government. As discussed, this law was aimed at removing the monopoly power 
from government owned ports to increase competition and private sector participation to 
improve performance. Under this Shipping Law, the role of the regulator and operator was 
separated. Previously, the Pelindo would have regulatory authority over ports in their area of 
control. However, this regulatory role was handed over to the port authority (Nathan Associates 
2008). In the new structure, the Pelindos are structured as a ‘company’ mandated to undertake 
port services (Annual Report Pelindo II 2012; Annual Report Pelindo III 2012). The company 
is run by a Board of Directors. De Langen (2017) argues that despite implementation of the 
new structure, the full transition towards a landlord model has not taken place in Indonesia. 
Decision making is still highly centralized and remnants of the ports pre reform structure still 
remain in place. 
 
This can be seen in the recent case of Pelindo II renewing Hong Kong Based Hutchinson Port 
Holdings (HPH) contract. Jakarta International Container Terminal (JICT) was privatised in 
1999 with a 20-year concession at a selling price of US$243 million because the government 
needed to raise capital during the Asian Financial Crisis. This comprised of US$215 million in 
cash and US $28 million in kind in exchange for 51 per cent control by HPH and 49 per cent 
to Pelindo II. A small portion went to the Maritime Workers Cooperative (Indonesia 




In August 2014, Pelindo II renewed its contract awarded to the HPH to operate the JICT until 
2039, five years before it was ending in 2019. The past President of Pelindo II, Mr Richard 
Lino, negotiated the deal that allowed Pelindo II to increase its ownership in JICT to 51 per 
cent from the agreed 49 per cent in 1999. The new terms of the agreement would also have 
resulted in an increase in Pelindo II’s revenue, as HPH’s rent increased from US$60 million to 
US$120 million with a US$250 million payment in advance. The agreement also accelerated 
dredging and deepening work in the port’s northern dock. The office had held tenders from 
several global port operators such as PSA International and APM Terminal, but HPH offered 
the best price (GresNews 17th September 2015).  
 
However, the Tanjung Priok Port Authority had sent a letter to Pelindo II to cancel the contract 
as the deal had not been approved by the transport minister. The unions had rallied against this 
decision and the annulment of Pelindo II’s decision to lay off two of their employees, including 
the head of JICT Labour Union, Sofyan Hakim. It was argued that the process behind the 
concession was not transparent as the shipping law required a resolution between regulators, 
operators and Pelindo II.  Therefore, Pelindo II did not have the rights to extend the concession 
without approval from the Transportation Ministry (The Jakarta Post 8th August 2014). The 
company had ignored attempts made by the union to have a transparent negotiation process to 
discuss the impact of the renewal of the contract with HPH on workers (Asean Affairs 8th 
August 2015). The Federation of State Owned Enterprise Workers Unions were disappointed 
with the decisions and filed a law suit against Pelindo II because the privatisation of the 




However, Pelindo II’s response (The Jakarta Post, 8th August 2014) was that the contract was 
renegotiated before the end of the term because Pelindo II needed additional funds to 
construct the Kalibaru Port in North Jakarta. There was no need to seek the approval from the 
Ministry because the operator owned the land where the terminal stood and this was normal 
business practice. In the end, the Oversight Committee24 concluded that Pelindo II acted 
‘transparently and in an accountable manner, which means it was not secretive and had reported 
the process to all stakeholders in charge of decision making’ (The Jakarta Post, 11th August 
2015). The committee considered Kalibaru Port critical in moving forward the country’s port 
development (The Jakarta Post, 11th August 2015). However, the Director General for Sea 
Transportation, Bobby Mamahit, said that future renegotiations could not take place unless the 
Minister for Transport had given approval. The case of the HPH negotiation to extend 
concessions can be studied to evaluate if the transition to the new structure for port authorities 
has been successful.  
 
 
Under this new structure, Pelindo has the role of an operator and should be able to enter into 
concession agreement with other private sector participants. The ‘2008 Shipping Law’s’ aim 
was to separate the role of the government from an operator to a regulator. The port authority 
would then license the private sector and Pelindo to operate and manage ports according to the 
landlord model discussed in Chapter 2. Despite the law being passed, there is still not much 
clarity on this role as Pelindo II was trying to re-negotiate contracts in advance through a 
process of competitive bidding which should have fallen under its role of operator. The 
response from the Ministry of Transportation reflects ambiguity on the separation of the role 
                                                 
24 The oversight committee consisted of several prominent figures such as former deputy Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) chairman Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas, economist Faisal Basri, Independent Research and 




of operator from that of regulator. As part of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’, there was meant to be 
a transfer of assets between the Indonesian Port Corporations and the port authorities to 
reallocate assets between the two parties (Hutagalung 2015). The Ministry of Transport’s 
primary role needs to be clearly defined as it still overlaps onto the operational role instead of 
performing only the policy making and regulatory role. More clarity is needed for the 
relationship between the Ministry of SOE and Ministry of Transport. 
 
A similar recurrence has occurred with Pelindo III cancelling Dubai Ports (DP World) long 
standing contract in Surabaya. It was due to differences with the Indonesian government over 
renewal terms. The Financial Times (18th September 2017) reported that DP World’s Chairman 
and Chief Executive Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem reported that they had built world class 
infrastructure in Surabaya to meet demands of shipping lines, manufactures, traders and 
consumers. This significant investment in terminal infrastructure had contributed to creating 
jobs and economic growth in the region. Despite a successful track record over the last twenty 
years, they were disappointed that their contributions to the maritime sector had not been 
recognised by the Indonesian government (Financial Times, 18th September 2017).  
 
De Langen (2017) argues that the Indonesian government needs to allow the port to operate as 
a commercial entity by removing restrictions which enable port authorities to set tariffs and 
obtain funding from the private sector independently. Although Indonesian port companies 
have boards, many of these appointments are political connections who are civil servants 
without private sector experience. Thus, more independence and transparency is needed for 
board appointments to bring about better decision making that will improve port performance. 
Despite the shift in the role of the port authority towards an operator, there is still a lack of 
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clarity on the roles of the port authority and the Ministry of Transportation (De Langen 2017). 




The second variable analysed in the matching framework is ‘strategy’. This section on the 
strategy of Indonesian ports analyses if Indonesian ports have become more competitive and 
whether connectivity has improved since the passage of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’. In the past, 
there has not been a clearly defined strategy for ports in Indonesia. Although there have been 
various master plans laid out as a strategy such as the RPJMN and MP3EI to improve 
connectivity amongst ports, Kannan and Morris (2014) argue that planning had not been 
integrated between the different levels of local and central government. At a national level, the 
Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Development (MP3EI) 
is an ambitious plan by the Indonesian government to accelerate the realization of becoming a 
more highly developed country. The administration change from the Yudhoyono to the Jokowi 
government has not brought about a change in the maritime strategy. Rather, President 
Jokowi’s vision is more focused on the nation’s maritime strategy and on implementing this 
strategy than his predecessor. The success of Indonesia’s port development depends to a great 
degree on the port sector’s ability to facilitate the implementation of these initiatives.  
 
Pelindo II’s strategy for Tanjung Priok’s development is focused on the government’s vision 
of reducing logistics costs and improving the competitiveness of ports. The port operator’s 
strategy is relying largely on the government’s MP3EI (Master Plan for Acceleration and 
Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Development) that is focused on potential economic 
development and strengthening national and international connectivity which was discussed in 
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Chapter 3. Along with the MP3EI, the ‘Pendulum Nusatara’ is also the focus of Pelindo II to 
improve connections from the East to the West of the archipelago. Within this strategy, ports 
have been identified as one of the key instruments for the growth of the Indonesian economy. 
Pelindo II has also been focusing on reducing logistics costs. The opening of the new Kalibaru 
terminal at Tanjung Priok is also part of the strategy to reduce logistics costs at the port through 
investment in infrastructure and better cargo handling capacities (Pelindo II Annual Report 
2012 to 2017). Likewise, similar development has been seen in Tanjung Emas in Semarang. 
The completion of the Kalibaru terminal in Tanjung Priok will increase capacity to18 million 
TEUs by 2023. The draft of the port will also gradually increase from 14 metres to 20 metres 
to accommodate larger vessels up to 18,000 TEUs (IPC n.d.).  
 
The implementation of this strategy can also be seen in Medan in Sumatra with the construction 
of ‘Kuala Tanjung’s’ deep water port that commenced in January 2016. The Port of Rotterdam 
Authority signed a joint venture agreement with Pelindo 1 on the 24th of November 2016 to 
develop the Port of Kuala Tanjung in the Straits of Malacca (Port of Rotterdam, 24th November 
2016). The ‘Sea Toll Road’ concept is also being implemented in Indonesia to reduce the 
disparity in prices between regions by connecting goods and services between regions (Annual 
Report 2016). This is expected to feed into China’s BRI investment for Indonesia. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, Indonesia has also agreed to participate in Beijing’s US $40 billion BRI. This has 
led to Chinese investment in Indonesia to build a high speed rail from Jakarta to Bandung, and 
the Trans Sumatra Toll Road. China has also invested heavily in port infrastructure in 
Kalimantan to increase the port’s capacity to produce alumina. With approximately 90 per cent 
of Indonesia’s trade exported by sea, the BRI could play a key role in developing Indonesia’s 




Patimban Port, located 150 km east of the Port of Tanjung Priok, is expected to add 1.5 million 
TEUs by 2019 and 7.5 million TEU when finally completed in 2027 (Port Strategy, 18th July 
2017). Dwell time has also been reduced from approximately 6 days in 2014 at Tanjung Priok 
to 3.5 days in 2017 as discussed in Chapter 5. Although, there has been progress on dwell time, 
costly logistics are still a problem as the government tries to reduce port fees. In order to 
improve inefficient and uncompetitive logistic services, The Jakarta Post (19th June 2017) 
reports that Jokowi’s administration re introduced the Indonesian National Single Window 
(INSW) scheme in June 2017 after the implementation of this system was halted in 2007 due 
to a lack of ministerial coordination and cooperation. This package aims to deregulate and 
streamline the nation’s bureaucratic licensing requirements which involves coordination with 
18 ministries within the port industry. 
 
The 2017 package consists of general directives that need to be detailed and will require 
amendments of several presidential decrees and ministerial regulations. Once it is fully 
established, it should be able to process official export and import documentations through a 
single contact point. This system should also assist in reducing excessive regulation, red tape 
and corruption. It should also help integrate port services in sparsely populated islands into a 
global value chain. A response from an interview25 with a terminal director suggest that these 




The strategy for Pelindo III is similar to Pelindo II and focuses on its role as a terminal operator 
to improve the distribution of goods and services in Indonesia. Interview responses from port 
                                                 
25 Interview conducted 15th January 2017 
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authorities suggest that there is a strong focus with investment in the development of strategic 
ports in Pelindo III’s Marine Highway Programme and integrating the maritime region from 
East to West to achieve better outcome for port users. This is achieved with focusing on the 
Company’s business as Port Terminal Operator, bringing the concept of ‘Green Port’ and 
Integrated Industrial Area with the Port, and modernising the loading and unloading facilities 
equipment such as the 20 ARTG Units in Terminal Petikemas Semarang (TPKS). During field 
interviews26 with Pelindo III, the question was asked if competition had increased between the 
Port of Tanjung Emas and the Port of Tanjung Perak. The response was that this had improved 
competition. Previously cargo from Central Java, Solo and Jogyakarta was handled by Tanjung 
Priok and Tanjung Perak. With infrastructure upgrade in TPKS, this changed the model of 
logistics flow. Although there is some level of rivarly between firms, Pelindo’s in most branch 
ports have a dominant market share for stevedoring although the stevedoring of some bulk 
cargo still needs improvement.  
 
Pelindo III’s strategic development plan focuses on its Marine Highway Programme and 
integrating these ports into the maritime region as part of the development of the port of Eastern 
Indonesia. Maritime Highway is a permanent and regular sea transportation organizer that 
connects hub ports such as Tanjung Perak and Tanjung Emas by feeder services from Sumatera 
to Papua by using large-scaled ships so that the economic benefits can be obtained. The overall 
strategy is derived from the RPJMN 2015 to 2025 and is also part of President Jokowi’s plan 
to develop 24 ports, consisting of five hubs and nineteen feeder ports as discussed in Chapter 
3. Their focus is also to achieve excellence in service for port users. The strategy is to focus on 
the Company’s business as Port Terminal Operator through port modernisation, having hub 
ports and focus on core competencies. Responses from port authorities suggest that there are 
                                                 
26 Interview conducted on 15th January 2017 
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efforts underway to bring in the concept of Green Port and Integrated Industrial Area with the 
port. Rivalry among firms in Pelindo III is assigned as medium by the port operator as the 
existing Pelindo has a relatively dominant market share. However, stevedoring can be 
improved in general cargo, bag cargo, dry bulk and liquid commodities (Annual Report Pelindo 
III 2016;2017). 
 
The RPJMN plan from 2015 to 2025 and the maritime vision of President Joko Widodo 
provides the guideline for this strategy (Annual Report Pelindo III 2012; 2015). Dubai Ports 
(DP) World have also signed a contract with Pelindo 1 to provide technical assistance to 
Pelindo 1 on developing Kuala Tanjung greenfield ports and logistics zone and Belawan in 
North Sumatra. DP World will also advise Pelindo 1 on increasing efficiencies, training and 
development of employees and developing multi modal transport hubs (Port Strategy, 18th July 
2017). Operations at the port of Kuala Tanjung have begun in January 2018 with Pelindo 1 
trying to secure shipping companies to use the port’s services. The Indonesian government has 
also offered transportation infrastructure cooperation at 4th ministerial meeting in Nusa Dua, 
Bali on 26th to the 28th of September 2017. Some of the projects include Makassar New Port 
worth Rp 7 trillion, product terminal of Kalibaru Port (Tanjung Priok, Jakarta) worth Rp 9.5 
trillion, Kijing Port (Pontianak) valued at Rp 5 trillion, Kuala Tanjung Port and Sorong Port 
(West Papua) with an investment of Rp 2.3 trillion (PWC 2017). Indonesia’s container ship 
trade is growing with more direct mainline services such as CMA CGM having direct services 
from Indonesia to Europe.  
 
Nationally, the strategy of the state versus the private sector is still an impediment to 
Indonesia’s economic growth. An interview27  response with a representative from an 
                                                 
27 Interview conducted 20th January 2016 
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economic think tank in Indonesia stated that more private sector investment is needed in ports, 
along with more stable policies to attract and retain foreign investment28. Saha (2016) argues 
that Indonesia’s Coordinating Maritime Affairs Minister Soesilo confirmed that the 
construction of four deep water ports had begun but financial constraints were an obstacle to 
new construction. Ray and Ing (2016) argue that Jokowi’s approach to the infrastructure agenda 
is focused at injecting large amounts of funds into SOEs and assigning important projects to 
them. This approach has raised concerns about the possible ‘crowding out’ of private sector 
investors that are more efficient and competitive.  However, Indonesia’s infrastructure needs 
are too large to rely solely on SOEs funding and private sector capital is necessary. This has 
also been addressed by the past coordinating minister for economic affairs, Sofyan Djalil 
(2014-2015). The Ministry of Public Works and Housing has also emphasized that the 
completion of the Trans Sumatra Toll Road will require partnership with the private sector 
(Ray and Ing 2016).  
 
The response from interviews29 with the port authority on their view on foreign investment is 
that they mostly follow the regulation and decision from Government and are not involved so 
much on this matter if related to Pelindo. The government has started to respond to these risks 
of inefficient SOEs by making attempts to improve the PPP scheme for joint ventures.  The 
problem in the past was that risk sharing arrangements under a PPP project were done by line 
ministries at the early development stage, which discouraged investors from participating as 
risks need to be allocated to the right parties during the conceptualisation phase. Therefore, the 
government is now aware of these risks, allowing investors to conduct their due diligence on 
the SOEs and their projects to maintain corporate governance, efficiency, transparency and 
                                                 
28 Interview conducted 17th January 2017 
29 Interview conducted on 15th January 2017 and 1st June 2017 
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accountability standards. However, such partnerships will require vigorous due diligence on 
the SOEs and their projects (The Jakarta Post 9th October 2017). Warburton (2016) argues that 
the government allocated $3 billion of additional State funds in 2015 to SOEs to merge and 
streamline the enterprises through the establishment of a large holding company. The aim was 
to increase efficiency, raise capital and use it as a vehicle for Indonesia’s development. 
 
As port authorities in Indonesia have traditionally been managed by the Pelindo through the 
Ministry of Transportation, Pangetsu et al. (2015) argues that Indonesia has little experience 
in managing ports in a competitive context. As Ray (2008) argued, this allowed the Pelindos 
to make full use of the regulatory power provided to them to prevent competition within their 
own ports. In the past, companies wishing to enter into the port construction and operation 
business had to enter into a joint venture with or obtain a concession from Pelindo. Private 
sector participation in major public port facilities had usually taken the form of a joint venture, 
with the Indonesian Port Corporation (IPC) controlling the ownership (OECD 2012). However, 
the OECD (2012) report outlines that the current governing structure of the port industry and 
presence of incumbent service providers, still present obstacles for the private sector 
participation and the encouragement of competition.  Therefore, it is necessary for the Ministry 
of SOEs to provide performance benchmarks to monitor prices charged by Pelindos.  
 
Despite the Indonesian government revising its ownership restrictions in transportation and 
logistics, foreign ownership in port management services, cargo handling and cold storage has 
still been capped to 49 per cent (Presidential Regulation 4/2016). However, the private sector 
is now allowed to own 100 per cent of toll roads compared to the previous cap of 95 per cent. 
This is because of national sovereignty concerns which is why the joint venture model is 
preferred. This decision reflects the Indonesian government views on ports being strategic 
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national assets but it could also potentially be an impediment for port development 
(Presidential Regulation 4/2016; PWC 2016). 
 
The OECD (2012) argues that private terminal operators are discouraged from engaging in 
third party cargo handling due to permits being granted for a short period of five years. This 
makes it difficult to obtain finance as there is a risk of contracts not being renewed. The private 
sector should also be allowed to handle third party cargoes and be given competitive allocation 
of port services licenses. OECD 2012d). Further engagement with the private sector will be 
useful in lifting constraints off the port sector. This will enable prices to be determined by 
market conditions, resulting in lower costs to port customers, as long as it is not a monopoly.  
Therefore, strategy development can only take place when the port authority is able to make 
independent decisions in relation to its organisational structure, marketing, pricing, budgeting, 
financing and procurement.  Thus, the OECD recommends competition where possible and 
regulation when necessary (OECD 2012a).  
 
Farell (2012) states that Indonesia also uses the Joint Venture (JV) model for foreign investors 
to invest in conjunction with the Pelindos, where regional port authorities such as Pelindo II 
and III have held stakes between 49 and 51 per cent in terminals at Tanjung Priok and Surabaya.  
This was due to a shortage of funds, following the Asian Financial Crisis which led the 
Indonesian government to embark on a partial privatisation process of the JICT and the 
Tanjung Perak container terminal to Dubai Ports (DP) World. This has resulted in improved 
port sector handling performance of container terminals at Jakarta and Surabaya which are now 
operating in partnership with leading global terminal operators (OECD 2012d). However, the 
issues around contract renewals with global terminal operators such as HPH and DP World 
with Pelindo highlights how this strategy may not work well. International Terminal Operators 
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play a key role in investing in infrastructure to build world class ports. The uncertainty around 
the renewal of their concessional agreements and the short time frame of these contracts does 
not send a very encouraging message to private investors. 
 
The cabotage requirements re-introduced in 2005 appear to contradict the aim of the ‘2008 
Shipping Law’ which was to improve competitiveness (OECD 2012d). As discussed 
previously, Indonesia had introduced policies to support its national shipping industry after the 
Dutch left. Many of these restrictions were removed or relaxed during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Dick 2008; OECD 2012).  This was a reflection of Indonesia’s movement towards economic 
liberalisation which led to an increase in the share of domestic cargo by foreign flagged vessels 
to approximately 45 per cent in 2005. The OECD (2012d) argues that this policy reversal could 
damage the nation’s trade and economy, as it reduces efficiency compared with competition in 
open markets. Domestic shipping operators lack the capital to make investments that drive 
efficiency, limiting innovation and best practices. Reversing this policy is difficult as it has 
strong sectoral support and has not encountered much internal opposition (OECD 2012d). The 
Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (KPPU) has also been established to advocate for 
competition by identifying aspects of legislation that impedes competition. The KPPU can 
provide recommendations and comments on such anti-competitive legislative proposals 
directly to the President. However, their involvement has been limited in recent times (OECD 
2012d).  
 
The draft NPMP indicated that a significant level of investment is required from the private 
sector to invest in PPPs but the cases of HPH and DP World highlight the challenges and 
uncertainty encountered by private sector investors (Netherlands Maritiem Land 2015). 
Therefore, along with individual case study port strategy for competitiveness, trade policy also 
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needs to be part of a broader comprehensive strategy. The focus needs to shift from 
protectionism to promoting the facilitation of the flow of goods, services and people. In order 
to be successful in attracting private sector investment in Indonesian ports, the government 
needs to influence the investment environment and specify policy, regulatory and institutional 
measures which need to be implemented to provide an enabling environment. 
Environment 
 
We now turn to examine the final variable ‘environment’ in Indonesia. For a good fit, the 
structure needs to match up with the complexity and dynamism of the environment. As the case 
study ports are run by government, it is difficult to separate the ‘environment’ into Pelindo II 
and Pelindo III as the case study ports are influenced by national government policies. Instead, 
it is important to consider the context of Indonesia’s political economy, in particular the 
fundamental transformation that occurred in its institutions in the post Suharto era as the 
economy transitioned from authoritarianism rule to a volatile democracy. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Indonesia’s development has largely been influenced by the global resources boom 
and busts, with modest investment in infrastructure (Dick 2008). These resource booms and 
busts led to both inward and outward oriented growth policies. The fall of Suharto’s 
government and the Asian financial crisis eventually pushed for fiscal decentralisation in the 
country which added another layer of complexity, uncertainty and increased challenges of co-
ordination. The difficulties of infrastructure project implementation are exacerbated in 
Indonesia decentralisation since 2003 (Kannan and Morris 2014; Davidson 2015).  
 
Kannan and Morris (2014) argue that this led to a reluctance in certain sectors to take key 
spending decisions for major infrastructure projects. They argue that there is a lack of 
centralized planning, with each ministry having its own plan, resulting in a confusion of 
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responsibilities. Coordination between ministries is slow as there are more than thirteen 
national agencies or stakeholders in relation to maritime affairs. Some of these agencies include 
the Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and administrative 
ministries. Companies trying to establish their business often face confusion and frustration 
navigating between these agencies (Nederlands Maritiem 2015). There have been an increasing 
number of institutions created for emergency measures to check on existing institutions and 
respond to new priorities. This institutional ‘evolution’ has led to duplications of functions. For 
instance, the MP3EI runs parallel to the medium and long term plans of the National 
Department for Planning (Bappenas). Therefore, central government intervention is necessary 
to build up local government capacity and streamline policy making processes (OECD 2012c). 
This was also articulated by a port users in  an interview30 suggesting improvement in agency 
coordination and reduction of red tape to improve efficiency. 
 
The Office of the Coordinating Maritime Affairs Minister claimed credit for the reduction in 
Tanjung Priok’s dwell time. These claims were, however, refuted by Tanjung Priok’s Port 
Authority which further highlighted the lack of coordination between government officials. 
The port authority has imposed a hefty fee on containers that are not cleared on time to 
encourage owners to process the documents required to release the containers. This new 
measure has started to hurt businesses and provides a greater incentive for pilferage (The 
Jakarta Post, March 15th 2016). However, the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs 
commented that the government was taking measures to lower these charges (The Jakarta Post, 
5th May 2017).  
 
                                                 
30 Interviews conducted 15th  to 17th January 2017 
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Despite President Jokowi’s vision for Indonesia as a ‘global maritime axis’ and the critical role 
the maritime sector plays, there is still no coherent plan on how Indonesia will build its 
maritime power. Damuri and Day (2015) argue there is a lack of expertise around government’s 
capacity to assess infrastructure projects and provide certainty to the private sector. They argue 
that the Head of Bappenas, which is the National Development Planning Agency in Indonesia, 
has concerns that revised regulations to create a PPP scheme might weaken the State’s control 
over infrastructure. These concerns are just another example of where the current 
administration is providing mixed signals to the private sector to deliver its economic policies 
and programmes.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, corruption is still a major issue in Indonesia. A report by Control 
Risks (2013), a specialist risk consultancy, showed that corruption is still prevalent in 
Indonesian ports through delays caused by discrepancies in customs documentation for 
imported goods. Even minor issues in paperwork could result in containers being held at ports 
for a long period of time, adding to costs. Hence, informal ‘payments’ are given to facilitate 
the process. The report further cites how one importer deals with this issue by returning goods 
back to their port or origin and resending them with perfect documentation. The establishment 
of the KPK in 2002 has led it to evolve into a fiercely independent and resilient institution 
prosecuting corrupt public officials. However, the report argues that the KPK only handles a 
small percentage (below 5 per cent) of total corruption cases. With widespread corruption in 
the justice system, it does not take long for police to drop an investigation, lose important 
evidence or charge a suspect with a lesser offence (Control Risks 2013).   
 
On December 18th 2015, the KPK named the President of Pelindo II, Mr Richard Lino, a 
suspect in an alleged corruption case in relation to the procurement of three quay container 
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cranes in 2010. These cranes were located in Pontianak Port, West Kalimantan, Panjang Port, 
Lampung; and Palembang Port, South Sumatra (The KPK, 2nd February 2016). The allegations 
against him are for abusing his authority to appoint a Chinese company to supply quay 
container cranes for Pelindo II. Mr Lino denied these allegations arguing that these charges 
were brought about by parties trying to take over the company, due to the reforms he introduced  
when he was appointed as Chief Executive in 2009. These included ousting corrupt and 
underperforming officials (Jakarta Globe, 23rd December 2015). Mr Lino had brought Pelindo 
II from an operating loss position to profitable position with a net worth of Rp 18.5 trillion in 
cash and Rp 45 trillion in assets (Jakarta Globe, 23rd December 2015).  
 
The Loadstar (1st March 2016), a multimodal online news for the logistics industry, reported 
that a source close to Pelindo II explained that the issue with the cranes began when Chinese 
manufacturer Wuxi Huadong Heavy Machinery (HDHM) won the tender process to deliver 
these three cranes. However, one of the other companies had offered a twin lift spreader crane 
which could pick up two 20 feet boxes simultaneously in their tender. This would significantly 
boost productivity at small ports. However, Mr Lino had requested HDHM to change what it 
was offering to a twin lift to win the contract. That resulted in a reclassification of a direct 
appointment rather than a tender. The source added that contrary to KPK claims, a direct 
appointment is not illegal and Pelindo III had paid more for a single lift crane a month later. 
This negates any claims of losses to the State. Moreover, no evidence had been found that Mr 
Lino benefited from this deal financially despite an analysis of his bank accounts. 
According to the Loadstar (1st March 2016) report, Mr Lino had been appointed to improve 
port efficiency in Jakarta which had been a major barrier to growth. Mr Lino’s supporters claim 
the only reason KPK was pursuing corruption allegations was because of his leadership culture 
of tackling corruption and his goal to improve port efficiency. The Serikat Pekerja Jakarta 
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International Container Terminal (SPJICT) union had been lobbying KPK since 2013 over the 
2010 HDHM crane purchase, claiming that he had benefited personally and caused state losses. 
His supporters claim that he is a victim of a political plot to oust his boss, State Owned 
Enterprises Ministers, Rini Soemarno. This is because the main party, PDIP (Indonesia’s 
Democratic Party of Struggle), was unhappy with her doing a good job and would benefit from 
any embarrassment the minister would face through Mr Lino being a corruption suspect (The 
Loadstar 1st March 2016). 
 
The KPK (The KPK, 2nd February 2016) reports that it has reason to believe that it will win 
the pre trial lawsuit against Richard Lino as they have reliable evidence. During the pre trial 
hearing, the KPK presented preliminary evidence to establish Mr Lino as a suspect in the case 
of ordering cranes from a single to twin lift. He is also alleged to have intervened with the 
Committee for Procurement of Goods and Services to appoint HDHM despite the firm not 
meeting administrative and technical requirements. However, GRESNEWS (27th February 
2017), an Indonesian law and politics news portal, reports that the KPK is still having difficulty 
in concluding this case with Mr Lino, despite ongoing investigations since August 2016. The 
KPK is still collecting evidence from overseas and investigations are still underway. Although 
the case has not reached a verdict, it still highlights the possibility of the risks well-meaning 
senior officials have to deal with when they attempt to cut bureaucratic corners to get things 
done more efficiently (GRESNEWS 23rd March 2017). Therefore, even though steps have 
been taken through Jokowi’s ambitious maritime plan with attempts to reduce dwell time, there 
are further elements of bureaucracy, red tape and foreign investment that require further 
improvement to increase certainty to investors. 




The previous section has provided an analysis of the variables structure, strategy and 
environment for Indonesian ports. This section looks at applying the ‘Matching Framework’ 
to determine if the configuration of these three variables is the right ‘fit’ for the ports in 
Indonesia post reform. The challenge in the application of the ‘Matching Framework’ to the 
Indonesian ports is the difficulty in separating each of the three analysed variables for the 
respective case study ports. This is because the ports in Indonesia are owned by government 
and their individual assessment is better assessed by the geographical boundary that they 
belong to such as Pelindo II and Pelindo III instead of individual case study ports as these 
bodies have a greater influence on port development, along with national government policies. 
Therefore, reference is made to the case study ports where applicable but analysis has been 
more broadly grouped under the respective Pelindo boundaries. Interviews were conducted 
with stakeholders with various perspectives such as the private sector, economic think tanks, 
port authorities, academics and terminal managers. However, the analysis of the variables is 
conducted from a public policy perspective similar to Wilmsmeier and Sanchez (2017) to 
evaluate port reform and the implementation of the new governance model and identify further 
governance challenges. 
 
The strategic aim of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ was meant to remove monopoly power from the 
Pelindos by increasing competition within the sector but there does not seem to be an 
overarching strategy on how this is meant to be achieved. The only policy planning document 
was the draft NPMP (Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative 2012) developed in 2008 under the 
Yudhyono government which has been left in draft form. The change in administration from 
Yudhyono to Jokowi in 2014 did see a different leadership approach being adopted. Jokowi’s 
maritime vision was a key focus of his election agenda.  However, no further maritime planning 
documentation have been produced. Rather, Jokowi had initially emphasised that the MP3EI 
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had to be revised due to funding availability (Tempo 2014). However, it has been reported that 
this plan was revised to include his maritime infrastructure agenda as there are similarities 
between Yudhoyono’s ‘sea pendulum’ concept and Jokowi’s ‘sea toll road’. However, the 
MP3EI was not implemented under the Yudhoyono government because of bureaucracy, lack 
of political will and logistical reasons such as land acquisitions and lack of private sector 
investment (The Asan Forum, 22nd February 2016).  
 
Examining the strategy of both the case study ports, it can be concluded that the strategic focus 
of Indonesian ports is on delivering the basic services, placing it into the configuration for 
efficiency in the short run. This strategy of the Indonesian ports sector can be described as a 
narrow product market with the aim of maximizing port throughput. Both the case study ports 
have been focused on reducing logistic costs and investing in infrastructure. In the case of the 
Port of Tanjung Priok, strict dwell time deadlines of three days also have to be adhered to. Both 
case study ports are also reliant on the MP3EI, RPJMN and ‘pendulum nusatara’ to guide 
strategy.  
 
The structure of the ports still is very hierarchical with centralised decision making despite port 
reform. In the case of the Port of Tanjung Priok in Pelindo II, there were elements of an organic 
structure emerging under the past President of Pelindo II, Mr Richard Lino, as the shipping law 
was meant to separate the role of the regulator and operator. Although most decision making 
or ‘operations’ in this structure is now left to the Pelindos, the renewal of the HPH contract 
revealed that decisions still needed approval from the Ministry of Transport and Port Authority, 
despite Pelindo II being an operator. Therefore, a complete transition towards a ‘landlord 
model’ in which operator and regulator roles are separated, has not taken place.  With Pelindo 
III, the port operator has seen more organic decision making emerging despite a mechanistic 
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structure with centralized planning. This can be seen from the level of investment in 
technology, infrastructure upgrade and attempts to attract shipping lines and becoming an 
international port. This could also be because of the Port of Tanjung Emas status as a growing 
port and not a leading port such as Tanjung Priok, which allows for more flexibility to emerge 
in its structure. 
 
Lastly, the variable ‘environment’ has changed over the post reform period from 2012 to 2016.  
This variable can be challenging to observe separately for both ports as they are SOEs that 
follow national level decision making. To better reflect the Indonesian environment more 
accurately, the environmental uncertainty is further classified as ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ 
risk as they allow for more flexibility to better represent the changes in Indonesia’s 
environment instead of just ‘high’ and ‘low’. The analysis for both the case study ports suggest 
that the environmental uncertainty has fallen from ‘high’ to ‘medium’ with regards to port 
development, infrastructure investment and dwell time. However, more needs to be done to 
provide greater certainty to attract private sector investment in ports such as reducing red tape, 
bureaucracy and providing certainty to foreign investors.  
 
Budgetary challenges accompanied with falling commodity prices, have placed pressure on 
government to encourage private sector investment to fill this funding gap. The President views 
liberalization as a last resort for attracting capital; the preference is for deregulation packages 
to ‘modernise, not liberalise’ Indonesia (Warburton 2016, p.309). Negara and Das (2017) have 
argued that a strong focus of Indonesia’s maritime strategy has been inward orientation, 
especially with the Sea Toll Road project that began in November 2015. Despite the 
government’s maritime vision and a kaldeiscope of planning documentation, they argue that 




Despite a change in administration since 2014, the uncertainty in the political environment has 
continue to discourage investment by foreign investors into infrastructure projects. President 
Jokowi was quoted by TODAY, Singapore’s online newspaper, claiming that Indonesia is not 
a protectionist economy and ‘the nation is open for investors’ (TODAY 17th October 2017). 
However, with Newmont Mining and BHP Billiton pulling out of investments in Indonesia in 
2016 and DP World in 2017, it does suggest that a mixed message is being sent out to foreign 
investors (TODAY 17th October 2017). Fiscal decentralisation has also exacerbated the 
challenge of coordination between the national and local governments. Many other government 
agencies also operate in silos with bureaucratic processes and duplications that create more 
regulatory barriers.  
 
The ‘2008 Shipping Law’ was brought about to increase competition, private sector 
participation and efficiency but the reversal of the cabotage policy appears contradictory to 
what the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ was set out to achieve. Therefore, the external environment does 
seem to fluctuate between regulation and deregulation (Dick 2008). Also, within the maritime 
industry, the competition for transshippment cargo along the Straits of Malacca continues to 
intensify, placing more pressure on Indonesia to improve the competitiveness of its ports. The 








Table 6.1: Matching Framework Configurations Applied to Indonesian Ports 
 
 Environment Strategy Structure 
 
Pelindo II: The Port 



























Efficiency oriented focusing 
on providing basic product 
and services. High dwell 
time and logistics costs. No 
longer term planning 
 
 
More efficiency oriented 
with attempts made at 
increasing infrastructure 
investment at ports, attempts 
to reduce dwell time and 
logistic costs to better 
provide basic product and 
services. Longer term plans 
include RPMJN, President 
Jokowi’s maritime agenda 













Mostly mechanistic with 
centralised decision making 
although some elements of 
an organic structure did 
emerge under the past 
President, Mr Richard Lino. 
 
Pelindo III: The 



































Efficiency oriented focusing 
on prodiving basic product 
and services. Lack of 
infrastructure and more 
dredging required to attract 






More efficiency oriented 
with attempts made at 
increasing infrastructure 
investment and having  direct 
international shipping routes 
to better provide basic 
product and services Longer 
term plans include RPMJN, 
President Jokowi’s maritime 
agenda and ‘sea toll road’ 





















More organic than 
mechanistic with decision 
making still centralised but 
allowing for the port 
operator to respond by 
upgrading infrastructure and 
attracting shipping lines to 





The results suggest that there is a misalignment in fit, especially between the variable 
‘environment’ and ‘structure’. Although there has been a reduction in environmental 
uncertainty from ‘high’ to ‘medium’, a more organic structure would be better able to deal with 




In conclusion, the ‘Matching Framework’ has been a useful methodology to evaluate the new 
port governance structure in Indonesia by analyzing the variables ‘strategy’, ‘structure’ and 
‘environment’ post reform from 2012 to 2016.  Wilmsmeir and Sanchez (2017) had adjusted 
the category of ‘environment’ from ‘more uncertain’ to ‘less uncertain’ while applying this to 
study Chilean ports to allow for more flexibility in the analysis. Likewise, the author has 
differentiated this category of environment to ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ to allow for more 
flexibility to better fit the Indonesian case. 
 
The results suggest that the environmental uncertainty in both case studies port has been 
reduced to ‘medium’ from ‘high’. Therefore, the ‘fit’ of the case study ports can be better 
improved by changing the structure of the case study ports from ‘mechanistic’ to ‘organic’ to 
better adapt to the environment. In the case study Port of Tanjung Emas, this is more prevalent 
with a more flexible and organic structure. For the case study Port of Tanjung Priok, the port 
did display elements of an organic structure under the leadership of the previous President, 




Although an overarching plan for the development of Indonesian ports is missing, port 
operators do revert to the RPJMN along with President Jokowi’s Sea Toll Road. Both case 
study ports have a focus on an ‘efficiency oriented’ strategy with the Port of Tanjung Priok 
focused on reducing logistics costs through reducing dwell time and building the new Kalibaru 
terminal to accommodate larger vessels and capacity. The strategy of the Port of Tanjung Emas 
has been to upgrade its infrastructure and develop direct international shipping routes that 
enabled it to achieve a status of an international port in 2017. Brooks and Balthazar (2001) 
highlight that regardless of the configuration, some minimum level of both efficiency and 
effectiveness is critical to organisational survival and to reduce the uncertainty in the 
environment.  
 
It is also evident that the transitioning towards a landlord model did not really result in a transfer 
of power but qualitative structuring. There have been several attempts made by the respective 
port authorities to provide a systematic strategy. However, a national port strategy to guide port 
reform is still missing. De Langen (2017) argues that the complete transition towards a 
‘landlord’ model has not taken place and decision making is still centralised. However, the 
government has been very active in promoting investment in port infrastructure to lower 
logistics costs.  Increased competition in stevedoring services could perhaps improve port 
competitiveness, especially in bulk ports and reduce logistics cost further through greater 




6.3 Results for Methodology III: Institutional Analysis Approach 
 
The ‘matching framework’ provides a valuable insight towards the long term evolution of the 
structure and governance of ports. Although the transition towards a landlord model has made 
some progress, the discussion suggests that the governance model is still rooted in its traditional 
pathway which could slow down the process of reform. Likewise, the new ‘2008 Shipping 
Law’ has brought about minimal change in the structure of the ports, foreign investment and 
competition. This is because the development of the port is still constrained by the deeply 
embedded nationalistic concerns, resulting in the continuation of the historical pathway. 
Therefore, although the ‘Matching Framework’ provides a tool to evaluate reform, path 
dependence plays a significant role in explaining the trajectory of port reform in Indonesia. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the internal environment of port institutions represent rooted 
structures of power, Notteboom et al. (2013) argues that it would be in no one’s interest to 
change the rules (Notteboom et al.2013; Reveley & Tull 2008). Thus, an evolutionary analysis 
is important because it links past behaviour and inherited social factors into the present.  
Conventional studies tend to ignore the embeddedness of ports within their institutional and 
economic domain and effectively analyse reforms from a static angle (Debrie et al. 2013). 
However, Reveley and Tull (2012) argue that unless various events can act as ‘triggers’ 
resulting in layering, stretching or displacement, it can be difficult to change the trajectory of 
a resistant port.  
 
 
Figure 6.26 summaries the series of reforms to the maritime sector in Indonesia from 1945 to 
2018 that were discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. The analysis begins from the departure of the 
Dutch (A) in 1945 that saw a continued path dependence of nationalization of Indonesia’s fleet 
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(B) in 1960. This is followed by the Suharto era where the 1980s saw a period of deregulation 
of policies in Indonesia (C) to welcome foreign investment as part of the nation’s non-export 
led growth strategy. This can be seen as a trigger point which brought about the removal of 
domestic cabotage policies and improved economic growth within Indonesia. Customs 
procedure were also outsourced to Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) (Dick 2008). 
However, this did not last very long as there was a reversal in government policy to bring 
customs under the Director General of Sea Transportation who was President Suharto’s son-
in-law. Crony capitalism continued until the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (D). This was 
the trigger event that led to the partial privatization of key ports such as Tanjung Priok in 
Jakarta and Tanjung Perak in Surabaya.  
 
Following this trajectory, the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ could have been seen as a major trigger 
point aimed at reducing the monopoly power and increasing competition at Indonesian ports. 
Since then, this trajectory has not changed very much (E). There have been several attempts by 
the current President Jokowi to attract foreign investment in Indonesian ports. At the same 
time, investment and operations by international terminal operators such as HPH and DP World 
have met with challenges. Cabotage policy still protects domestic fleet and limits on foreign 
investment still hold at 49 per cent. The end result (G) is providing mixed signals to investors 
about the government’s policy towards more open policies and foreign investment. Figure 6.26 
shows Indonesian port reform exhibiting signs of a ‘resistant port’. Thus, when a reform 
process appears to be rigid and hierarchical, it could be because of this embeddedness within 
the institutions that creates a trajectory of resistance or ‘lock in’ which impedes the 
implementation of local reform. This reasoning can provide further insight as to why the ‘2008 




Figure 6.26: Trigger Points in the trajectory of Port Reform in Indonesia 
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A: Departure of Dutch (1945) 
B: Nationalisation of the fleet (1960) 
C: Deregulation in the 1980s 
D: Re- regulation in the 1990s and the Asian Financial Crisis led to partial privatisation of ports (1999-2000) 
E: 2008 Shipping Law Reform 
F: Foreign investment capped at 49 per cent (2016 Negative Investment List), Cabotage policies re-introduced 
G: Contract renegotiation issues with Pelindo II and III with HPH and DP World in 2016 
 
Almost 350 years of Dutch colonial rule into the twentieth century has shaped the dominant 
idealogical views of an economy that was extractive, exploitative and inward looking (Hill 
2018). As discussed in Chapter 2, Adiputri (2014) argues that both the ‘Guided Democracy’ 
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and the ‘New Order’ leadership of Sukarno and Suharto had inherent features of a highly 
centralised system, with an authoritarian style leadership under which monopoly and 
corruption increased. Although there were period of economic growth during the Suharto era, 
there was still much protectionism on heavy industry which continues today in various sectors 
of the economy such as agriculture and shipping. The Suharto era saw President Suharto as the 
institution while the democratic era since 2000 has seen a diffusion in power with the State 
becoming more important (Hill 2018). However, protectionist and inward looking policies 
continue to be implemented. Hadiz and Robinson (2004) argue that the reform in institutions 
in Indonesia’s new democracy had still left old institutional forces intact which is an 
impediment for Indonesia’s port development to become more successful and provides an 
explanation on the trajectory of port reform in the two case study ports.  
 
Port Reform Trajectory for Tanjung Priok 
 
Applying this analysis to the Port of Tanjung Priok, it can be seen that much effort has been 
placed in reducing the logistics cost over the period from 2012 to 2017. These measures include 
building the new Kalibaru terminal, reducing dwell time and streamlining logistics through the 
‘National Single Window’. However, there are still elements of path dependence that have 
prevented a complete transition to the ‘landlord model’. This can be seen especially from the 
angles of competition and foreign investment. The ‘2008 Shipping Law’ aimed at increasing 
port competitiveness but not much competition has been seen in terminal operations at Tanjung 
Priok.  This is largely due to the remnants of port reform where the Pelindo has always operated 
as a monopoly. Although the port operator has made attempts to increase efficiency and invest 
in infrastructure, there has been resistance to introduce more competition. 
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Similarly, more foreign investment is needed to fund President Jokowi’s ambitious maritime 
plan but preference has been to use SOEs as funding vehicles instead of the private sector. The 
private sector also has significant capabilities and expertise which can benefit the port reform 
process. However, foreign investment in ports is still limited to 49 per cent due to national 
sovereignty, especially after Dutch colonisation. Thus, this path dependency argument could 
provide a reason as to why there has been resistance or an ‘oscillating pendulum’ for and 
against foreign investment. 
 
Therefore, these institutional rigidities and path dependent lock in can hamper the port’s growth 
potential and delay the outcome of port reform. Also, being the leading port in Indonesia, the 
port is a major focus point of government. Although the port reform process has had remnants 
of path dependency, some level of stretching is visible. This can be seen with President 
Jokowi’s focus on ports and connectivity, the new Kalibaru terminal and greater private sector 
participation through joint venture in the new Kalibaru terminal. The next section analyses the 
port reform trajectory for Tanjung Emas. 
 
Port Reform Trajectory for Tanjung Emas 
 
 
Tanjung Emas is a very innovative port that is quick in adopting technologies to modernise its 
facility.The port reform trajectory for the Port of Tanjung Emas does bear resemblance to the 
Port of Tanjung Priok, especially in terms of foreign investment. However, an alternative 
pathway can be seen developing at the Port of Tanjung Emas despite the path dependence 
present of Pelindo III. Significant infrastructure investments have been made since 2012 to 
further modernise the port with the lengthening of the quay, purchasing new container cranes, 
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improving the port’s capacity in loading and unloading ships and dredging to allow larger 
vessels of up to 3,500 TEUs to berth in the third largest port in Indonesia. Responses from 
interviews with port authority personnel in Pelindo III suggest that competition has been a 
driver for this level of investment31. At the same time, the port operator is very active in 
marketing the port to attract shipping lines with direct routes to Asia since the port received 
‘international’ status, instead of a ‘feeder’ port that used to tranship cargoes to ports in Tanjung 
Priok or Tanjung Perak. 
 
The Port of Tanjung Emas can be better described as a ‘path leader’ port where the process of 
reform is not just a ‘top down’ process that followed the ‘2008 Shipping Law’. It is also a 
‘bottom up’ or emergent pathway that has developed due to the port operator’s and authorities 
innovation and flexibility. The comparison between the Port of Tanjung Priok and the Port of 
Tanjung Emas does bear resemblance to the comparison between the Port of Auckland and the 
Port of Tauranga discussed in Chapter 2 where institutional reform allowed the Port of 
Tauranga to operate with more flexibility and innovation, resulting in improved port 
performance (Pyvis and Tull 2017). Likewise, the Port of Tanjung Emas is showing signs of 
innovation and flexibility despite the challenges it faces due to its size and location. These 
institutional reforms could possibly allow the Port of Tanjung Emas to flourish at a quicker 
pace over time as compared with the Port of Tanjung Priok where institutional rigidities and 
path dependent lock in could limit the port’s growth potential. Also, unlike Tanjung Priok 
which has more government interest, perhaps being a smaller port enabled this management 
structure to be more effective. 
 
                                                 
31 Interview conducted 15th January 2017 
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To conclude, port reform is never easy to implement and the timeframe varies from country to 
country as seen in the discussion above Brooks et al. (2017). Also, political and cultural 
traditions can influence these reforms (Ng and Pallis 2010). The Indonesian port reforms has 
shown signs of being impeded by a path resistant port. On the one hand, port policy is 
encouraging competition to improve efficiency while, on the other hand, ports are surrounded 
by protectionist measures and nationalism. As discussed in Chapter 4, neighbouring South East 
Asian ports such as Vietnam, Thailand and Philippines are also in competition to attract greater 
shipments. This competition could act as a trigger, providing ‘bottom up’ pressure to further 
stretch out the port’s trajectory to bring about reform. However, the argument put forward in 
Chapter 2 by Reveley and Tull (2012) suggest that the use of ‘competition’ as a solution to 




This chapter set out to evaluate the performance of Indonesian ports since the ‘2008 Shipping 
Law’ using the mixed methods methodology which includes the indicator analysis approach, 
‘Matching Framework’ and institutional analysis. The results from the indicator approach of 
the Port of Tanjung Priok and the Port of Tanjung Emas suggest that port performance has 
improved. However, the misalignment in ‘fit’ suggests that further changes need to take place 
in the internal environment of institutions in Indonesia. Path dependence provides an 
explanation as to why it can be challenging to achieve the desired results of port reform 
(Notteboom et al. 2014). Also, protectionist policies applied by the Indonesian government are 
a reflection of the need to hold onto their deep, rooted culture. De Langen (2017) argue that 
further action is required to remove government control that restricts the port to operate as a 
commercialised entity. This includes allowing port authorities to operate autonomously and 
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obtain funding from the private sector through PPPs. Araidno et al. (2014) argued that the port 
reform process can be long and difficult. It needs further clarity and support from institutions, 
regulations and planning documents.  This will prevent investors from being faced with a 
policy vacuum with no clarity on processes, approvals and permit and provide a more certain 
environment. There is also a need to develop a new growth strategy with less reliance on non 
resource exports. For this, Indonesia needs to boost its level of investment in infrastructure, 
productivity and cut red tape that are reducing economic efficiency and investment.  
 
The ‘Matching Framework’ has been developed with insights from Mintzberg (1985), Porter 
(1980) and Burns and Stalker (1962) on strategic management and organizational theory. The 
variables structure, strategy and environment were evaluated to assess the fit and alignment of 
the Indonesian port sector post reform. The results suggest that there still is a misalignment in 
fit between the environment and strategy against the structure of the ports post reform. 
Therefore, an organic structure can improve port performance by allowing more flexibility for 
ports to response and adjust to their uncertain environment. The Indonesian government can 
also play a further role by creating a more stable economic and political environment that is 
more conducive to foreign investment. 
 
Indonesia also needs to make significant changes to reduce its level of regulation and 
corruption and create a more transparent environment to encourage competition and private 
sector participation within the maritime sector. Competition law and policy have played a 
substantial role in underpinning Indonesia's economic achievements since 1999. However, the 
government has been accepting only a small proportion of the KPPU’s recommendations which 
minimise anti-competitive impacts in proposed legislation.  Although the government had 
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consulted the private sector prior to drafting ‘Indonesia’s Investment Negative list’, foreign 
investment is still limited in the port sector to 49 per cent (OECD 2012a). 
 
Although the new shipping law promised to be simpler and have a better regulatory structure, 
it is still entrenched in the principles of cabotage and regulatory controls over routes and tariffs. 
The constant swing of the pendulum from a highly regulated to a deregulated maritime sector 
is a reflection of the conflict between protectionism and economic development within 
Indonesia (Dick 2008; De Grauwe 2017). Therefore, although the government is committed to 
increasing trade, further liberalization is required in the maritime sector to upgrade 
infrastructure and drive efficiency and competitiveness within the Indonesian economy. 
Although the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ reflected elements of efficiency and competitiveness, path 
dependence means that reform is heavily overweighed by defense, strategic and nationalistic 
concerns. Therefore, it can be observed that external circumstances such as weaker economic 
growth and political leadership are really the key drivers behind driving port reform rather than 
the introduction of a new law that has elements of creating a more competitive port sector but 
still has some elements of protectionism. Broader institutional reform needs to take place for 













As an archipelago of 17,500 islands, maritime connectivity plays a critical role in Indonesia’s 
trade and economic growth. The maritime sector’s contribution to the Indonesian economy is 
nearly US $1.2 trillion (Saha 2016). Intensifying competition for transhipment cargo in the 
Southeast Asia region has led to more pressure on Indonesia to further invest in its maritime 
infrastructure to remain competitive. A more competitive and efficient port sector can assist in 
Indonesia’s transition from a middle income to higher income country, through greater trade 
flows. At the same time, it can also help distribute the gains from economic growth equally 
among its islands to improve the livelihood of the Indonesian people. However, good logistics 
systems reform requires investment in infrastructure, cooperation between the relevant 
government agencies and reductions in regulations that impede logistics reform (Sandee et al. 
2016). 
 
This thesis sets out to evaluate the port reform process in Indonesia to determine if the ‘2008 
Shipping Law’ improved port performance. The aim of the Shipping Law was to provide a 
separation between the operator and regulator roles to increase competition and private sector 
participation in Indonesian ports. The intent of the reform was for the Indonesian port 
governance model to transition towards a ‘landlord model’. The aim of this concluding chapter 
are three fold. Firstly, this chapter aims to answer the research questions posed at the beginning 
of the thesis. Secondly, it intends to summarise the findings from the previous chapters. 
Thirdly, it proposes to use these findings to suggest further policy reforms to ensure that 
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To summarise, Chapter 2 provided an overview of the role of institutional reform in port 
governance and analysed how ports can be viewed as institutions that have deeply rooted 
cultures. Hence, this can influence the outcome of the reform process and the port governance 
model. The chapter also discussed the various port governance models including the public 
sector model, a hybrid model which involves both the private and public sector and the private 
sector model. The discussion led to the complexities of port operations and ownership which 
makes it difficult for ports to fit into a particular category. The literature review further 
discussed the ongoing debate on private versus public sector ownership and the advantages and 
disadvantages of these ownership models. The empirical evidence suggest that many ports tend 
to adopt a landlord or hybrid port model with some element of devolution to the private sector. 
However, the empirical evidence was inconclusive in suggesting if there was a perfect model 
for port governance. The literature review revealed a gap on port governance studies in 
Indonesia which provided an impetus for the research in this thesis.  
 
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the Indonesian economy and its port governance 
framework. This chapter set the background for understanding Indonesia’s history and 
macroeconomic environment. It provided an in depth understanding of Indonesia’s progress as 
a nation after the departure of the Dutch and its economic development as a young, democratic 
nation. Since its independence, the nation has witnessed policy making shift between inward 
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and outward oriented policies towards foreign investment. Towards the end of the 20th century, 
President Suharto’s rule came to an end with the Asian Financial Crisis. Laws supporting fiscal 
decentralisation were announced shortly after to ensure provinces received their share of 
revenues.  A kaleidoscope of economic plans, such as the ‘MP3EI’ and the ‘RPMJN’, have 
been developed to assist the transformation of Indonesia from a middle income to a high 
income country. Despite these plans, regulatory issues, a lack of infrastructure investment, 
corruption and co-ordination between the different level of governments are challenges 
preventing the nation from making the transition to a higher income country. Although these 
plans have discussed the importance of the maritime sector to the Indonesian economy, it was 
President Jokowi who further implemented this agenda. 
 
Chapter 4 examined Indonesia’s logistics and port governance structure. Various 
benchmarking studies showed that although Indonesia’s ports had made modest progress, its 
logistics costs were significantly higher and its port performance fell behind neighbouring 
Southeast Asian economies. The chapter also tabled the evolution of Indonesia’s port 
governance from the 1960s and how the ports in Indonesia fall under government ownership 
of the four Pelindos. In 2008, the government introduced the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ to remove 
the legislated monopoly from the Pelindos to encourage competition and efficiency within the 
port sector. These reforms were evaluated using case studies of the Port of Tanjung Priok in 
Jakarta and the Port of Tanjung Emas in Semarang using a mixed methods approach in Chapter 
5 and 6. 
 
Chapter 5 examined the various methodologies that have been used to assess port performance 
and their strength and weaknesses. The chapter then discussed further the three methodologies 
294 
 
used in the thesis which included the indicator approach, ‘Matching Framework’ and 
institutional analysis. The aim of using this multi method approach was to allow for a broader 
analysis of the port reform process and for one method to complement the weakness of the 
other. The indicator approach discussed the various operational and financial indicators to 
evaluate port performance such as dwell time, port labour, container throughput, net operating 
profit and financial ratios. The ‘Matching Framework’ approach was suitable for evaluating 
port reform because the port governance model had features of ‘strategy’, ‘structure’ and 
‘environment’. This allowed the ‘Matching Framework’ to be applied to assess the new 
governance structure against the ideal ‘fit’. The last approach used is the institutional analysis. 
This approach aims to analyse if ‘institutional lock-in’ has hampered the port reform process 
or have new trajectories or alternative pathways developed. 
 
The discussion in Chapter 6 summarised the results of this thesis by examining the application 
of the three methodologies to the case study ports of Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Emas. The 
results from the indicator approach show that both ports had made improvements in operation 
and productivity from 2012 to 2016. In Tanjung Priok, these improvements were seen with a 
decrease in dwell time, increased container throughput and financial performance. Major 
investments are also being made for the new Kalibaru Terminal. At the same time, dwell time 
has fallen to approximately 3.5 days at Tanjung Priok in 2016 from 17 days in 2008. In the 
case of Tanjung Emas, profitability and container throughput has increased significantly. The 
data also suggests that there have also been modest improvements in productivity. This is 
largely attributed to the investment in infrastructure and technology such as automated gantry 
cranes within the container terminal. However, one limitation of this approach was the 
unavailability of publicly available time series databases that could encapsulate broader 
productivity indicators to better assess port performance. 
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The results from the ‘Matching Framework’ analysis indicate that there is a misalignment 
amongst the structure against the environment and strategy. Therefore, to have the right ‘fit’, 
the structure of ports could become more organic to adapt to its medium level environmental 
uncertainty to see further improvements in port performance. The Indonesian government 
needs to provide a more certain environment towards foreign investment. Lastly, the path 
dependency methodology provides an explanation of the internal environment of the 
Indonesian ports and help explain the slow process of reform. The main reason is the level of 
institutional lock-in present, especially at the Port of Tanjung Priok. Therefore, the 
management style of the ports still bears resemblance to past institutitions such as the ‘Dutch 
Colonisation’ and ‘Suharto era’ that have locked in the trajectory of the ports, with little 
commercial autonomy despite wanting to transition towards a ‘landlord’ model. This also 
explains why competition has not been very evident among ports in Indonesia with all ports 
controlled by one authority, the IPC. However, with users demanding efficiency in operations 
and with more competition from neighbouring ports, both case study ports have displayed some 
levels of stretching with the Port of Tanjung Emas displaying more innovation and flexibility 
compared with the Port of Tanjung Priok. 
 
In conclusion, the results from the research indicate that port performance at both the port of 
Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Emas has improved since 2008 based on the financial and 
operational indicators that were analysed. However, it is important to draw a caution as it can 
be challenging to identify whether some of the indicators discussed improved due to increased 
demand or as a result of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’. The results from the ‘matching framework’ 
analysis suggest that structure of the ports need to shift towards becoming more ‘organic’ rather 
than ‘mechanistic’ for a better ‘fit’. Most importantly, port reform is not a ‘one off’ event and 
it can take a series of reforms to reach a desired outcome.  
296 
 
7.3 Research Findings  
 
This thesis aimed to contribute to the literature by evaluating port reform in Indonesia since 
the passing of the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ as there has been limited research undertaken on port 
governance reform in Indonesia. The aim of this thesis was to answer the three research 
questions posed in Chapter 1 on Indonesia’s port reform which are listed below.  
Research Questions 
1. Did the change in the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ result in the implementation of a ‘landlord’ 
port governance structure? If so, did this new governance structure result in improved 
port performance? 
2. Did ‘institutional lock-in’ play a role in determining the trajectory of port reform in 
Indonesia or have other alternative pathways developed? 
3. Is the ‘Matching Framework’ a useful evaluation tool for evaluating port reform in 
Indonesia? 
 
The first research question was whether port reform in Indonesia resulted in the implementation 
of a ‘landlord’ model which resulted in improved port performance. This was assessed using 
an indicator approach, matching framework and institutional analysis to assess the case study 
ports of Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Emas. The analysis in Chapter 6 suggested that the case 
study ports had made significant improvements on dwell time, cargo throughput, producitivity  
and profitability. Tanjung Priok has already been investing in further capacity for its ‘New 
Priok Project’ to attract larger vessels and reduce logistics costs. Similarly, Tanjung Emas 
began modernising its infrastructure through using automation, building connections with its 
hinterland and considering the development of a ‘green’ terminal. Both operational and 
financial indicators have shown signs of improved port performance. However, the results 
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suggest that there has not been a complete transition to the ‘landlord’ model. The infrastructure 
deficit in ports requires funding from the private sector and cannot be funded by the SOEs 
alone. The Indonesian government also needs to provide certainty and the appropriate 
investment climate to attract funding and allow the ports to operate as commercial entities to 
realised their full potential and be able to obtain private sector funding independently. More 
competition should also be allowed for stevedoring services.  
 
Pilcher and Tseng (2017) argue that the methodology applied in evaluating port performance 
is largely dependent on the availability of data. In Indonesia, there is no reliable international 
database or national agency collecting specific information on indicators such as port labour 
and operational productivity. Indonesian port authorities also have concerns of releasing this 
information publicly due to benchmarking done against other ports. Therefore, the weakness 
in the indicator approach is a lack of public data to assess better productivity and operational 
indicators to measure performance. Bichou (2006) argues that measuring port performance is 
difficult due to the complexity of interactions of port missions, institutions and functions. This 
raises the question of whose perspective (regulator, operator or customer) one has to consider 
when undertaking performance benchmarking. Although the indicator approach showed an 
overall improvement, it was difficult to attribute these improvements simply to the ‘2008 
Shipping Law’ or whether it was due to greater competition. Likewise, the financial indicator 
approach also did see profitability and other financial ratios fall and rise over this timeframe, 
especially for the Port of Tanjung Priok. The fall in profitability was due mostly to slower 




The second question was what role does ‘institutional plasticity’ or ‘lock in’ play in 
determining the trajectory for port reform in Indonesia and have other alternative pathways 
emerged? The results suggest that path dependency and the legacy of colonisation have played 
a critical role in explaining the trajectory of port reform in Indonesia. The manner in which 
Indonesian ports operate have a strong path dependence that follows from the Dutch 
colonisation. This has placed limits on the reform process with elements of protectionism, 
restrictions on private sector investment and an uncertain investment environment. Therefore, 
for Indonesia to make further progress, it needs to fully release itself from the mindset inherited 
from the colonial period to fully embrace competition in order to transition from a middle to a 
high income country (Negara and Wihardja 2015; Hill 2018).  
 
Although port performance has improved, remnants of path dependence still remain in port 
institutions. The Port of Tanjung Emas has demonstrated signs of path leadership and 
innovation by leading in technological investment to attract shipping lines, despite its size and 
location and transitioning from a feeder to an international port. The port has demonstrated a 
‘path leadership’ role due to it having lesser institutional lock-in compared with the leading 
port of the nation, the Port of Tanjung Priok. Although the remnants of path dependence have 
placed limits on the outcome of port reform, new trajectories can be seen to have emerged at 
the case study ports that have resulted in improved port performance from 2012 to 2016. As 
port reform can take many years, the results could suggest that this is a transitionary stage. Port 
reform may not always achieve the intended outcome because of deliberate policy choices and 
vested interests of elite groups (Hadiz 2003). In the context of Indonesia, this can be seen over 
the various periods, especially over the rule of President Suharto (Hadiz 2003; Hadiz and 
Robinson 2004). Therefore, the challenge for port reform then is how do policy changes occur 
and how is power balanced between the elites. 
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The third question was whether the ‘Matching Framework’ is a useful evaluation tool for 
evaluating port reform in Indonesia? The ‘Matching Framework’ methodology was useful in 
evaluating the progress of port reform across the busiest port in Indonesia and a smaller port 
respectively. The strength in this framework is that it enabled an assessment of the new 
governance model by assessing key factors which are environment, strategy and structure to 
determine if the governance model is the right fit to successfully implement port reform. These 
variables play a critical role in evaluation, especially in complex environments such as the port 
industry which operates with varying stakeholders and private and public ownership. The 
results from applying the ‘Matching Framework’ in Indonesia from the timeframe of before 
2008 and after reform (2012 to 2016) suggest that there is a mismatch or a ‘poor fit’ in 
Indonesia’s port governance structure between the ‘structure’ and ‘environment’. Although the 
level of uncertainty in the policy marking environment has decreased from ‘high’ to ‘medium’, 
an organic structure is necessary to improve the competitiveness of the case study ports. Also, 
more competition is needed in the strategy between ports, together with increased foreign 
investment.  
 
Researchers such as Balthazar and Brooks (2001) and Wilmsmeier and Sanchez (2017) have 
argued about the rigidity in the categories presented in the ‘Matching Framework’. One of the 
weaknesses identified with this framework when examining Indonesian ports is the rigidity in 
the categories of environment to ‘high’ and ‘low’. The author introduced a ‘medium’ category 
to better reflect the change in uncertainty in the environment as ‘high’ and ‘low’ were too rigid 
to fit the case of Indonesia. In the case of the Indonesian ports, differentiating the strategy of 
the two case study ports was a challenge because the case study ports follow the national 




7.4   Contributions to the Existing Literature and Lessons Learned 
 
The evaluation of port reform in Indonesia was undertaken to fill a gap in the literature as 
limited research has been undertaken on the port governance and reform process in Indonesia. 
The results from evaluating port reform in Indonesia do bear some resemblance to other 
countries that have embarked on port reform. Brooks et al. (2017) highlights that  outcome of 
port reform has varied in various countries and has not always delivered the full benefit. This 
was due to complexity in the reform process, unsuccessful implementation, transition times 
and flaws in decision making. In Indonesia’s case, the aim was to transition its governance 
structure from a public to a landlord model to improve competition and efficiency. The results 
suggest that this full transition has not taken place but measures have been taken by government 
to reduce logistic costs and upgrade infrastructure at the case study ports.  
 
Many other ports such as the  the Port of Singapore Authority (Tongzon 2008) and the Port of 
Rotterdam (De Langen and Van der Lugt 2017) have benefited from the landlord model which 
gave more flexibility to manage ports in a competitive environment. In the case of the Port of 
Rotterdam, the ownership is by local government whereas in Singapore it is by the national 
government. The results from ports that have been privatised has been mixed with ports such 
as Port Klang in Malaysia (Tull and Reveley 2002; Ghashat et al. 2011) having a successful 
outcome and while privatisation of ports in the UK (Monios 2017; Baird 2013) and Sweden 
have achieved limited success (Bergqvist and Cullinane 2017). The results from the Chilean 
port reform suggest that the results have not been completely satisfactory from a national 




The case of Indonesia’s port governance shows that there is still a significant level of 
government ownership and concern that privatisation will result in a loss in government control 
which is seen as a risk to national sovereignty. This was seen in the case of the ‘Negative 
Investment List’ that limited the share of port investment at 49 per cent. Limiting foreign 
investment in port reform could slow down the much needed investment in infrastructure. 
Malaysia’s port privatisation experience could be a model for Indonesia to emulate to further 
improve its port performance. The Malaysian government decided to change the port’s 
governance structure to improve its commercial and operational efficiency due to the 
competition it was facing in the port sector (Tull and Reveley 2002; Ghashat et al. 2011). This 
allowed foreign investment  and changed the structure from a mechanistic into a more organic 
structure that allowed flexibility and decentralisation. This better ‘fit’ improved Malaysia’s 
port competitiveness and enhanced the port’s ability to compete for cargo from Singapor 
(Ghashat et al. 2011).  
 
Other nations such as China (Notteboom and Yang 2017) and New Zealand (Pyvis and Tull) 
have also seen gains in port performance through privatisation. Chen et al. (2017) argues that 
port privatisation in Australia’s major capital cities has been part of the government’s asset 
recycling project to fund other infrastructure and reduce debt. However, the sale of the Port of 
Darwin to  Landbrige, owned by Chinese billionaire Ye Cheng for 99 years, has raised concerns 
of national sovereignity because Darwin plays host to major Navy and multinational exercises 
and is the centre from which the Navy conducts border integrity operations. The ports of 
Brisbane, Sydney and the Port of Newcastle have no price regulation nor a formal independent 
statutory regulator (Chen et al. 2017). Ports in New South Wales (NSW) need to provide 
advance notice of any propose change to port charges. Contarily, ports in Western Australia 
have been successfully operating under a commercialised governance model since 1999 (Tull 
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and Affleck 2007). Therefore , Indonesia could also adopt a gradual approach to privatisation 
of services such as stevedoring as it transitions towards the ‘landlord’ model. 
 
The literature does suggest that the timeframe of port reform varies across countries. 
Indonesian ports were given three years from 2008 to 2011 to adapt to the new structure. The 
evaluation in this thesis has only been over a five year period from 2012 to 2016. During this 
period of time, there has been significant investment in infrastructure made at the New Priok 
terminal and the Port of Tanjung Emas to reduce logistics costs. More time would be required 
to see the full effects of port reform in Indonesia because institutions take time to change.  
Some countries such as France took three years to implement their port reform while Brazil 
took twenty years as this process was disrupted by conflicts and lengthy negotiations. In 
Greece, port reform has been slow while there have not been any substantive reforms in the 
United States over the last decade (Brooks et al. 2017). Therefore, more time may be needed 
to determine the benefits from these reforms. 
 
7.5 Policy Recommendations 
 
There are still aspects of the Indonesian governance system and political environment where 
further reform is necessary to reap the full benefits of port reform. Ideally, the economy needs 
to be less reliant on commodity boom cycles for growth opportunities and the government 
needs to undertake structural and microeconomic reform to improve productivity. This can 
play a critical role in achieving stronger economic growth, raising the standard of living and 
reducing the income gap and poverty in Indonesia and assist in Indonesia’s transition from a 
middle to high income country. There are three key policy recommendations arising from this 
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research which include institutional reform, further reform on port governance and greater 
private sector participation.  
 
Firstly, on-going  reform is required to facilitate the transition in Indonesia from a middle to 
high income country. As discussed by Hadiz and Robinson (2004) and Thee (2013), Indonesia 
needs to break away from the inherited authoritarian path dependence approach within its 
institutions where old institutional forces continue to persist through interested oligarchs and 
rent seeking individuals. Instead, it needs to embrace policies that consistently pursue 
competition rather than switch between regulation and deregulation policies. There is also a 
need to improve efficiency through removing public sector monopolies and increasing 
competition in the private sector (Ray 2014). Improved policy coordination between the 
various levels of government is required to further reduce bureaucracy and red tape. This 
includes further deregulation, measures to target corruption, increasing competition and 
improved coordination between Pelindos and the various government agencies such as the 
Ministry of Transport, Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (PWC 2016). Although efforts have been 
made to reduce corruption, it still continues to pose a challenge for businesses.  
 
Secondly, the port governance framework could undergo further reform.  The recent case of 
renewal of concession agreements between Pelindo II and HPH for example, have sent out 
mixed signals to international terminal operators. Although the ‘2008 Shipping Law’ has 
legislated Pelindo’s to be operators, it has still not been fully implemented in practice. 
International Terminal Operators can and have played a significant role by investing and 
operating port infrastructure that has resulted in improved port performance. Therefore, 
measures need to be put in place to encourage further private sector involvement and 
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investment. Pilcher & Tseng (2017) argue that port governance evaluation should be built into 
legislation for port reform. However, this may not always be the best method to evaluate port 
reform, especially if industry or government practice does not follow the legislation.  
 
Although cabotage rules are practiced in many nations, they work against the outcome of 
increasing competition. China’s BRI can play a critical role with infrastructure funding to 
develop its ‘Sea Toll Road’ which can reduce the price disparity of commodities across the 
archipelago. De Langen (2017) argues that further action is required to remove government 
control that prevents the ports from operating as commercialised entities. This includes 
allowing port authorities to operate independently in setting tariffs with customers and 
obtaining funding from the private sector. Although Indonesian port companies have boards, 
many of these appointments are from political connections who are civil servants without 
private sector experience (De Langen 2017). 
 
Lastly, the Indonesian government needs to create a good balance between State intervention 
and market involvement (De Grauwe 2017). There needs to be greater private sector 
participation in ports and infrastructure and the removal of monopolies in the public and private 
sector to increase competition (Ray 2014). The growing need and competitive pressures to 
provide modern ports with sophisticated cargo-handling facilities with terminal management 
and security systems has substantially increased capital and technical requirements of ports in 
recent years. This can be accomplished with greater collaboration between the private and 
public sector (UNCTAD 2017). In Indonesian ports, this can take place with greater private 
sector competition through a gradual removal of the foreign investment cap at 49 per cent. 
Many other nations such as China, New Zealand and Malaysia have seen gains in port 
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performance through adopting such measures (Notteboom and Yang 2017; Pyvis and Tull 
2017; Ghashat et al. 2011). 
 
SOEs should not be used as vehicles to ‘crowd out’ private sector investment or given 
preferential financing. Instead, the Indonesian government should encourage the use of PPPs 
as a first, rather than a last method of infrastructure funding. Successful PPPs should have a 
well-designed contract that clearly lists the distribution of roles and activities, the sharing of 
risk between both the public and private sector, legal and regulatory systems that are 
enforceable and an institutional framework to manage the process (UNCTAD 2017). Without 
private sector funding, it will be difficult to fund the infrastructure deficit in the ports sector 
with falling budget revenues from slower commodities growth. Therefore, government needs 
to be cautious of its intervention in the market economy as this could undermine the market’s 
success (De Grauwe 2017). 
 
 
7.6 Further Research 
 
Although it can be difficult to evaluate port reform in its early stages, this evaluation serves as 
an ongoing feedback mechanism to government as to how the reform can be improved further 
and the intended result of the reform process can be obtained. Therefore, as challenging as it 
is, it is necessary to frame the questions around evaluating port reform carefully to allow for a 
better assessment of the impact of port governance reform. In the case of Indonesia, data 
limitations made this process more challenging but nevertheless this research was able to 




Avenues of further research for port performance in Indonesia could include an extension of 
this analysis to include stakeholder surveys from port users to assess the effectiveness of this 
reform (Vaggelas et.al. 2017; Brooks 2007). This includes extending this case study approach 
to other ports outside the island of Java, including bulk ports. Ports in Sumatra and East 
Indonesia could also be included to provide a more comprehensive outlook of the reform 
process. The focus of further research could also shift towards inter island connectivity to 
assess the progress of the ‘sea toll road’ programme implemented by President Jokowi and the 
role it will play in China’s BRI.  
 
For an archipelago nation such as Indonesia, there is also scope to undertake further research 
on adopting multi-dimensional measures of port performance in Indonesia to benchmark ports 
within Indonesia. This could be a longer term project which bears similarity to the 
‘PORTOPIA’ project in Europe that benchmarks port performance across a range of indicators. 
These include market trends and structure, socio economic indicators, environmental and 
occupational health, safety and security indicators, logistics chain and operational performance 
indicators, governance indicators and user perception on port quality indicators. This will help 
enhance the competitiveness of the Indonesian port industry. 
 
The possibility of greater consolidations amongst alliances could see vessel size increase to 
30,000 or even 50,000 TEUs by 2067 (McKinsey and Company report 2017). These containers 
would be lifted not by quay cranes but giant gantry cranes for larger ships. The size of 
containers carried by trucks on land could also increase from 53 feet to taller and wider 60 feet 
containers. Self driving trucks, automated operations and digital customs clearance are 
expected to improve productivity at ports. However, this digital transformation of the maritime 
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industry will result in unemployment in labour intensive jobs such as dock workers but could 
also create knowledge based jobs in the maritime sector in data analytics, robotics and artificial 
intelligence. Therefore, further research could measure the impact of digitalisation on the future 
of the maritime labour force in Indonesia and identify policy measures government and 
industry can adopt to retrain and upskill their port labour force. 
 
In conclusion, as global trade in the container market continues to evolve, ports have to 
constantly upgrade their infrastructure, logistics and connections to the hinterland to keep 
ahead of their competitors. As Southeast Asia’s largest economy, there is enormous potential 
and pressure for Indonesia to further improve the performance of its ports, boost economic 
growth and maritime connectivity. This will assist with the transition of Indonesia from a 
middle to high income country. For this to happen, it needs the right balance of political 
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Appendix 1: Public Private Partnership Project Plan in Indonesia 
 
The table below shows the summary of PPP Project Plan in Indonesia for 2017. 
 




Ready to Offer Sanitation/Water Supply Bandar Lampung Water Supply  
81.48 
 Transportation  5996.97 
 Sea Transportation Development of Kabil Port (Tanjung 
Sauh Terminal) Batam 
729.00 
 Sea Transportation Development of Kuala Tanjung 
International Hub Port, North 
Sumatra 
3.67 
 Sea Transportation Development of Bitung International 
Hub Port, Bitung North Sulawesi 
532.00 





Sea Transportation Development of Patimban Port, West 
Java 
3203.00 
 Railway Batam Island Railway Project, Riau 
Islands 
635.00 
Under Preparation Railway Urban Railway City of Medan, North 
Sumatra 
477.40 
 Toll Road and Toll Bridge 1601.00 
 Toll Road Sukabumi – Ciranjang Toll Road 103.00 
 Toll Road The 2nd Jakarta – Cikampek Toll 
Road 
834.00 
 Toll Road Tanjung Priok Access Toll Road 281.00 
 Toll Road Yogyakarta – Solo Toll Road 113.00 
 Toll Road Yogyakarta – Bawen Toll Road 270.00 
 Solid Water and Sanitation       121.23 
 Waste Disposal Final Waste Disposal Site (TPPAS) 
Legok Nangka 
43.73 
 Water Supply Pendok Gede Water Supply, Bekasi, 
West Java 
25.00 
 Water Supply Pekanbaru Water Supply, Riau 35.50 
 Water Treatment Plan Sindang Heula Water Treatment 
Plant 
17.00 
 Telecommunications and Informatics                                                        318.00 
 Satellite Government Multi Functions Satellite 318.00 
 Social 276.10 
 Correctional Institution Nusakambangan Correctional 
Institution 
51.50 
 Sport Sport Facility Papua 38.90 
 Teaching Hospital Sam Ratulangi Teaching Hospital, 
North Sulawesi 
28.70 
 Street Lighting Bandung Street Lighting, West Java 157.00 
 Total                                                                                                                                        8393.88 
Source: Bappenes 2017 (p.26) 
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Appendix 3: Chapter VII of Law no. 17 of 2008 about Shipping  
 
 





































































































1. What was the port governance in Indonesia before the 1992 Shipping Law came in 
place and established Pelindos (Port Authorities)? 
2. How has the governance process change with the 2008 Shipping Law directed at 
driving port reform? 
3. What new changes has the port implemented? 
4. What type of cargo does the port handle? 
5. Could you provide some data on the following indicators over the last 10 years? 
• Dwell Time (The time cargo remains in a terminal's in 
transit storage area while awaiting shipment by clearance transportation) 
• Container Traffic 
• Berth Time 
• Revenue per ton of cargo 
• Cost per ton of cargo 
6. What is the internal structure of the port authority and how has that changed as a 
result of port reform? 
7. What is the aim of the port? (e.g., profit maximisation ) 
8. How does the port promote or markets itself? 
9. What are some of the challenges facing the port? 
10.  What strategies does the port employ to remain competitive internationally? 
 
